The challenge of political Islam to Megawati

The challenge of political Islam to Megawati

Azyumardi Azra, Rector State Islamic Studies Institute (IAIN),
Jakarta, Part 2 of 2

Polemics on the relationships between Islam and politics, and
Islam and democracy in the nation-state have once again come to
the fore in Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto. This has much
to do with the rise of "political Islam", one of the most visible
political developments in post-Soeharto Indonesia.

Many believe that the rise of political Islam, represented by
so many "Islamic parties", will bring serious political
repercussions to the future of the Indonesian state, which until
today has been based on Pancasila.

Despite the fact that the first pillar of Pancasila is belief
in One Supreme God, many, if not most, foreign observers perceive
this Indonesian basis for the state as essentially secular. This
argument is further supported by the fact that Indonesia has not
adopted any particular religion -- notably not Islam, as the
religion most Indonesian adhere to -- as the official religion of
the state.

Yet, most Muslims love to argue that the Indonesian state is
neither secular nor theocratic. For them Pancasila is fully in
accord with Islamic beliefs and teachings. The first point in
Pancasila, for instance, is simply another reformulation of the
Islamic belief in One Supreme God (tauhid).

A number of groups in the past attempted to replace Pancasila
with Islam as the basis of the Indonesian state. In the 1950s the
Masjumi Party struggled in parliament to do so. Then came the
Darul Islam (Islamic State) rebellions under the leadership of
Kartosuwirjo in West Java and Daud Bereueh in Aceh, which
attempted to establish the Indonesian Islamic State (Negara Islam
Indonesia). All these efforts failed.

Suspicions among non-Muslim groups, mainly Christians and
secular circles, that Muslims would continue their struggle to
establish an Islamic state at the expense of other groups of
citizens, have persisted.

Successive regimes took harsh measures, not only against any
potential group that subscribed to the idea of an Islamic state,
but also against any dangerous manifestation of political Islam.

After Soeharto's fall in 1999, some 40 "Islamic parties" were
set up; 20 of them passed the selection to participate in the
1999 general elections.

Their prospects were very doubtful. First, these parties have
only caused acute political fragmentation, leading to confusion
among Muslims at the grassroots level. Open fighting occurred
among fanatic supporters of the Islamic parties, even among
members of the largest organization Nahdlatul Ulama, who
supported different parties.

Second, these Islamic parties became trapped in the
romanticism of Islamic politics and "illusions" of the support of
the country's population, which is 87 percent Muslim.

Third, they seemed to have underestimated both Megawati
Soekarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI
Perjuangan), and Golkar, founded by Soeharto. Many leaders
believed that PDI Perjuangan would not get many votes because of
the gender issue, and doubts about Megawati's capability. The
Muslim leaders also underestimated Golkar for its connections
with Soeharto. PDI Perjuangan won the largest block of votes,
followed by Golkar.

The 20 Islamic parties took only 37.1 percent of the total
votes between them. In 1955, Islamic parties won 43.9 percent of
the total national votes. Many Muslims became worried that the
election results marked the end of Islamic politics.

So what is the prospect for the Islamic parties, or even
political Islam? How viable is the idea of stronger and formal
connections between Islam and the Indonesian nation-state?

First, the elections again confirmed that Islamic parties have
never been very popular among Indonesian Muslims. One most
important reason is that most Muslims here lean more to
"substantive Islam" than "formalistic Islam".

Therefore, there are no convincing signs that the majority of
Muslims support the idea of formal Islamic politics. Nobody among
prominent Muslim political leaders subscribes to the idea or aims
to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia at the expense of
Pancasila. Leaders, such as Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Deliar Noer,
Ahmad Sumargono, Muhaimin Iskandar, Nur Mahmudi Ismail, AM Fatwa,
Salahuddin Wahid and many others, have declared that they and
their parties do not aim to establish an Islamic state.

Amien Rais, former chief leader of the Muhammadiyah, now
Speaker of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), and former
president Abdurrahman, have long considered the idea of an
Islamic state as having no precedent in Islamic history.

Amien argues that there is no religious obligation for Muslims
to establish one. Nur Mahmudi, first president of the Justice
Party (Partai Keadilan) -- which is considered to represent a new
spirit of contemporary Islamic political revival -- also
maintains that the most important thing in Islam is the
substance, not the formality.

The indication of the unpopularity of formal Islam among
Muslims here shares similarities with the growing appeals
regarding the application of syariah, Islamic law, in Indonesia.
The idea and appeal of this application dates back to the early
days surrounding independence.

Muslim leaders introduced to the Preamble of the 1945
Constitution ("the Indonesian state is based on the belief in
One, Supreme God"), the obligation that adherents of Islam
implement syariah. This stipulation is known in Indonesia as "the
seven words" of the Piagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter).

Before long this stipulation was dropped, following objections
from Christian leaders and "secular nationalists", who argued
that the Constitution should not give preferential treatment to
any religious group. Furthermore, the Constitution should
maintain the integration of national plurality.

The moves for the introduction of Islamic law increased in the
period surrounding the 2000 MPR annual session. The United
Development Party (PPP) and others declared their support for the
reinclusion of the Jakarta Charter, which would have allowed the
application of Islamic law.

The move was strongly opposed by most MPR members, and the
issue of the syariah application once again failed within the
highest political institution.

Outside the MPR, groups like the Laskar Jihad, Islam Defenders
Front (FPI) and other similar groups continue to seek the
application of Islamic law.

In the name of Islamic law they have attacked nightclubs,
discotheques, and alleged brothels. The rise of these groups
seems to have more to do with the government's failure to enforce
the law, thus leading them to take the law into their own hands.
As long as the government is weak, these groups will hold sway at
certain times and places to engage in the principle of
"encouraging good, prohibiting evil" (amar ma'ruf nahi munkar) in
their own way.

The reasons for the unpopularity of the demands of such groups
are clear: First, hard-line groups are only splinter groups from
the vast majority of the Muslim mainstream. The nature of
Indonesian Islam, which is basically tolerant and peaceful, will
prevent these groups from exerting significant influence.

If Indonesia succeeds in reestablishing political stability
and economic recovery, the social, economic and political
disorientation and radical tendencies of Muslims will tend to
decrease.

Second, most moderate Muslims continue to support President
Megawati, some for the practical reason that she should be given
a fair chance to lead the nation out of the crisis. Many have
refrained from strong criticism of her, since this would only
provoke hard-liners further to question her legitimacy and
ability to lead the country.

One example is Amien, who vigorously criticized former
presidents B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid.

Not least is the changing attitude of Vice President Hamzah
Haz. In the case of the U.S.-led attacks on Afghanistan, he has
been criticized for his unclear and conflicting statements. Some
even believe a split occurred between him and the President.
This observation has some truth, but that is not the whole story.

We have to admit that there is some suspicion within certain
circles towards Hamzah. He is the national leader of the United
Development Party (PPP), which is known for its support of the
reintroduction of the Jakarta Charter.

However his more recent comments suggest adjustments and
compromises, not only to the reality of Indonesian politics, but
also to President Megawati.

Megawati will survive the challenges posed by Muslim hard-line
groups. But, at the same time, she could be distracted by their
continued threatening activities, which, in the end, could affect
her ability to lead Indonesia toward political stability and
economic recovery.

The above is based on the writer's presentation to the Joint
Public Forum on Indonesia, held by Singapore's Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies and Jakarta's Centre for Strategic and
International Studies in Singapore on Nov. 1.