The Cold War may be reignited

The Cold War may be reignited

By Muhammad Takdir

JAKARTA (JP): On consecutive days in mid-March 1999, the
Senate and House voted in Capitol Hill to endorse the national
missile defense system. Their votes signified the closest
deployment of the most advanced technology in missile defense
technology since President Ronald Reagan delivered his famous
star wars speech in 1983. America's drive to develop missile
defense weapons systems is putting Washington in high voltage and
controversial positions, both domestically and abroad. However,
the two votes move the U.S. one step closer to deployment of the
missiles and increase pressure on the Clinton administration to
decide in June 2000 to commit to deployment.

Development of the program reflects strong aspirations within
the U.S. national budget, submitted by President Bill Clinton to
Congress on Feb. 1, 1999. The budget requested an extra US$6.5
billion for more work on the national missile defense system over
the next six years, bringing the total earmarked for the system
to $10.5 billion between now and 2005. The Senate and House votes
ensure the program is politically visible by presenting and
mandating the national missile defense deployment "as soon as it
is technologically feasible".

Besides the National Missile Defense (NMD) system, programs
also stress the importance of study and research in the
deployment of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems. As deployed
in the 1991 Gulf War, the latter is designed to neutralize a
strike on U.S. forces or their allies by destroying incoming
enemy missiles, either against medium or short-range missiles.

The Clinton administration has announced steps to advance the
TMD program by proposing joint-research projects between Japan
and the U.S., with Japan earmarking about $8 million for TMD
research and development programs. Most international observers
speculate that the missile defense shield might be extended to
involve Taiwan and South Korea in the process of achieving its
ultimate goal.

As Josep L. Galloway said, the Clinton calculation regarding
the program is not hard to follow (see Seeking a Silver Bullet,
U.S. News & World Report, March 29, 1999). The recent China spy
scandal in Los Alamos and the successful North Korean missile
test in Aug. 31, 1998, raised the stakes for the U.S. and opened
a bag full of questions. In terms of domestic political
objectives, we can say that Clinton -- ever-deft at catching
late-breaking waves and co-opting conservative initiatives
(Senator Thad Cohran, a Republican from Mississippi, introduced
the bill mandating deployment of NMD systems) -- withdrew his
long-standing threat to veto a missile defense bill. Everybody
knows it was President Clinton who "killed" star wars in a
flourish upon taking office in 1992.

In a statement responding to the congressional endorsement of
ballistic missile defense, Clinton expressed gratitude that the
Senate, on a bipartisan basis, included in its NMD legislation
two amendments which significantly changed the original bill
which he strongly opposed. Clinton emphasized the growing danger
of what he called "outlaw nations" developing and deploying long-
range missiles that could deliver weapons and cause mass
destruction against the U.S. and its allies.

Although Clinton called the program a "limited NMD" against
these threats, disassociating the approach from the star wars
program, he was clearly disposed to the new policy. Such a stance
is fraught with political danger and international risk,
especially when we consider that arms-control negotiations with
Russia may be thrown into jeopardy.

Clinton himself aligned the program with achieving U.S. arms-
control objectives, including negotiating any amendments to the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty signed by the U.S. and the
Soviet Union in 1972 that may be required to accommodate possible
NMD deployment. But the point is, can the U.S. guarantee that
Russia's political and military leaders will agree to sharply
reduce strategic nuclear missiles, in the absence of the ABM
treaty's constraints on defense against those missiles?

Reasons proffered among the politicians, both Republicans and
Democrats, in Capitol Hill, were that the ABM treaty is a
historical irrelevancy, a Cold War anachronism which should be
abandoned. In response to this viewpoint, Russia's President
Boris Yeltzin has repeatedly stated that Russia will not reduce
its nuclear arsenal unless the U.S. adheres to the ABM treaty.
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Yvanov, said that further cuts in
strategic offensive weapons can be made if there is a clear
vision of preserving and observing the treaty.

The question now is that if the Senate defeats the ABM treaty
protocols negotiated between Moscow and Washington, is there any
possibility the treaty will become null and void? In March 1999,
the Russian Duma took an encouraging step toward obtaining final
approval of START II. However, I am not sure whether the Russians
want to move ahead on the START III framework -- a blueprint
negotiated between Clinton and Yeltzin in 1997 to cut Russian and
U.S. arsenals by 80 percent from Cold War levels -- while
maintaining the ABM treaty as a cornerstone of strategic
stability, as Clinton wishes.

What becomes clear from that picture, is that U.S. programs on
missile defense deployment could start a new arms race, re-
igniting the Cold War after burying it nine years ago. The
programs would certainly antagonize other nuclear powers such as
Russia and China, causing them to retain or develop additional
long-range missiles that could evade or overcome such a defense.

Aside from the continuing debate in which missile defense
deployment as a political issue has achieved critical mass, the
future of the programs, both in terms of NMD and TMD deployment,
is not as promising, given the long history of antimissile system
failures. The $5 billion spent by the U.S. government in the
1960s bought a system that shut down only five months after
commencing operation. Analysts said the reasons were simple:
things did not work as the U.S. had expected and it cost too much
to operate.

Another $55 billion spent on star wars in the 1980s ironically
produced similar results and met a similar end. John Pike of the
Federation of American Scientists, a leading missile-defense
expert and critic said: "They have not been able to get these
things to work. One big problem they face is that the critical
technology -- using heat-seeking sensors to intercept missiles --
has a terrible track record. There have been 15 hit-to-kill tests
since 1980. In only two did the test interceptor hit something".

Finding a technology that works, at a price even the richest
nation in the world can afford, has always been the underlying
problem with antimissile defense systems. Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Gen. Henry Shelton, in an interview with Sea
Power Magazine in February 1999, acknowledges the technological
difficulties.

Shelton said that it was a simple fact that the U.S. does not
yet have the technology to field a NMD. "We have, in fact, put
some $40 billion into the program over the last 10 years. But
today we do not technologically have a bullet that can hit a
bullet." Even after more than 40 years of research -- and
spending over $100 billion -- intercepting ballistic missile
warheads remains a major technological hurdle.

Disregarding the program's technical and political barriers,
Washington keeps putting the plan on the table and authorizing
spending whatever it takes to develop an antimissile defense
system over the next six years. It appears determined despite
leaks that it does not work or has not proven itself, the cost to
taxpayers, its impact on global stability and its effectiveness
in operation.

The Cohran Bill which backs up the system, is just like a
blank check for any defense contractor interested in and capable
of functioning the system. Defense contractors under Boeing Co --
one of the Pentagon's close working partners -- have until June
2000 to coordinate a program of four flight tests. At the same
time, Clinton will review whether the system can be put into
operation or should remain in research. Whatever the result,
perhaps the deployment of a missile defense system, as in the
star wars program, is not only fiscally irresponsible, but also
represents a false sense of security among U.S. policy makers.

Indeed, this is the chance for key global actors, including
the U.S., to begin the 21st century with large concessions and
agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. Such
a scenario is most likely further than a dream, unless the U.S.
can find a way to protect their interests by not developing a
massive missile defense system.

The writer works at the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. He has written this article in a personal capacity.

Window: ...the deployment of a missile defense system, as in the
star wars program, is not only fiscally irresponsible, but also
represents a false sense of security among U.S. policy makers.