The challenge of political Islam to Megawati

Azyumardi Azra, Rector State Islamic Studies Institute (IAIN), Jakarta, Part 2 of 2

Polemics on the relationships between Islam and politics, and Islam and democracy in the nation-state have once again come to the fore in Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto. This has much to do with the rise of "political Islam", one of the most visible political developments in post-Soeharto Indonesia.

Many believe that the rise of political Islam, represented by so many "Islamic parties", will bring serious political repercussions to the future of the Indonesian state, which until today has been based on Pancasila.

Despite the fact that the first pillar of Pancasila is belief in One Supreme God, many, if not most, foreign observers perceive this Indonesian basis for the state as essentially secular. This argument is further supported by the fact that Indonesia has not adopted any particular religion -- notably not Islam, as the religion most Indonesian adhere to -- as the official religion of the state.

Yet, most Muslims love to argue that the Indonesian state is neither secular nor theocratic. For them Pancasila is fully in accord with Islamic beliefs and teachings. The first point in Pancasila, for instance, is simply another reformulation of the Islamic belief in One Supreme God (tauhid).

A number of groups in the past attempted to replace Pancasila with Islam as the basis of the Indonesian state. In the 1950s the Masjumi Party struggled in parliament to do so. Then came the Darul Islam (Islamic State) rebellions under the leadership of Kartosuwirjo in West Java and Daud Bereueh in Aceh, which attempted to establish the Indonesian Islamic State (Negara Islam Indonesia). All these efforts failed.

Suspicions among non-Muslim groups, mainly Christians and secular circles, that Muslims would continue their struggle to establish an Islamic state at the expense of other groups of citizens, have persisted.

Successive regimes took harsh measures, not only against any potential group that subscribed to the idea of an Islamic state, but also against any dangerous manifestation of political Islam.

After Soeharto's fall in 1999, some 40 "Islamic parties" were set up; 20 of them passed the selection to participate in the 1999 general elections.

Their prospects were very doubtful. First, these parties have only caused acute political fragmentation, leading to confusion among Muslims at the grassroots level. Open fighting occurred among fanatic supporters of the Islamic parties, even among members of the largest organization Nahdlatul Ulama, who supported different parties.

Second, these Islamic parties became trapped in the romanticism of Islamic politics and "illusions" of the support of the country's population, which is 87 percent Muslim.

Third, they seemed to have underestimated both Megawati Soekarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan), and Golkar, founded by Soeharto. Many leaders believed that PDI Perjuangan would not get many votes because of the gender issue, and doubts about Megawati's capability. The Muslim leaders also underestimated Golkar for its connections with Soeharto. PDI Perjuangan won the largest block of votes, followed by Golkar.

The 20 Islamic parties took only 37.1 percent of the total votes between them. In 1955, Islamic parties won 43.9 percent of the total national votes. Many Muslims became worried that the election results marked the end of Islamic politics.

So what is the prospect for the Islamic parties, or even political Islam? How viable is the idea of stronger and formal connections between Islam and the Indonesian nation-state?

First, the elections again confirmed that Islamic parties have never been very popular among Indonesian Muslims. One most important reason is that most Muslims here lean more to "substantive Islam" than "formalistic Islam".

Therefore, there are no convincing signs that the majority of Muslims support the idea of formal Islamic politics. Nobody among prominent Muslim political leaders subscribes to the idea or aims to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia at the expense of Pancasila. Leaders, such as Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Deliar Noer, Ahmad Sumargono, Muhaimin Iskandar, Nur Mahmudi Ismail, AM Fatwa, Salahuddin Wahid and many others, have declared that they and their parties do not aim to establish an Islamic state.

Amien Rais, former chief leader of the Muhammadiyah, now Speaker of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), and former president Abdurrahman, have long considered the idea of an Islamic state as having no precedent in Islamic history.

Amien argues that there is no religious obligation for Muslims to establish one. Nur Mahmudi, first president of the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan) -- which is considered to represent a new spirit of contemporary Islamic political revival -- also maintains that the most important thing in Islam is the substance, not the formality.

The indication of the unpopularity of formal Islam among Muslims here shares similarities with the growing appeals regarding the application of syariah, Islamic law, in Indonesia. The idea and appeal of this application dates back to the early days surrounding independence.

Muslim leaders introduced to the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution ("the Indonesian state is based on the belief in One, Supreme God"), the obligation that adherents of Islam implement syariah. This stipulation is known in Indonesia as "the seven words" of the Piagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter).

Before long this stipulation was dropped, following objections from Christian leaders and "secular nationalists", who argued that the Constitution should not give preferential treatment to any religious group. Furthermore, the Constitution should maintain the integration of national plurality.

The moves for the introduction of Islamic law increased in the period surrounding the 2000 MPR annual session. The United Development Party (PPP) and others declared their support for the reinclusion of the Jakarta Charter, which would have allowed the application of Islamic law.

The move was strongly opposed by most MPR members, and the issue of the syariah application once again failed within the highest political institution.

Outside the MPR, groups like the Laskar Jihad, Islam Defenders Front (FPI) and other similar groups continue to seek the application of Islamic law.

In the name of Islamic law they have attacked nightclubs, discotheques, and alleged brothels. The rise of these groups seems to have more to do with the government's failure to enforce the law, thus leading them to take the law into their own hands. As long as the government is weak, these groups will hold sway at certain times and places to engage in the principle of "encouraging good, prohibiting evil" (amar ma'ruf nahi munkar) in their own way.

The reasons for the unpopularity of the demands of such groups are clear: First, hard-line groups are only splinter groups from the vast majority of the Muslim mainstream. The nature of Indonesian Islam, which is basically tolerant and peaceful, will prevent these groups from exerting significant influence.

If Indonesia succeeds in reestablishing political stability and economic recovery, the social, economic and political disorientation and radical tendencies of Muslims will tend to decrease.

Second, most moderate Muslims continue to support President Megawati, some for the practical reason that she should be given a fair chance to lead the nation out of the crisis. Many have refrained from strong criticism of her, since this would only provoke hard-liners further to question her legitimacy and ability to lead the country.

One example is Amien, who vigorously criticized former presidents B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid.

Not least is the changing attitude of Vice President Hamzah Haz. In the case of the U.S.-led attacks on Afghanistan, he has been criticized for his unclear and conflicting statements. Some even believe a split occurred between him and the President. This observation has some truth, but that is not the whole story.

We have to admit that there is some suspicion within certain circles towards Hamzah. He is the national leader of the United Development Party (PPP), which is known for its support of the reintroduction of the Jakarta Charter.

However his more recent comments suggest adjustments and compromises, not only to the reality of Indonesian politics, but also to President Megawati.

Megawati will survive the challenges posed by Muslim hard-line groups. But, at the same time, she could be distracted by their continued threatening activities, which, in the end, could affect her ability to lead Indonesia toward political stability and economic recovery.

The above is based on the writer's presentation to the Joint Public Forum on Indonesia, held by Singapore's Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Jakarta's Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Singapore on Nov. 1.