The buck likely to stop with Aceh, Papua

The government has again been reminded of problems behind the controversial Papuan People's Congress. The following is an excerpt of an e-mail interview with Robert Cribb of the department of history at the University of Queensland, Australia.

Question:Many observers have addressed the issue of Indonesia's disintegration. How much greater is the threat today?

Answer: Indonesia is becoming more vulnerable to disintegration because the global environment has become increasingly sympathetic to small states.

Fifty years ago, most people believed big states were necessary to deliver a proper range of (public) services and to fulfill their responsibilities as members of the international community. Now people are happy with the idea of small states and more interested in ethnic self-determination.

These factors put disintegration on the political agenda, even if they are nowhere near being enough to make it happen. Deep discontent with the Soeharto era also means that people in Indonesia are more open than they might otherwise be to radical solutions, such as separation.

Another factor is the sentimental view which many people have about islands. They like to believe that islands should be independent and don't have any appreciation of the role of the sea in uniting archipelagoes like Indonesia.

Q: Aceh is insisting on self-determination, Riau has made the same gesture though less loudly, and now West Papuans are calling for independence. Do you believe in the domino effect of East Timor's separation?

A: Aceh and Papua are special cases (as was East Timor). Aceh was the last powerful state to be incorporated into the Netherlands Indies and its independence had previously been guaranteed by international treaty.

Aceh has a case for restoration of sovereignty, whereas other potential separatist movements have only a case for ethnic self- determination. Papua's case is even stronger in international law (though still much weaker than East Timor's), mainly because of questions over the Act of Free Choice in 1969.

On the other hand, Aceh still lacks serious international sponsors, and the prospects for an independent West Papua are made less attractive by the problems in Papua New Guinea. But we should not ignore the extent to which people in both regions feel utterly alienated from Indonesia by the treatment they have received over the last 30 years.

(So) it is possible that Aceh and Papua will break away leaving a truncated but still large Indonesia.

The wholesale breakup of Indonesia into dozen or more states is much more unlikely. The disillusion with the idea of Indonesia that has emerged since the fall of Soeharto is nothing like the disillusion with the Soviet system that brought about the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In other words, a domino effect might just lead to the separation of Aceh and Papua, but it would not go further than that.

Q: Are there other explanations for the current push for self- determination?

A: In the other regions there seem to be two key factors. One is a naive sense of excitement at the possibility of independence, whose implications have not been properly thought through in most cases. The other is that regional elites are using the idea of independence as a lever to claim a greater degree of autonomy within Indonesia.

Q: Some speculate that Soeharto might be behind the religious strife in Maluku, Central Sulawesi and even Medan, North Sumatra. Is he still dabbling? Why?

A: It would not surprise me if he is dabbling, but I don't think he is powerful enough to control events. There is a risk in looking for a dalang (shadow puppet master) that we ignore the more public causes of tension.

Q: What about rogue elements in the military?

A: The same applies to this question.

Q: Soeharto invariably used military force to nip signs of dissension in the bud. How do you think Abdurrahman Wahid will respond to the West Papuan's quest for self-determination?

A: Indonesia is still heavily dependent on support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to restore economic prosperity. The IMF in turn is somewhat sensitive to pressure on human rights issues. A harsh response to the separatists in Papua would probably damage Indonesia's economic prospects.

A more subtle response, however, is to get people to think about the implications of independence, especially the likelihood of foreign economic domination and internal ethnic conflicts, while at the same time working to make it more attractive to be a part of Indonesia.

Independence for Papua is then likely to look less rosy when examined in detail than when it is put forward as a general goal.

Q: Abdurrahman initially "delegated" authority over Maluku, Riau and West Papua to Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri. Has this been fruitful?

A: I'm not so impressed with Megawati's initiatives so far, but I don't think that the problems are easy to solve. Different measures are needed in each of the three regions.

In Maluku the clear need is for the army to keep order without appearing to take sides, and for leaders such as Amien Rais to take a more responsible approach in working for peace between the communities. There needs to be a period of calm in which both Muslims and Christians can feel that their immediate survival is not under threat.

In Papua there needs to be a lot of discussion about what will make remaining in Indonesia a more attractive option for the Papuans. The Jakarta government needs to talk seriously and generously with local community leaders to come up with a new formula for governing the province.

Riau has always been a rather assertive province, but I think its problems are best solved in the context of decentralization, not by any special measures. (Santi Soekanto)