The Aceh war in the eyes of international community

Bantarto Bandoro Editor, 'The Indonesian Quarterly', Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jakarta bandoro@csis.or.id

At midnight on May 18, after tense talks between the authorities and the leaders of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) rebels in Tokyo had broken down, President Megawati Soekarnoputri placed Aceh under martial law and gave the Indonesian Military (TNI) the green light to launch what could be the country's largest military operation since the 1975 invasion of East Timor.

Hopes for a peaceful solution, as strongly desired by most of the international community, had disappeared.

The presidential decree ordering an integrated operation in Aceh, a combination of humanitarian, law enforcement and governance operations, had been postponed at least three times since its was first mooted in May. The delays were probably the result of international resistance to military escalation in Aceh.

Now the international community has not only expressed regret the two sides failed to reach a peaceful solution, but also has begun to express concern on the impact of the war on the security and stability of Southeast Asia.

It is feared that the war in Aceh could cause, among other things, terrorist attacks across the country and the region by those sympathetic to GAM. Malaysian authorities have reportedly taken measures to prevent its border with Sumatra from being crossed by refugees from Aceh.

As the peace deal was breaking down, representatives of the U.S., Japan, Italy and Switzerland, as well as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, persuaded the government to resume negotiations with GAM. The Tokyo meeting was indeed made possible due to the facilitation provided by the Paris Club of donor nations.

But, as anticipated by some, the peace talks in Tokyo collapsed, freeing the government and GAM to apply their own solutions to the conflict. The current armed conflict in Aceh goes against the wishes and belief of the international community that the conflict could be settled through negotiation.

Reactions from the international community emerged shortly after the government launched the offensive against the rebels. In New York, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan led the international community in asking the government and GAM to return to the negotiating table. Representatives from other countries expressed similar sentiments, saying the war would only drag the government and GAM further from an amicable solution.

The U.S. expressed the view that the government of Indonesia and GAM had forfeited a rare opportunity in Tokyo to advance the peace process. The U.S. is also of the view that the possible avenues to peaceful resolution were not fully explored at the Tokyo meeting, and that it does not believe that the problems in Aceh can be settled by force. Australia and Japan expressed their desire that Indonesia and GAM return to the diplomatic path.

The British government regretted that the Tokyo meeting failed, but its representative in Jakarta could understand the decision to launch military operations in Aceh (The Jakarta Post, May 20). Our immediate neighbor, Malaysia, urged Indonesia to restore peace in Aceh, arguing that the violence there could undermine stability and security in the region. And New Zealand appealed to the government and GAM to return to mediation and negotiation, saying it felt special autonomy was a workable solution if both sides were committed to it.

While expressing hope that the two sides return to the negotiating table, which is very unlikely, the international community has maintained its support for Indonesia's territorial integrity. Not a single country anywhere backs GAM's desire for independence. Even Sweden, the home of GAM's leaders in exile, has voiced support for the unitary state of Indonesia.

Though the international community regrets the central government had to take military action, there was a report that they support such a policy provided the action is conducted according to the laws of warfare and avoids the abuse of force.

An analyst with the School of Oriental and African Studies in London said the timing of the government's military strike against the rebels was significant, and that the government as capitalizing on American goodwill after its crackdown on terror organizations in the aftermath of Sept. 11.

For Jakarta, perhaps it is a matter of national pride not to let what happened in East Timor happen again. The East Timor case taught Indonesia that it should take a tougher line on any moves or aspirations to separate from the unitary state of Indonesia.

There are reasons the international community was deeply concerned that the military option was chosen, and is worried about the effects of this option.

First, a prolonged military operation would certainly change the investment climate in the country. Foreign companies operating in Aceh in particular would face the possibility of having to halt production if caught up in the fighting.

Second, the world does not want to see another series of bloody wars in Southeast Asia, which would undermine the security and stability of the region.

Third, the imposition of martial law in Aceh means that all civilian authorities will be answerable to the military, a move that many in the international community fear will encourage human rights abuses, as happened in the past.

Fourth, some members of the international community remain committed to helping develop Aceh, but the war will force them to halt, at least temporarily, development assistance. In their view, the relationship between the restoration of peace and economic development is a powerful two-way relationship, but the war has diminished it.

Fifth, the war will lead to substantial losses of life.

Now that the war in Aceh has become a political reality, even the most powerful members of the international community cannot step in to stop the fighting.

To the deep regret of the international community, military action against the rebels had to be taken by Jakarta. This policy is not only desirable, but also necessary if Indonesia is to be seen as politically and strategically united. After all, the war is taking place in Indonesia's national jurisdiction, and the UN, for example, cannot become involved in the conflict as Indonesia has sole jurisdiction over Aceh.

The principle of the unitary state of Indonesia is nonnegotiable, and the international community can only decry the war and urge peace.