The best choice for Aceh and Indonesia

Damien Kingsbury, Melbourne, Australia

Representatives of the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) are again meeting in Helsinki for the fifth and probably last round of talks aimed at securing an end to Aceh -- almost three decade long conflict. While recent rounds of the talks have made significant progress, and there remains at least a verbal desire to reach a peace agreement, this coming round of talks is likely to see the peace process ending in failure, committing Aceh to future of bloodshed.

This likely failure of the Helsinki peace process was always avoidable, and for a while it did look as though a peace agreement was genuinely possible. The tragic Boxing Day tsunami that devastated Aceh was not the sole catalyst for the talks, but it did provide both sides with greater incentive, and accelerated the timing of the process.

The motives for ending the Aceh conflict were and remain multiple. First, if Indonesia is to have a future, it cannot continue as a state at war with itself, regarding part of itself as an occupied enemy territory, murdering, torturing, raping and burning as a matter of course.

Second, the international community will not invest in a country that is unable to resolve its most pressing problems, while donors are looking equally askance at the continuing conflict. Third, the cost of the Aceh conflict has created a financial burden that the still weak Indonesian economy cannot sustain.

Finally, there has been much talk about bringing the TNI under civilian authority, for a range of political, economic and legal reasons. Aceh is the site in which the TNI is most out of control and that in which it needs most to be reined in, and without which there is little prospect of meaningful civilian supremacy.

For GAM's part, it has been developing its political thinking, and had begun to consider alternative political arrangements that could address the most pressing issues that affected the people of Aceh.

After the first round of talks at the end of January, under the auspices of the Crisis Management Initiative, the peace process was seen to have some prospect of success and was formalized. Despite what some observers have said in Jakarta, the head of the CMI, President Marrti Ahtisaari made it very clear he would not continue with the process unless it was a formal one.

Both sides expressed willingness to reach a peace agreement, with both recognizing that compromise was necessary for such an agreement.

GAM took the lead, by not bringing to the peace talks its claim for independence. That is, if an agreement can be reached in Helsinki, its claim for independence will lapse. It has also presented a series of working papers to the talks, and proposed an alternative to the current "special autonomy" status of Aceh.

From GAM's perspective, and that of most Acehnese, there has been nothing "special" about Aceh's status, nor has it included any meaningful autonomy. GAM instead proposed the working name of "self government", which was to embody a genuine form of autonomy while still within the Republic of Indonesia. It was by compromising and agreeing in Round Two to this alternative to the current failed "special autonomy" that the talks were able to progress.

Through Rounds Three and Four, both GoI and GAM hammered out a large part of an agreement, including in principle local political parties for Aceh. The issue of local political parties is important because most Acehnese feel that the "national" parties are controlled from Jakarta and thus do not and cannot represent their interests.

Further, authentic democratic principles do not stipulate who can or cannot form or join political parties, or place conditions of their size, scope or policies. The current Indonesian model for political parties was the first step away from the New Order's undemocratic system, but it was only a partial step. Indonesia is maturing as a democracy, or claiming to, so removing restrictions on political parties is a logical and desirable next step.

The claim, made by some, that local political parties would lead to parties based on religion is nonsensical. Indonesia has always had religious-based parties, without threatening its integrity. The claim against "tribal" parties is equally empty, as such parties would by definition always be in a minority, truly representing the interests of their local constituencies but never able to muster enough votes to influence the DPR or the presidential system.

As the 2004 elections in Aceh did not allow parties that directly reflected the interests of Acehnese people, and were described by independent observers as deeply flawed, a peace agreement that saw new parties, which may include a transformed GAM among others, would require new elections.

After having agreed on so much -- perhaps 90 percent -- it was on this point that the GoI delegates objected. What of legislators who might lose their seats in new elections, they asked? If these legislators genuinely represented the interests of their constituents they should not fear being thrown out. And if they did not, they do not deserve to keep those seats.

From rejecting fresh elections for Aceh, the GoI delegation refused to formally agree, even in principle, to the establishment of local political parties. This was even though they had just the previous day discussed mechanisms by which such parties could be established.

From there it was a short step to walking away from "self government", or whatever the new arrangement was to be called. It was clear to see why the GoI delegation had back-flipped. There has been a great deal of pressure from the TNI, which has escalated its military campaign in Aceh since the talks began, and from some "nationalist" legislators in Jakarta.

As for the "nationalists", they appear confused. A "nation" is a bonded political community, in which its people, no matter how varied they might be, consider themselves to have common interests. The conflict which troubles Aceh is precisely because, under the Republic of Indonesia, the Acehnese have only experienced political expropriation, economic plunder, corruption and violence. This has been contrary to their interests, not in common with them. Set against the Acehnese' strong pride and long history of resisting external aggression, conflict will remain in Aceh as long as the present relationship with Jakarta prevails.

Yet here is a golden opportunity for the "nationalists" to build a real nation, by creating common interest and common welfare. At the same time it could put in place that which a previous government offered only as an empty term: Autonomy. The choice, therefore, is clear.

As the two sides return to Helsinki, they will be faced with the option of the GoI delegation making an offer that is comparable in its compromise to GAM's not bringing its claim for independence to the talks. Such a compromise will require changing the existing legislation on both Aceh's "special autonomy" and on the electoral laws. But it will bring lasting peace, foreign investment, and a new hope for the Indonesian nation. It will also prove that the Indonesian government is intelligent and creative enough to resolve its most critical problems.

The alternative to this is that, having brought nothing new to the talks, the GoI retreats to the status quo and guarantees a future filled with more death and destruction.

The writer is Director of International and Community Development at Deakin University, Australia. He is also an adviser to the GAM delegation to the Helsinki peace talks.