The danger of sectarian politics

The danger of sectarian politics

By Santi W.E. Soekanto and Wisnu Pramudya

JAKARTA (JP): Over the one-year period since Soeharto's
resignation in May last year, Indonesian Muslims have been warned
at least twice against allowing the reemergence of "sectarian
politics".

The first occasion was last year when new political parties
mushroomed with dozens declaring Islam as their parties'
ideology. The second warning was strongly delivered by some
political observers and politicians about a week before the June
7 elections. Members of the Indonesian Council of Ulemas (MUI)
and several other Islamic organizations called on Muslims to vote
for parties that "fight for national interests and which field
Muslim legislative candidates".

Tainted by the fact that MUI was less than credible during
Soeharto's regime, as well as early proof of the call's
ineffectiveness given the apparent triumph of the secular
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), the
demand nevertheless drew strong reactions. Amien Rais of the
National Mandate Party (PAN), for instance, expressed concerns
that the call would revive old practices of sectarian politics at
the expense of the reform movement. Abdurrahman Wahid, better
known as Gus Dur, leader of the 30 million-strong Nahdlatul
Ulama, blasted MUI as having meddled in politics by overstepping
its boundaries.

These warnings, sometimes delivered with disdain, have served
at least as a deterrent for some segments of the Muslim community
to express themselves politically. While their secular fellow
Indonesians took advantage of the new political opening brought
about by Soeharto's collapse, some Muslims had to hold themselves
in check.

This move was ironical, because for decades under Soeharto's
New Order regime Muslims were sidelined politically. They were
given only a tiny breathing space in the early 1990s with the
birth of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals
(ICMI). Even then, questions remained whether the apparent
improvement in Soeharto-Muslims ties was because the Muslims
truly had their political rights restored, or because Soeharto,
being the shrewd politician that he was, realized the importance
of playing the Islamic card to perpetuate his power.

To be fair, those who set up Christian parties also received
their own share of admonishment from fellow Christians. Muslim
majority accusations of causing the already pronounced
differences between the sectarians and Muslims became even more
marked. More often than not, the label "sectarian politics"
conjured up an image of bearded Muslim clerics shaking their
fists while delivering fiery speeches against the establishment
or rival religious groups; inciting their audience of angry-
looking Muslims into committing violence.

One of the things that follow concerns about sectarian
politics are worries about fundamentalism. Even Gus Dur, who is
also the founder of the National Awakening Party (PKB),
reportedly said earlier this year that "My biggest enemies are
violence, namely 'right-wing Islam' and Soeharto".

Aside from the fact that Abdurrahman had held a number of
meetings with his "enemy" at the latter's exclusive Cendana
residence, Abdurrahman's use of the expression "right-wing Islam"
may have helped perpetuate the negative image about Muslim
sectarian politics.

Last March, Gus Dur wrote the following for Media Indonesia
daily: "Those who claim to be fighting for the interests of
Muslims through (involvement in) state (affairs) are often
actually fighting for their own political or ideological
interests... They even commit violence, all in the name of
Islam.

"The ultimate example is what's happening in Ambon now. Isn't
it in the name of Islam that the murder and slaughter of
Christians were committed?... What drove them to do such a thing
if not their ideological or political interests?... Doesn't it
mean that Islam was used for the interests of a group?"

Gus Dur's account of the deadly religious clashes in Ambon may
be questionable, but he was voicing fears of Muslims abusing
Islam for their political interests. Rightly or otherwise, Gus
Dur was also again perpetuating the long-standing habit of
pigeon-holing political Muslims with sectarian politics and with
fundamentalism.

How great in fact is the threat of fundamentalism here?
Azyumardi Azra, the rector of the Syarif Hidayatullah Institute
for Islamic Studies in Jakarta, said concerns over Islamic
fundamentalism in Indonesia, triggered by the increased political
activities of Muslims, was in fact the result of "very simplistic
thinking".

In a column in D&R weekly last week he attributed the fear to
the image of militant and radical Muslims in the Middle East, who
fought not only state domination by secular regimes hostile to
Islam, but also the West, which they believed was the patron of
anti-Islamic forces.

Azyumardi said Indonesia had a different sociological and
political environment from that which gave rise to Islamic
radicalism in the Middle East. There was also the matter of
differences in state ideologies, he said.

"Third, the nature of the regimes in power in the Middle East
is different from the regime in Indonesia."

For sociohistorical reasons, Indonesian Muslims tend to be
more accommodating and moderate compared to their Mideast
brethren. Whereas Mideast "radical Muslims" fight alien
ideologies such as secularism (Turkey) and socialism (Egypt,
Iraq) planted in their countries, many Indonesian Muslims see
Pancasila as already religious in nature. Most of the
earlier resistance was not against Pancasila, but against the
power-hungry Soeharto who forced Islamic organizations to accept
it as their "sole ideology".

"The process that gives birth to 'Islamic fundamentalism' is
not as simple as some people may think," said Azyumardi. "Radical
Islamic movements are the product of complex social, historical
and political processes, and often the result of a political
development of our own making ... (which is why we need to)
prevent the emergence of those factors that (contribute) to
Islamic fundamentalism."

Another important point about why the worries over sectarian
politics and Islamic fundamentalism have appeared was the defeat
that religion-based parties suffered in the June 7 elections. The
three Christian parties, also, performed poorly. More Muslims
supported the secular-nationalist PDI Perjuangan.

Most Muslims are actually of the opinion that what they need
is an adequate breathing space. They do not think of taking
power, turning Indonesia into an Islamic state, and forcing
everybody to submit to their religious persuasion. Many are
mature enough to understand this diverse country can be bound
more by tolerance than by force.

It therefore stands to reason that just because some Muslims
now want to have their time in the political sun, we need fewer
warnings about the danger of sectarian politics.

At the risk of being charged with naivete, we assert that
Indonesia also needs less dirty politics, practices which have
been in the forefront lately. The term "dirty politics" may well
be an oxymoron to those who have always equated politics with
corrupt practices and mudslinging.

But if the objective of politics is democratization which
leads to clean governance, it then stands to reason that the
means to achieve the ideals should at least be a little cleaner.
It is what students want, and it is precisely why billions of
rupiah (millions of U.S. dollars) have been spent for the
deployment of some 500,000 poll watch activists from Unfrel, the
Rectors Forum, Anfrel, or KIPP to ensure fair and honest
elections. It is also what many Indonesians living in remote
places wanted to see when they traveled long distances in order
to cast their vote.

It is not certain whether we discovered the profusion of poll
irregularities during the campaigning and voting because there
were more instances now, or because we were prevented from seeing
them under Soeharto's administration.

What is clear is that one needs only to name a stage or a body
involved in the elections and one would find evidence of those
irregularities. There were allegations of corruption of billions
of rupiah involving the General Elections Commission (KPU) and
the National Elections Committee (PPI), for instance. The KPU
recently announced violations committed by almost all parties in
relation to campaign funding.

Intimidation, manipulation, cheating and rigging were reported
at almost all stages of the polls. Examples were the local
officials who threatened rural voters into voting for Golkar, or
the PDI Perjuangan activists who beat up a North Jakarta ulema
who distributed copies of the MUI call. There were also PKB and
United Development Party (PPP) clerics who traded execrations
that would have delighted the entire inhabitants of a zoo --
pigs, goats, dogs, chicken droppings, you name it, the ulemas
said them all.

On top of everything else, we have yet to know whether dirty
politics will rule the day when it is time for the presidential
elections. Some of its stages are particularly vulnerable to
manipulation, including the naming of People's Consultative
Assembly (MPR) representatives from interest groups.

Can politics, Islamic or otherwise, be clean? Some politicians
think so, though they give it different names. Amien Rais, for
instance, once introduced the term "high politics", which he
defined as practices informed by morality and ethics. Only with
high politics could Indonesians fight corruption, social,
economic and political injustices, and give birth to clean and
democratic governance, he said.

"High politics" -- as opposed to "low politics" -- requires at
least three conditions. First, politics should be seen as a
religious mandate or concept; second, there should be an
awareness of political accountability; and third, politics should
be tied to a concept of ukhuwah (brotherhood) regardless of
ethnicity, religious persuasion, or social, economic and cultural
backgrounds.

Nur Mahmudi Ismail, the president of the Justice Party (PK),
proposed "moral politics", which he defined as a commitment to
moral political behavior. He said this could be realized by
shifting the political discourse from merely a competition for
power to a contest for the implementation of programs.

The second condition needed was to change state institutions
from power-perpetuating bureaucratic machines into servants of
the people. After all, Prophet Muhammad once said "the best
leaders among you are those who serve people the best".

Nur Mahmudi said the third requirement for moral politics was
justice and honesty.

The writers are journalists.