The danger of sectarian politics

By Santi W.E. Soekanto and Wisnu Pramudya

JAKARTA (JP): Over the one-year period since Soeharto's resignation in May last year, Indonesian Muslims have been warned at least twice against allowing the reemergence of "sectarian politics".

The first occasion was last year when new political parties mushroomed with dozens declaring Islam as their parties' ideology. The second warning was strongly delivered by some political observers and politicians about a week before the June 7 elections. Members of the Indonesian Council of Ulemas (MUI) and several other Islamic organizations called on Muslims to vote for parties that "fight for national interests and which field Muslim legislative candidates".

Tainted by the fact that MUI was less than credible during Soeharto's regime, as well as early proof of the call's ineffectiveness given the apparent triumph of the secular Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), the demand nevertheless drew strong reactions. Amien Rais of the National Mandate Party (PAN), for instance, expressed concerns that the call would revive old practices of sectarian politics at the expense of the reform movement. Abdurrahman Wahid, better known as Gus Dur, leader of the 30 million-strong Nahdlatul Ulama, blasted MUI as having meddled in politics by overstepping its boundaries.

These warnings, sometimes delivered with disdain, have served at least as a deterrent for some segments of the Muslim community to express themselves politically. While their secular fellow Indonesians took advantage of the new political opening brought about by Soeharto's collapse, some Muslims had to hold themselves in check.

This move was ironical, because for decades under Soeharto's New Order regime Muslims were sidelined politically. They were given only a tiny breathing space in the early 1990s with the birth of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI). Even then, questions remained whether the apparent improvement in Soeharto-Muslims ties was because the Muslims truly had their political rights restored, or because Soeharto, being the shrewd politician that he was, realized the importance of playing the Islamic card to perpetuate his power.

To be fair, those who set up Christian parties also received their own share of admonishment from fellow Christians. Muslim majority accusations of causing the already pronounced differences between the sectarians and Muslims became even more marked. More often than not, the label "sectarian politics" conjured up an image of bearded Muslim clerics shaking their fists while delivering fiery speeches against the establishment or rival religious groups; inciting their audience of angry- looking Muslims into committing violence.

One of the things that follow concerns about sectarian politics are worries about fundamentalism. Even Gus Dur, who is also the founder of the National Awakening Party (PKB), reportedly said earlier this year that "My biggest enemies are violence, namely 'right-wing Islam' and Soeharto".

Aside from the fact that Abdurrahman had held a number of meetings with his "enemy" at the latter's exclusive Cendana residence, Abdurrahman's use of the expression "right-wing Islam" may have helped perpetuate the negative image about Muslim sectarian politics.

Last March, Gus Dur wrote the following for Media Indonesia daily: "Those who claim to be fighting for the interests of Muslims through (involvement in) state (affairs) are often actually fighting for their own political or ideological interests... They even commit violence, all in the name of Islam.

"The ultimate example is what's happening in Ambon now. Isn't it in the name of Islam that the murder and slaughter of Christians were committed?... What drove them to do such a thing if not their ideological or political interests?... Doesn't it mean that Islam was used for the interests of a group?"

Gus Dur's account of the deadly religious clashes in Ambon may be questionable, but he was voicing fears of Muslims abusing Islam for their political interests. Rightly or otherwise, Gus Dur was also again perpetuating the long-standing habit of pigeon-holing political Muslims with sectarian politics and with fundamentalism.

How great in fact is the threat of fundamentalism here? Azyumardi Azra, the rector of the Syarif Hidayatullah Institute for Islamic Studies in Jakarta, said concerns over Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia, triggered by the increased political activities of Muslims, was in fact the result of "very simplistic thinking".

In a column in D&R weekly last week he attributed the fear to the image of militant and radical Muslims in the Middle East, who fought not only state domination by secular regimes hostile to Islam, but also the West, which they believed was the patron of anti-Islamic forces.

Azyumardi said Indonesia had a different sociological and political environment from that which gave rise to Islamic radicalism in the Middle East. There was also the matter of differences in state ideologies, he said.

"Third, the nature of the regimes in power in the Middle East is different from the regime in Indonesia."

For sociohistorical reasons, Indonesian Muslims tend to be more accommodating and moderate compared to their Mideast brethren. Whereas Mideast "radical Muslims" fight alien ideologies such as secularism (Turkey) and socialism (Egypt, Iraq) planted in their countries, many Indonesian Muslims see Pancasila as already religious in nature. Most of the earlier resistance was not against Pancasila, but against the power-hungry Soeharto who forced Islamic organizations to accept it as their "sole ideology".

"The process that gives birth to 'Islamic fundamentalism' is not as simple as some people may think," said Azyumardi. "Radical Islamic movements are the product of complex social, historical and political processes, and often the result of a political development of our own making ... (which is why we need to) prevent the emergence of those factors that (contribute) to Islamic fundamentalism."

Another important point about why the worries over sectarian politics and Islamic fundamentalism have appeared was the defeat that religion-based parties suffered in the June 7 elections. The three Christian parties, also, performed poorly. More Muslims supported the secular-nationalist PDI Perjuangan.

Most Muslims are actually of the opinion that what they need is an adequate breathing space. They do not think of taking power, turning Indonesia into an Islamic state, and forcing everybody to submit to their religious persuasion. Many are mature enough to understand this diverse country can be bound more by tolerance than by force.

It therefore stands to reason that just because some Muslims now want to have their time in the political sun, we need fewer warnings about the danger of sectarian politics.

At the risk of being charged with naivete, we assert that Indonesia also needs less dirty politics, practices which have been in the forefront lately. The term "dirty politics" may well be an oxymoron to those who have always equated politics with corrupt practices and mudslinging.

But if the objective of politics is democratization which leads to clean governance, it then stands to reason that the means to achieve the ideals should at least be a little cleaner. It is what students want, and it is precisely why billions of rupiah (millions of U.S. dollars) have been spent for the deployment of some 500,000 poll watch activists from Unfrel, the Rectors Forum, Anfrel, or KIPP to ensure fair and honest elections. It is also what many Indonesians living in remote places wanted to see when they traveled long distances in order to cast their vote.

It is not certain whether we discovered the profusion of poll irregularities during the campaigning and voting because there were more instances now, or because we were prevented from seeing them under Soeharto's administration.

What is clear is that one needs only to name a stage or a body involved in the elections and one would find evidence of those irregularities. There were allegations of corruption of billions of rupiah involving the General Elections Commission (KPU) and the National Elections Committee (PPI), for instance. The KPU recently announced violations committed by almost all parties in relation to campaign funding.

Intimidation, manipulation, cheating and rigging were reported at almost all stages of the polls. Examples were the local officials who threatened rural voters into voting for Golkar, or the PDI Perjuangan activists who beat up a North Jakarta ulema who distributed copies of the MUI call. There were also PKB and United Development Party (PPP) clerics who traded execrations that would have delighted the entire inhabitants of a zoo -- pigs, goats, dogs, chicken droppings, you name it, the ulemas said them all.

On top of everything else, we have yet to know whether dirty politics will rule the day when it is time for the presidential elections. Some of its stages are particularly vulnerable to manipulation, including the naming of People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) representatives from interest groups.

Can politics, Islamic or otherwise, be clean? Some politicians think so, though they give it different names. Amien Rais, for instance, once introduced the term "high politics", which he defined as practices informed by morality and ethics. Only with high politics could Indonesians fight corruption, social, economic and political injustices, and give birth to clean and democratic governance, he said.

"High politics" -- as opposed to "low politics" -- requires at least three conditions. First, politics should be seen as a religious mandate or concept; second, there should be an awareness of political accountability; and third, politics should be tied to a concept of ukhuwah (brotherhood) regardless of ethnicity, religious persuasion, or social, economic and cultural backgrounds.

Nur Mahmudi Ismail, the president of the Justice Party (PK), proposed "moral politics", which he defined as a commitment to moral political behavior. He said this could be realized by shifting the political discourse from merely a competition for power to a contest for the implementation of programs.

The second condition needed was to change state institutions from power-perpetuating bureaucratic machines into servants of the people. After all, Prophet Muhammad once said "the best leaders among you are those who serve people the best".

Nur Mahmudi said the third requirement for moral politics was justice and honesty.

The writers are journalists.