The cheapening of loyalty, Indonesian style

Aguswandi, Researcher, The Indonesian Human Rights Campaign (TAPOL), London

In Aceh, the price of loyalty to the unitary state of Indonesia is not very expensive after all. It is equal to only the two cows and a small amount of cash given out by Aceh's governor, Abdullah Puteh, at each rally held to demonstrate the loyalty of Acehnese to the Republic of Indonesia.

There is nothing extraordinary about bribery in Indonesia. It has long been a feature of society and will continue to be as it seems there is nobody who can stop it. But, in Aceh it has taken on a novel form. It is bribery in exchange for loyalty to the government of Indonesia. The present governor of Aceh is the man in charge of organizing this mass purchase of loyalty.

So far, it seems he has done the job well, especially if one's definition is the number of people who turn up at each loyalty rally in Aceh. It might be because he has plenty of experience with such tactics. According to local sources, the same methods were used to get him in the governorship. It also explains how, even though his party, Golkar, did not win a majority of votes in Aceh, he was elected governor (by the local legislature). As a member of Golkar and an established New Order-ite before that regime was brought down, he is surely very knowledgeable about strategies for winning the hearts and minds of people in this way.

In the latest public meeting in Aceh Besar on Jan. 18, 2004, the governor generously asked the crowd -- who were not invited, so much as they were compelled to attend the declaration rally for the Red and White Youth Movement (GPMP) -- who among them needed money for modal usaha (a business venture). The lucky ones selected from among the crowd were awarded two cows and a pocketful of money. As in many other provinces, it seems Puteh likes to display Indonesian generosity in public.

As with more conventional forms of bribery, the briber demands something in return. In Aceh, that is their loyalty to the nation state of Indonesia, their willingness to condemn GAM (the Free Aceh Movement) in many public meetings and their willingness to join one of the new militia gangs designed to oppose the separatists.

However, if this is the kind of loyalty that Jakarta wants in Aceh right now, it seems it is easy enough to get. This is particularly true since the conflict has resulted in extreme increases of unemployment and poverty. Aceh is becoming one of the poorest places in Indonesia. The impact of the conflict on unemployment and poverty rates in Aceh is appalling.

The governor himself has admitted that 40 percent of Aceh's 4.2 million people are now living below the poverty line. For many ordinary Acehnese, economic life in Aceh is a disaster. The war has not only killed thousands of people, but has destroyed many critical sources of income.

However, apparently poverty in Aceh is not a problem for some, because it has certain advantages. It offers certain solutions. With the government's closure of Aceh to foreign aid workers, all economic aid must pass through a single source: A corrupt, local government and military officials. The governor knows that the truly desperate poor Acehnese will surrender their identity and beliefs in exchange for short-term relief from poverty.

Indeed, this is the very point of martial law and the military operations in Aceh. Poverty and unemployment are a part of the strategy to create total economic and political control that can be manipulated to create equally total local dependence on the government. Such total dependence upon Jakarta, it is reasoned, should lead to total loyalty.

Invariably, villagers have been forced to attend the loyalty ceremonies. Now, as well as being compulsory, the parades are also occasions for a small number of the lucky draw winners to get aid from the governor and officials. This is seen as a perfect combination: The military drives the people to the loyalty ceremonies through fear, and the government leaders offer a chance for a cash/cow incentive to drive the fear away.

As a result, Aceh is becoming a place where the locals endlessly celebrate their allegiance to Unitary Republic of Indonesia. Almost everyday, there are ceremonies to celebrate Indonesia. The number of people turning up is always extraordinary; rarely dipping below 10,000. And the governor of Aceh is becoming almost like a priest at a mass confession.

Everyday, he listens to the Acehnese "sinners" repent for their lack of faith in Jakarta. Almost everyday, the "priest" performs ceremonies for people to convert them to the Indonesian faith. National anthems are sung loudly by Acehnese and the Merah Putih (Red and White flag) is seen in all directions. The Acehnese are becoming more Indonesian than the rest of Indonesia. They even have a Merah Putih identity card.

But is this not all so very superficial? Who cares? Does Jakarta actually need Aceh for superficial reasons? Jakarta's leaders would say this kind of "loyalty" helps during elections, and for other political purposes, but particularly for keeping the huge map of Indonesia intact. And those things go hand in hand with Jakarta's need for Aceh's oil, forests and other valuable natural resources. The corrupt government in Aceh, the military, and the disgraceful politicians in Jakarta have never really wanted to know what the Acehnese think and believe deep in their hearts.

And now, as the conflict intensifies along with the poverty and misery of the local people, the price of loyalty to Indonesia is getting even cheaper. While ordinary Acehnese get meager cash handouts during loyalty parades and ceremonies, the governor and military are earning Mega-bucks by cutting down the forests, smuggling in quantities of luxury cars and controlling almost all business activities under martial law.