The buck likely to stop with Aceh, Papua

The buck likely to stop with Aceh, Papua

The government has again been reminded of problems behind the
controversial Papuan People's Congress. The following is an
excerpt of an e-mail interview with Robert Cribb of the
department of history at the University of Queensland, Australia.

Question:Many observers have addressed the issue of Indonesia's
disintegration. How much greater is the threat today?

Answer: Indonesia is becoming more vulnerable to
disintegration because the global environment has become
increasingly sympathetic to small states.

Fifty years ago, most people believed big states were
necessary to deliver a proper range of (public) services and to
fulfill their responsibilities as members of the international
community. Now people are happy with the idea of small states and
more interested in ethnic self-determination.

These factors put disintegration on the political agenda, even
if they are nowhere near being enough to make it happen. Deep
discontent with the Soeharto era also means that people in
Indonesia are more open than they might otherwise be to radical
solutions, such as separation.

Another factor is the sentimental view which many people have
about islands. They like to believe that islands should be
independent and don't have any appreciation of the role of the
sea in uniting archipelagoes like Indonesia.

Q: Aceh is insisting on self-determination, Riau has made the
same gesture though less loudly, and now West Papuans are calling
for independence. Do you believe in the domino effect of East
Timor's separation?

A: Aceh and Papua are special cases (as was East Timor). Aceh was
the last powerful state to be incorporated into the Netherlands
Indies and its independence had previously been guaranteed by
international treaty.

Aceh has a case for restoration of sovereignty, whereas other
potential separatist movements have only a case for ethnic self-
determination. Papua's case is even stronger in international
law (though still much weaker than East Timor's), mainly because
of questions over the Act of Free Choice in 1969.

On the other hand, Aceh still lacks serious international
sponsors, and the prospects for an independent West Papua are
made less attractive by the problems in Papua New Guinea. But we
should not ignore the extent to which people in both regions feel
utterly alienated from Indonesia by the treatment they have
received over the last 30 years.

(So) it is possible that Aceh and Papua will break away
leaving a truncated but still large Indonesia.

The wholesale breakup of Indonesia into dozen or more states
is much more unlikely. The disillusion with the idea of Indonesia
that has emerged since the fall of Soeharto is nothing like the
disillusion with the Soviet system that brought about the
disintegration of the Soviet Union. In other words, a domino
effect might just lead to the separation of Aceh and Papua, but
it would not go further than that.

Q: Are there other explanations for the current push for self-
determination?

A: In the other regions there seem to be two key factors. One is
a naive sense of excitement at the possibility of independence,
whose implications have not been properly thought through in most
cases. The other is that regional elites are using the idea of
independence as a lever to claim a greater degree of autonomy
within Indonesia.

Q: Some speculate that Soeharto might be behind the religious
strife in Maluku, Central Sulawesi and even Medan, North Sumatra.
Is he still dabbling? Why?

A: It would not surprise me if he is dabbling, but I don't think
he is powerful enough to control events. There is a risk in
looking for a dalang (shadow puppet master) that we ignore the
more public causes of tension.

Q: What about rogue elements in the military?

A: The same applies to this question.

Q: Soeharto invariably used military force to nip signs of
dissension in the bud. How do you think Abdurrahman Wahid will
respond to the West Papuan's quest for self-determination?

A: Indonesia is still heavily dependent on support from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to restore economic prosperity.
The IMF in turn is somewhat sensitive to pressure on human rights
issues. A harsh response to the separatists in Papua would
probably damage Indonesia's economic prospects.

A more subtle response, however, is to get people to think
about the implications of independence, especially the likelihood
of foreign economic domination and internal ethnic conflicts,
while at the same time working to make it more attractive to be a
part of Indonesia.

Independence for Papua is then likely to look less rosy when
examined in detail than when it is put forward as a general goal.

Q: Abdurrahman initially "delegated" authority over Maluku, Riau
and West Papua to Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri. Has this
been fruitful?

A: I'm not so impressed with Megawati's initiatives so far, but I
don't think that the problems are easy to solve. Different
measures are needed in each of the three regions.

In Maluku the clear need is for the army to keep order without
appearing to take sides, and for leaders such as Amien Rais to
take a more responsible approach in working for peace between the
communities. There needs to be a period of calm in which both
Muslims and Christians can feel that their immediate survival is
not under threat.

In Papua there needs to be a lot of discussion about what will
make remaining in Indonesia a more attractive option for the
Papuans. The Jakarta government needs to talk seriously and
generously with local community leaders to come up with a new
formula for governing the province.

Riau has always been a rather assertive province, but I think
its problems are best solved in the context of decentralization,
not by any special measures. (Santi Soekanto)