The case for active UN role
As important as this week's meeting in Berlin is in discussing the future of Afghanistan, a dose of reality is necessary so that expectations are not unnecessarily inflated.
The gathering has been widely billed as preparations for a "post-Taliban Afghanistan", aimed at establishing a "broad-based government" in Kabul. It is also seen by many as a more practical option to the establishment of a United Nations' temporary administration in Afghanistan.
Few people would deny the need for a multi-ethnic administration in the Central Asian country which has been impoverished through more than 20 years of bloody civil and ethnic wars. One might want to add that the new administration must be civil and democratically elected.
While all of these objectives are fine and good, getting there is where the biggest challenge lies. Under the present circumstances, it is debatable whether the time is ripe for such a meeting being organized in Berlin. It is also debatable whether this is a more viable option to a more active UN role.
All talks about a post-Taliban Afghanistan presume the imminent collapse of the regime which has imposed its harsh interpretation of Islamic laws on Afghan society for the last five years. While they have lost Kabul, the Taliban remain very much in control in the southern part of Afghanistan.
Even if one were to assume that the Taliban's days are numbered, it is inconceivable that the Berlin meeting could ever be expected to bring together a fair representation of the existing ethnic and political groups in Afghanistan.
But even assuming that the organizers manage to bring all the factions together, the meeting will still be lopsided.
The Northern Alliance forces, who overran the Taliban from Kabul with the help of the United States last week, will go to Berlin as the conquerors. Representatives of the Pashtun, the country's biggest ethnic group who are dominant in the south, will be regarded as the conquered.
As long as the war is still raging in Afghanistan, and the war mentality among the leaders remains strong, the meeting in Berlin cannot be expected to produce anything that will bring the goal of building a peaceful and democratic Afghanistan any closer.
That said, bringing leaders of the warring factions together at this stage of the conflict is crucial, not to discuss power sharing arrangements, but to put an immediate end to the current hostilities and to allow the distribution of aid to the millions of displaced Afghans who are on the verge of starvation.
Given the existing division of territory in Afghanistan between the different political forces, it is inconceivable that peace and security could be entrusted to one particular group, say the Northern Alliance, without risking a bloodbath.
At this late stage of the conflict, peace and security can only be imposed on the Afghan people from outside. This points to a role for an international peacekeeping force as a prerequisite to discussions about a post-Taliban Afghanistan.
The best game plan for Afghanistan clearly remains with a more active role of the United Nations (UN), including first and foremost the dispatch of a UN peacekeeping force. This is where Indonesia and other neutral and predominantly Muslim countries come in.
It is a great fallacy to assume that after 20 years of fighting each other, the Afghanistan people could be expected to rebuild their nation on their own. To do that would be to repeat the mistake the West made in 1991, when, having fought together against the occupation Soviet forces, they abandoned Afghanistan.
There is clearly a need to establish a UN administration in Afghanistan, one that is broad-based and that represents all the major ethnic groups in the country. Once established, Afghanistan can start rebuilding the economy, with the full support the international community.
Any discussion about the future of Afghanistan should first and foremost be about the people in that country. The Afghan people have suffered long enough from wars, not only of the making of their power-mad leaders, but also of foreign powers seeking to expand their influence in Central Asia.
Russia, or certainly its predecessor the Soviet Union, Pakistan, the United States, both in the past and now with its bombing campaign these past weeks, and some of Afghanistan's neighbors have had a role, directly or indirectly, in its destruction.
With each and every leader in Afghanistan indebted to one or two foreign powers, the Berlin meeting is not likely to produce the results that are in the best interests of the Afghan people. A more active UN role has a far better chance of success in what must now be the last chance to save the Afghan people.