The blurring of myths and history

The blurring of myths and history

JAKARTA (JP): The new atmosphere of openness has encouraged
historians and many others to call for the rewriting of the
country's history, especially the history of the New Order.
Former president Soeharto and his government are now being
accused of twisting history to stay in power unchallenged.

"We have to get free from the historical myths created by the
New Order regime which wrote its own version of history to serve
its own interests," says intellectual Mudji Sutrisno.

"The border between myth and history is an illusion," says
international award-winning novelist Pramoedya Ananta Toer,
writer of Arus Balik, a 1995 novel on the 16th century.

Myth can be turned into history, says noted historian Taufik
Abdullah, by repeating romanticized versions of films or stories,
which in themselves are valid as entertainment.

The Sept. 30, 1965, aborted coup attempt against the country's
first president Sukarno that killed six senior and one junior
Army officer and was allegedly perpetrated by the Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI), is now under the spotlight as one of the
most disturbing chapters where many questions remain unanswered.

Unanswered questions include who the mastermind of the bloody
attempted coup was, who its main players were, and whether it was
true that Soeharto, who was then commander-in-chief of the Army
Strategic Reserves (Pangkostrad), was informed in advance of the
impending tragedy, as a living officer in jail has claimed.

Confirming an earlier part of the hush-hush version, a former
forensic expert was quoted by the DR magazine recently as saying
that the victims were tortured ("the bodies had been shot several
times") but not in the manner that Indonesians have been brought
up to believe.

For instance, the penises were not cut off, the doctor, Arif
Budianto, said.

Then there is the issue of the number of victims in the
bloodbath that ensued, how they died and the fate of their
descendants -- a subject never raised in public despite people
remembering the many corpses lying in rivers when they were
young, given the official version that they were PKI members.

Beyond the political intrigue of the elite, the killing of
civilians by civilians, mainly in Java and Bali, has yet to
become part of the nation's painful soul searching. At least one
study, The Forgotten Years by researcher Hermawan Sulistyo of the
National Institute of Sciences (LIPI), published in 1997 raised
the figure of 400,000 victims.

Allegations by the 73-year-old officer in Cipinang jail, Col.
A. Latief, that Soeharto knew of the coup plans were recently
echoed by Sukarno's widow, Ratna Sari Dewi.

Film

Latief claims he twice informed Soeharto of the coup plans. On
Sept. 1 he said that seven high ranking officers, six of whom
became victims, would be summoned by Sukarno "in relation to
rumors of a Council of Generals" plotting against him.

With such information at least a month ahead of the tragedy,
both Latief and Dewi question why Soeharto did not do anything.

The film on the September coup attempt, is one example of
romanticizing history. Director Arifin C. Noer's intriguing
combination of film and documentary, and the convincing portrayal
of characters is the film's strength.

But the fact that ever since 1984 the authorities insisted
that it had to be broadcast every year on all television
stations, is what historian Taufik sees as the possible gradual
phasing from romanticization to myth. When it has become a myth,
he said, the next phase is that it could be considered a
historical source.

This year, the film's showing was no longer compulsory. But a
different film "of similar nuance" will be played each year, also
on all channels.

Pramoedya said, "I happen to have several documents
(indicating a version of the September tragedy different to that
of the government). And maybe others also have (sources). The
kidnapping and killing of the six Army generals was masterminded
by the Army itself."

Cornell University historians Ben Anderson and Ruth McVey
wrote the renown Cornell Paper, in which they pointed out that
the Sept. 30 tragedy was an internal conflict within the Army,
with the result of sparking the demise of the PKI.

Pramoedya, a leader of the former Lekra literary organization
associated with PKI, asserts the tragedy was "part of the global
strategy of capitalist countries led by the United States and
Britain to eradicate communism."

Similar to what is mentioned in unofficial versions, he
pointed out that a document written by Sir Andrew Gilchrist,
Britain's envoy to Indonesia in 1965, mentioned a plot to
forcibly topple Sukarno, who was perceived by some to be close to
the PKI.

The document said the enterprise would be done by "our local
army friends".

"It so happens that in the country's political arena, the PKI
defeated the Army, and since Indonesia has never experienced any
real democracy, some in the Army wouldn't accept the defeat and
arranged a killing," Pramoedya added.

Dewi has also charged that the actual coup was not the aborted
one of Sept. 30 -- but March 11, 1966, when Sukarno gave written
authority to Soeharto to restore peace and order following the
chaos after Sept. 30.

A former Sukarno guard claims the founding father was
intimidated into signing it by the three high-ranking officers
who went to the palace with the document -- a charge already
denied by the only general among the three still alive, Gen.
(ret).M. Yusuf.

The whereabouts of the original document known as Supersemar
is unknown, adding to the mystery of the affair.

Pramoedya also questions the government version of the March
1, 1949, clash with the Dutch in Yogyakarta. The official line is
that Soeharto, then a brigade commander, initiated the attack, an
episode made into a few films, one being Enam Jam Di Jogja (Six
Hours In Yogyakarta).

Other versions have it that it was the late Sultan
Hamengkubuwono IX who masterminded the attack, and it was
Soeharto who implemented it, but the Sultan never claimed credit
to the official version.

Yogyakarta historian Soegijanto Padmo once said that the
sultan "very wisely" said, "I will never say who the initiator of
the March 1 attack was."

In the banned memoirs of a late former cabinet minister under
Sukarno, Oei Tjoe Tat, the Sultan is quoted as nonchalantly
saying "Let it be ..." (rei/bnt/aan)