The best choice for Aceh and Indonesia

The best choice for Aceh and Indonesia

Damien Kingsbury, Melbourne, Australia

Representatives of the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the
Free Aceh Movement (GAM) are again meeting in Helsinki for the
fifth and probably last round of talks aimed at securing an end
to Aceh -- almost three decade long conflict. While recent rounds
of the talks have made significant progress, and there remains at
least a verbal desire to reach a peace agreement, this coming
round of talks is likely to see the peace process ending in
failure, committing Aceh to future of bloodshed.

This likely failure of the Helsinki peace process was always
avoidable, and for a while it did look as though a peace
agreement was genuinely possible. The tragic Boxing Day tsunami
that devastated Aceh was not the sole catalyst for the talks, but
it did provide both sides with greater incentive, and accelerated
the timing of the process.

The motives for ending the Aceh conflict were and remain
multiple. First, if Indonesia is to have a future, it cannot
continue as a state at war with itself, regarding part of itself
as an occupied enemy territory, murdering, torturing, raping and
burning as a matter of course.

Second, the international community will not invest in a
country that is unable to resolve its most pressing problems,
while donors are looking equally askance at the continuing
conflict. Third, the cost of the Aceh conflict has created a
financial burden that the still weak Indonesian economy cannot
sustain.

Finally, there has been much talk about bringing the TNI under
civilian authority, for a range of political, economic and legal
reasons. Aceh is the site in which the TNI is most out of control
and that in which it needs most to be reined in, and without
which there is little prospect of meaningful civilian supremacy.

For GAM's part, it has been developing its political thinking,
and had begun to consider alternative political arrangements that
could address the most pressing issues that affected the people
of Aceh.

After the first round of talks at the end of January, under
the auspices of the Crisis Management Initiative, the peace
process was seen to have some prospect of success and was
formalized. Despite what some observers have said in Jakarta, the
head of the CMI, President Marrti Ahtisaari made it very clear he
would not continue with the process unless it was a formal one.

Both sides expressed willingness to reach a peace agreement,
with both recognizing that compromise was necessary for such an
agreement.

GAM took the lead, by not bringing to the peace talks its
claim for independence. That is, if an agreement can be reached
in Helsinki, its claim for independence will lapse. It has also
presented a series of working papers to the talks, and proposed
an alternative to the current "special autonomy" status of Aceh.

From GAM's perspective, and that of most Acehnese, there has
been nothing "special" about Aceh's status, nor has it included
any meaningful autonomy. GAM instead proposed the working name of
"self government", which was to embody a genuine form of autonomy
while still within the Republic of Indonesia. It was by
compromising and agreeing in Round Two to this alternative to the
current failed "special autonomy" that the talks were able to
progress.

Through Rounds Three and Four, both GoI and GAM hammered out a
large part of an agreement, including in principle local
political parties for Aceh. The issue of local political parties
is important because most Acehnese feel that the "national"
parties are controlled from Jakarta and thus do not and cannot
represent their interests.

Further, authentic democratic principles do not stipulate who
can or cannot form or join political parties, or place conditions
of their size, scope or policies. The current Indonesian model
for political parties was the first step away from the New
Order's undemocratic system, but it was only a partial step.
Indonesia is maturing as a democracy, or claiming to, so removing
restrictions on political parties is a logical and desirable next
step.

The claim, made by some, that local political parties would
lead to parties based on religion is nonsensical. Indonesia has
always had religious-based parties, without threatening its
integrity. The claim against "tribal" parties is equally empty,
as such parties would by definition always be in a minority,
truly representing the interests of their local constituencies
but never able to muster enough votes to influence the DPR or the
presidential system.

As the 2004 elections in Aceh did not allow parties that
directly reflected the interests of Acehnese people, and were
described by independent observers as deeply flawed, a peace
agreement that saw new parties, which may include a transformed
GAM among others, would require new elections.

After having agreed on so much -- perhaps 90 percent -- it was
on this point that the GoI delegates objected. What of
legislators who might lose their seats in new elections, they
asked? If these legislators genuinely represented the interests
of their constituents they should not fear being thrown out. And
if they did not, they do not deserve to keep those seats.

From rejecting fresh elections for Aceh, the GoI delegation
refused to formally agree, even in principle, to the
establishment of local political parties. This was even though
they had just the previous day discussed mechanisms by which such
parties could be established.

From there it was a short step to walking away from "self
government", or whatever the new arrangement was to be called. It
was clear to see why the GoI delegation had back-flipped. There
has been a great deal of pressure from the TNI, which has
escalated its military campaign in Aceh since the talks began,
and from some "nationalist" legislators in Jakarta.

As for the "nationalists", they appear confused. A "nation" is
a bonded political community, in which its people, no matter how
varied they might be, consider themselves to have common
interests. The conflict which troubles Aceh is precisely because,
under the Republic of Indonesia, the Acehnese have only
experienced political expropriation, economic plunder, corruption
and violence. This has been contrary to their interests, not in
common with them. Set against the Acehnese' strong pride and long
history of resisting external aggression, conflict will remain in
Aceh as long as the present relationship with Jakarta prevails.

Yet here is a golden opportunity for the "nationalists" to
build a real nation, by creating common interest and common
welfare. At the same time it could put in place that which a
previous government offered only as an empty term: Autonomy. The
choice, therefore, is clear.

As the two sides return to Helsinki, they will be faced with
the option of the GoI delegation making an offer that is
comparable in its compromise to GAM's not bringing its claim for
independence to the talks. Such a compromise will require
changing the existing legislation on both Aceh's "special
autonomy" and on the electoral laws. But it will bring lasting
peace, foreign investment, and a new hope for the Indonesian
nation. It will also prove that the Indonesian government is
intelligent and creative enough to resolve its most critical
problems.

The alternative to this is that, having brought nothing new to
the talks, the GoI retreats to the status quo and guarantees a
future filled with more death and destruction.

The writer is Director of International and Community
Development at Deakin University, Australia. He is also an
adviser to the GAM delegation to the Helsinki peace talks.