The Cold War may be reignited

By Muhammad Takdir

JAKARTA (JP): On consecutive days in mid-March 1999, the Senate and House voted in Capitol Hill to endorse the national missile defense system. Their votes signified the closest deployment of the most advanced technology in missile defense technology since President Ronald Reagan delivered his famous star wars speech in 1983. America's drive to develop missile defense weapons systems is putting Washington in high voltage and controversial positions, both domestically and abroad. However, the two votes move the U.S. one step closer to deployment of the missiles and increase pressure on the Clinton administration to decide in June 2000 to commit to deployment.

Development of the program reflects strong aspirations within the U.S. national budget, submitted by President Bill Clinton to Congress on Feb. 1, 1999. The budget requested an extra US$6.5 billion for more work on the national missile defense system over the next six years, bringing the total earmarked for the system to $10.5 billion between now and 2005. The Senate and House votes ensure the program is politically visible by presenting and mandating the national missile defense deployment "as soon as it is technologically feasible".

Besides the National Missile Defense (NMD) system, programs also stress the importance of study and research in the deployment of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems. As deployed in the 1991 Gulf War, the latter is designed to neutralize a strike on U.S. forces or their allies by destroying incoming enemy missiles, either against medium or short-range missiles.

The Clinton administration has announced steps to advance the TMD program by proposing joint-research projects between Japan and the U.S., with Japan earmarking about $8 million for TMD research and development programs. Most international observers speculate that the missile defense shield might be extended to involve Taiwan and South Korea in the process of achieving its ultimate goal.

As Josep L. Galloway said, the Clinton calculation regarding the program is not hard to follow (see Seeking a Silver Bullet, U.S. News & World Report, March 29, 1999). The recent China spy scandal in Los Alamos and the successful North Korean missile test in Aug. 31, 1998, raised the stakes for the U.S. and opened a bag full of questions. In terms of domestic political objectives, we can say that Clinton -- ever-deft at catching late-breaking waves and co-opting conservative initiatives (Senator Thad Cohran, a Republican from Mississippi, introduced the bill mandating deployment of NMD systems) -- withdrew his long-standing threat to veto a missile defense bill. Everybody knows it was President Clinton who "killed" star wars in a flourish upon taking office in 1992.

In a statement responding to the congressional endorsement of ballistic missile defense, Clinton expressed gratitude that the Senate, on a bipartisan basis, included in its NMD legislation two amendments which significantly changed the original bill which he strongly opposed. Clinton emphasized the growing danger of what he called "outlaw nations" developing and deploying long- range missiles that could deliver weapons and cause mass destruction against the U.S. and its allies.

Although Clinton called the program a "limited NMD" against these threats, disassociating the approach from the star wars program, he was clearly disposed to the new policy. Such a stance is fraught with political danger and international risk, especially when we consider that arms-control negotiations with Russia may be thrown into jeopardy.

Clinton himself aligned the program with achieving U.S. arms- control objectives, including negotiating any amendments to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty signed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union in 1972 that may be required to accommodate possible NMD deployment. But the point is, can the U.S. guarantee that Russia's political and military leaders will agree to sharply reduce strategic nuclear missiles, in the absence of the ABM treaty's constraints on defense against those missiles?

Reasons proffered among the politicians, both Republicans and Democrats, in Capitol Hill, were that the ABM treaty is a historical irrelevancy, a Cold War anachronism which should be abandoned. In response to this viewpoint, Russia's President Boris Yeltzin has repeatedly stated that Russia will not reduce its nuclear arsenal unless the U.S. adheres to the ABM treaty. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Yvanov, said that further cuts in strategic offensive weapons can be made if there is a clear vision of preserving and observing the treaty.

The question now is that if the Senate defeats the ABM treaty protocols negotiated between Moscow and Washington, is there any possibility the treaty will become null and void? In March 1999, the Russian Duma took an encouraging step toward obtaining final approval of START II. However, I am not sure whether the Russians want to move ahead on the START III framework -- a blueprint negotiated between Clinton and Yeltzin in 1997 to cut Russian and U.S. arsenals by 80 percent from Cold War levels -- while maintaining the ABM treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability, as Clinton wishes.

What becomes clear from that picture, is that U.S. programs on missile defense deployment could start a new arms race, re- igniting the Cold War after burying it nine years ago. The programs would certainly antagonize other nuclear powers such as Russia and China, causing them to retain or develop additional long-range missiles that could evade or overcome such a defense.

Aside from the continuing debate in which missile defense deployment as a political issue has achieved critical mass, the future of the programs, both in terms of NMD and TMD deployment, is not as promising, given the long history of antimissile system failures. The $5 billion spent by the U.S. government in the 1960s bought a system that shut down only five months after commencing operation. Analysts said the reasons were simple: things did not work as the U.S. had expected and it cost too much to operate.

Another $55 billion spent on star wars in the 1980s ironically produced similar results and met a similar end. John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists, a leading missile-defense expert and critic said: "They have not been able to get these things to work. One big problem they face is that the critical technology -- using heat-seeking sensors to intercept missiles -- has a terrible track record. There have been 15 hit-to-kill tests since 1980. In only two did the test interceptor hit something".

Finding a technology that works, at a price even the richest nation in the world can afford, has always been the underlying problem with antimissile defense systems. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Henry Shelton, in an interview with Sea Power Magazine in February 1999, acknowledges the technological difficulties.

Shelton said that it was a simple fact that the U.S. does not yet have the technology to field a NMD. "We have, in fact, put some $40 billion into the program over the last 10 years. But today we do not technologically have a bullet that can hit a bullet." Even after more than 40 years of research -- and spending over $100 billion -- intercepting ballistic missile warheads remains a major technological hurdle.

Disregarding the program's technical and political barriers, Washington keeps putting the plan on the table and authorizing spending whatever it takes to develop an antimissile defense system over the next six years. It appears determined despite leaks that it does not work or has not proven itself, the cost to taxpayers, its impact on global stability and its effectiveness in operation.

The Cohran Bill which backs up the system, is just like a blank check for any defense contractor interested in and capable of functioning the system. Defense contractors under Boeing Co -- one of the Pentagon's close working partners -- have until June 2000 to coordinate a program of four flight tests. At the same time, Clinton will review whether the system can be put into operation or should remain in research. Whatever the result, perhaps the deployment of a missile defense system, as in the star wars program, is not only fiscally irresponsible, but also represents a false sense of security among U.S. policy makers.

Indeed, this is the chance for key global actors, including the U.S., to begin the 21st century with large concessions and agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. Such a scenario is most likely further than a dream, unless the U.S. can find a way to protect their interests by not developing a massive missile defense system.

The writer works at the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He has written this article in a personal capacity.

Window: ...the deployment of a missile defense system, as in the star wars program, is not only fiscally irresponsible, but also represents a false sense of security among U.S. policy makers.