The Aceh conflict: The long road to peace

The Aceh conflict: The long road to peace

S. Wiryono
Jakarta

The beginning of an involvement

1. It was in early January 2002, with the fasting month of
Ramadhan having just come to a close, when Indonesian Foreign
Minister Hassan Wirajuda asked me if I was willing to accept the
position of negotiator on the side of the Indonesian government
on the problem of Aceh. The negotiations had been launched two
years earlier with some encouraging results, but had been in
suspension for about seven months. I accepted the offer as a
matter of patriotic duty but with a great deal of trepidation. I
actually began assuming my duties as negotiator when the
suspended talks resumed in Geneva on Feb.2 2002.

Historical background

2. Aceh has a history of militancy, having fought the Portuguese
in the 1520s and the Dutch from 1873 to 1913, and having waged an
Islamist uprising against the Republic of Indonesia in 1953. In
that uprising, the rebellion, called Darul Islam, aimed at
establishing an Islamic republic all over Indonesia, which was
also sought by religious militants in West Java and South
Sulawesi. It came to an end 1962 when, after negotiations, the
Sukarno government gave assurances that Aceh would be given
status as a special region, with broad autonomy with regard to
religion, customary law, and education. Over the years, however,
that pledge was largely unfulfilled.

3.The current secessionist rebellion in Aceh began on Dec. 4 1976
when Muhammad Hasan di Tiro declared Acehnese independence. Di
Tiro and his closest followers had been involved in the Darul
Islam rebellion of 1953 but this time their uprising, to which
they gave the name Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) or Free Aceh
Movement, was of a clearly secessionist intent.

Not long after that declaration of independence, the forces of
the GAM began attacking government troops, only to reel back in
the ensuring government counterinsurgency operation. By 1983 the
GAM forces had been defeated in the field and di Tiro had fled to
exile abroad where he and some of his followers eventually became
a Swedish citizen.

4. During most of the decade of the 1980s the GAM recuperated,
rationalized its political status, and strengthened its military
arm, Angkatan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (AGAM). During this period,
some 400 Acehnese cadres were reportedly sent to Libya for
military training. By 1989, GAM felt strong enough to challenge
the Indonesian government once more, attacking troops, civilian
personnel and suspected informers. The government responded with
a massive military operation and repression.

5. By 1992, it appeared that the government had the situation
under full control. Military oppression characterized by
widespread violation of human rights, however, fed public
resentment against the government in Jakarta.

The human rights violations in Aceh came to public light soon
after Soeharto bowed out of power in the political tumult of May
1998. Pressured by a public outcry all over Indonesia at the
atrocities and human rights violations in Aceh, the Indonesian
Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief General Wiranto apologized for
the excesses of the military from 1989 to 1998 and lifted Aceh's
status as an area of military operations, promising substantial
troop withdrawal from the province. Peace did not come, however,
as the GAM, taking advantage of the demoralization of the
military, launched an offensive. Armed confrontation resumed.

6. In mid-1994, the GAM organization split when Kuala Lumpur-
based officials broke off from the Sweden-based leadership, which
includes Hasan di Tiro. Apparently the main difference between
these two factions was the form of government that Aceh would
assume after independence. Di Tiro favors a monarchy, with
himself as Sultan, while the Kuala Lumpur-based group favors a
modern Islamic republic. Di Tiro, who claims to be a descendant
of the last Sultan of Aceh, has secured the loyalty of most of
the GAM forces operating in the province.
A window of opportunity

7. During the administration of president Abdurrahman Wahid,
there was a window of opportunity for peace in Aceh, which both
sides were able to seize, for a while at least. The Wahid
administration's overtures for dialog received positive
response from the GAM faction led by Hasan di Tiro.

In May 2000, representatives of the Indonesian government and
the Free Aceh Movement signed in Geneva a document called "Joint
Understanding for Humanitarian Pause for Aceh" the stated
objective of which was to allow the free flow of humanitarian aid
to a population in dire need of it.

Reached after a series of confidential talks with the
mediation of the Henri Dunant Centre, an international
humanitarian NGO, the Joint Understanding was an important
confidence-building measure that created common ground between
the two sides on which further dialog could be built.

Although this development was welcomed by the war-weary people
of Aceh, it was less than satisfactory to many circles in
Jakarta. For one thing, parliament was not consulted on this
matter, nor was there any discussion in the press or anywhere
else in which experts and academics could have contributed their
views.

8. The negotiator of this agreement on the Indonesian side was
Dr. N. Hassan Wirajuda, then Permanent Representative of
Indonesia to the UN in Geneva, who would later become Foreign
Minister of Indonesia. The government took care to explain that
Dr. Wirajuda, while representing the government, was not
negotiating in his capacity as Permanent Representative to the UN
in Geneva.

This explanation was apparently given to reduce criticism that
by negotiating with the GAM, the government had made a blunder
and the GAM had scored a diplomatic victory, since the act of
negotiating with the GAM implied recognition, putting the GAM, at
least theoretically, on an equal footing with the government.

To a number of legislators, some academics and a few in the
media, the talks in Geneva represented an internationalization of
the Aceh problem. This negative reaction becomes easier to
understand when cast in the light of what many Indonesians have
seen as the consequences of the internationalization of the
problem of East Timor.

9. Nevertheless, the administration of president Abdurrahman
Wahid persevered in pursuing dialog. That dialog, in spite of
many difficulties brought about partly by the situation on the
ground, proceeded steadily forward so that in January 2001 both
sides reached a "Provisional Understanding" that contained
various provisions that would make possible future arrangements
to check the violence and carry out confidence-building measures.

By the middle of the year, the government side put on the
table the offer of special autonomy, and both sides agreed on an
eventual holding of an all-inclusive informal dialog of all
sectors of Acehnese society, including the GAM. But for about
seven months after that, from July 2001 to February 2002, dialog
could not proceed mainly because of difficulties on the ground
brought about by an increasing frequency of skirmishes.
Meanwhile, President Megawati Soekarnoputri, who has a more
nationalistic outlook than Wahid, had taken over the reins of
government, and she had appointed Indonesia's negotiator, Dr.
Hassan Wirajuda, as Indonesia's Foreign Minister.

Some aspects of the problem

10. Within the Southeast Asian region and among various countries
with which Indonesia has bilateral relations, as well as in
international forums like the Non-aligned Movement, the
Organization of the Islamic Conference, the European Union, etc.
there is strong support for Indonesia's sovereignty and
territorial integrity, especially with regard to the question of
Aceh and even Irian Jaya.

The GAM, on the other hand, has no external support for its
claim to statehood except perhaps from some NGOs. It did at some
point received military training support from Libya but not much
else. To some degree, the GAM is in control of a force and enjoys
some support, which is difficult to estimate, from the people of
Aceh. There is widespread concern at the continuing violence
resulting in frequent violations of human rights and producing a
great number of internally displaced persons, while crippling the
socioeconomic life of Aceh. This concern translates into domestic
and international pressure on both sides to bring the conflict
situation to an end, to establish durable peace and rebuild the
socioeconomic life of the province.

11. A good number of observers have identified one extremely
formidable obstacle to peace in Aceh, and that is a situation of
widespread corruption that gives everyone involved an economic
motive for leaving the problem unsolved.

There is reportedly a great deal of smuggling of luxury goods
going on in the free port of Sabang. Extortion and protection
racketeering by both the military and the GAM guerillas have been
observed to be endemic from one end of the province to the other.
Weapons from foreign sources are regularly brought ashore by
fishing boats in a thriving arms trade that keeps the GAM and
other groups of a more criminal nature well armed. The national
government can to a large extent curb the corruption by simply
making provincial officials and other authority figures more
accountable, but such a crackdown may have its own destabilizing
effect.

The situation in 2002

12. By the time I was entrusted with the task of leading the
Indonesian side of the dialog, some 10,000 individuals have died
as the course of the conflict and killings were averaging five a
day. Enormous damage had been wreaked on the economic and social
life of this resource-rich province. The people of Aceh were
weary of the conflict. Having succeeded to some extent in solving
the conflict situation in the Maluku islands and Central Sulawesi
through the Malino peace processes, the government had a sense of
momentum that it could soon enough solve the Aceh problem as
well. The government, both the executive and the legislature had
publicly affirmed in various statements and documents that the
best solution was through dialog within the framework of a
comprehensive approach, which also included the use of military
and police work. In effect, it was a two-track policy.

13. In spite of that two-track policy, there was already a
widespread perception in the government, including parliament,
that the Indonesian armed forces had the upper hand in Aceh.
Until today, many of these feel that there is no need to
negotiate with a losing and weakening secessionist movement that
has no international support. There are also not a few hawks who
believe that there is only one thing to do about a separatist
movement and that is to crush it, period. In this kind of
atmosphere, dialog has proven difficult to pursue.

Nevertheless, I proceeded to do what I could to get a dialog
going with the GAM. I interpreted my mandate to be the
continuation of the negotiation process with a view to
consolidating what has been achieved so far in a document -- if
possible in the form of an "interim agreement" -- that would
cover both the points of consensus and the points for further
elaboration so that succeeding meetings of the two sides will
have a foundation to build on. As previously agreed, the two
sides formed a Joint Council for Political Dialog with five
internationally eminent individuals acceptable to both sides
serving as advisors.

14. Having been briefed on the situation in Aceh and on previous
developments, the negotiator drafted a "Proposed Guidance" for
his own use in the negotiations. The Proposed Guidance recognized
the desire of the Acehnese people to administer themselves
peacefully in freedom and democracy. This would be achieved
through three main courses of action.

First, the conflict would be ended and peace established over
a transitional period, and special autonomy would be accepted as
the final solution to the conflict. Second, during the
transitional period, there would be cessation of hostilities, an
intensive confidence-building process would take place, and
socio-economic life in Aceh would be normalized with humanitarian
aid and economic assistance from the government of Indonesia and
the international community.

And third, an all-inclusive dialog among all elements of
Acehnese society, including the GAM, would serve as the
consultative forum for achieving a negotiated peaceful settlement
to the Aceh problem on the basis of the Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam
(NAD) Special Autonomy Law, a legislation passed during the
tenure of President Wahid granting special autonomy status to the
province of Aceh. After conclusion of that all-inclusive dialog,
preparations could then be made for general elections in Aceh to
enable GAM followers to participate in the Indonesian national
elections of 2004.

15. In the February 2002 meeting, the Negotiator explained to the
Henri Dunant Centre officials and all the advisors the ideas
contained in the Proposed Guidance. They generally responded
positively to the Proposed Guidance, particularly since it
allowed dialog to proceed without explicitly discussing the
sensitive issue of the GAM'S DEMAND for Acehnese independence.
The only source of difficulty was the core of the government's
position and that was the acceptance by the GAM of the
government's offer of autonomy spelled out in the NAD Law. Its
acceptance by the GAM would have implied abandonment of its
demand for independence.

16. The two sides discussed intensively during that February
meeting but in the end, the GAM side was not ready to sign the
joint statement that would have been the outcome of the meeting,
as it sought more time to consider the offer of autonomy. And
since the draft joint statement could not be jointly issued by
the two sides, it was agreed that the facilitator, the Henri
Dunant Centre, would issue it on their behalf.

The text of that statement clearly stated that the two sides
agreed "to use the NAD Law as a starting point for discussions"
and "to a period of confidence-building in which they will cease
hostilities and then move towards democratic elections in Aceh in
2004." The document therefore served as a road map for the peace
process ahead, stipulating a cessation of hostilities, an all-
inclusive dialog and elections.

The May 10 Agreement

17. The subsequent meeting between the two sides held in early
May 2002 resulted in the formalization of the February document
issued by the Henri Dunant Centre. On 10 May 2002, they signed a
Joint Statement with essentially the same content as the February
document. Difficulty arose when the two sides interpreted the
text differently.

The government had thought that it had secured commitment of
the GAM's "acceptance of the NAD Law as a starting point," while
the GAM seemed to understand it only as the first thing to be
discussed. One of the principal spokesmen of the GAM side, Mr.
Sofyan Ibrahim Tiba, upon his return to Aceh, firmly denied that
the GAM had accepted the NAD Law.

What made matters worse was that armed elements claiming to
belong to the GAM started attacking government facilities,
particularly electric pylons, and in the process killing a
considerable number of innocent civilians, including women and
children. The military responded by bringing in more troops and
intensifying anti-insurgency operations. This followed a pattern
where every time both sides reached an agreement, elements on the
ground would issue statements repudiating what had been agreed on
take hostile action that set back the dialog process.

18.Thus, a third meeting, which should have taken place in June,
did not materialize as the deteriorating situation on the ground
made negotiations untenable. On Aug. 19, the Indonesian
government announced a new policy on Aceh: It gave the GAM until
the end of the fasting month of Ramadhan, which fell around Dec.7
2002, to accept the offer of special autonomy as a prerequisite
for future dialogs, or face the full brunt of Indonesia's
military power. In fact, the dialog process is now in suspension,
without any assurance that the GAM would return to the
negotiating table.

Meanwhile, violence has escalated and continues to claim more
lives. An attempt was made recently on the life of the governor
of the province. Just before the end of August 2002, however, the
government softened its stance a little with the announcement by
the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs that
"we expect to have another round of talks (with the GAM) in
September, perhaps not official ones, but we will continue to
pave the way for a peaceful settlement."

19. In early September the government of Indonesia submitted a
draft agreement for the cessation of hostilities to the Henri
Dunant Centre and the advisors. The Centre and the advisors
subsequently made amendments to the draft, which means that they
adopted it so that it could serve as basis for further dialog
between the government of Indonesia and the GAM.

And that was precisely what happened: The draft as amended and
consolidated by the Centre was negotiated with the
representatives of the GAM and in a series of meetings of
indirect negotiations the two sides were facilitated by the
shuttle diplomacy of the HDC held in Singapore, Paris, Geneva and
Stockholm. That process took several weeks.

On Nov. 19 2002, the Centre announced that both sides had
committed themselves to reach an agreement. Although a few issues
still had to be resolved, an agreement on cessation of
hostilities was planned to be held on Dec. 9 2002.

Essentially, the draft agreement called for the formation by
the government of Indonesia, the GAM and the Henri Dunant Centre
to form a 150-member Joint Security Committee to monitor the
cessation of hostilities, to investigate violations and to take
measures, including sanctions, to restore calm. The Nanggroe Aceh
Darussalam (NAD) Special Autonomy Law would be the starting point
of an all-inclusive dialog among the Acehnese leading to
provincial elections in 2004.

The unresolved issues included such details as the timing and
manner of the laying down of arms by the GAM, and the counterpart
measures to be taken by the Indonesian security forces. The whole
process is designed to take the guns out of politics.

A positive turn of events

20. While the Henri Dunant Centre sounded confident that the
signing would take place as scheduled, there were actually many
hitches that, up to the last moment, had to be overcome. It
greatly helped that the international community took an interest
in the process and demonstrated its support by holding in Tokyo
on Dec. 3 2002, six days before the scheduled signing of the
agreement, a conference of donor countries led by Japan and the
United States and international funding agencies to raise funds
for the reconstruction of Aceh after both have signed the
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.

Other countries that participated in that conference were
Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Indonesia, Qatar,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand and the
United Kingdom. Also in attendance were the European Commission,
the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the UN Development
Programme and the Henri Dunant Centre. The GAM was invited to the
conference but did not attend.

21. The holding of the conference was a manifestation of the
concern of the international community at the continuing
instability of Indonesia, which was partly due to the problem of
Aceh. If the problem of Aceh as well as those of Papua, Maluku
and several other provinces could be altogether solved in the
months ahead, it would be to the tremendous relief of neighboring
countries that had been anxious at the adverse effects of the
internal conflicts in Indonesia on the general stability of the
region. For Indonesia, the solution of these internal problems
would to a large extent restore its standing in the international
community and among foreign and domestic investors.

22. It was agreed at the Tokyo Conference on Peace and
Reconstruction in Aceh that once the agreement was signed, a
multi-agency mission would be sent to Aceh to assess the
requirements of the social and economic rehabilitation of the
province. The participating countries and institutions would then
raise the funds needed for humanitarian assistance, support for
the demobilization of combatants, short term high-impact
community-driven investments, improvement of health and education
facilities and infrastructures-building.

The Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) would coordinate the
donors while local communities and civil society will be engaged
to ensure that the funds reach the people as quickly as possible,
with accountability and transparency. The idea was to ensure that
the people would feel that they were immediately reaping "peace
dividends" and thereby the peace process would be strengthened.

23.The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed in Geneva on
Dec. 9 2002. I was privileged, as the Indonesian government
negotiator, to sign the Agreement on behalf of my government. My
counterpart on the GAM side was Dr.Zaini Abdullah. In my remarks
on that occasion, I pointed out that this was a modest but
significant victory for both sides and for all that were
interested in peace, but not yet the final victory, for which we
still had to work hard.

We still had to make the Cessation of Hostilities work so that
durable peace could be attained in Aceh and that was the hard
part. Important new details of the Agreement include the
provision of a two-month grace period during which both sides
would demonstrate their commitment to peace by not increasing
their forces and relocating these forces to defensive positions.
Demilitarized zones would also be designated during the period.
After that grace period, the GAM would designate where it would
place its weapons.

The placement of weapons would be completed in five months.
After that preparations would be made for the all-inclusive Aceh
dialog during which they would negotiate on the modality for the
review and possible revision of the NAD law.

24.By January, it was already apparent that the road to peace
would be a bumpy one, especially during the first two months.
Much would depend on the skills and wisdom of the Joint Security
Committee under Maj. Gen. Thanungsak Tuvinan of Thailand and his
deputy, Brig. Gen. Nogomora Lomodag of the Philippines. As of
Dec. 30 2002 there were already some 50 incidents of fighting
between the GAM troops and the Indonesian security forces.

From the moment the Agreement was signed up to this writing,
the body count has dropped considerably but it has been going up
lately. There was also the problem that resulted from a late
rejection by the GAM of the Filipino observers in the Joint
Security Committee: The GAM contends that because the Philippine
government is fighting a Moro secessionist movement and because
Indonesia has brokered a peace agreement with another
secessionist group in 1996, the Filipino monitors cannot be
impartial. The matter was soon smoothed over, with the Filipino
monitors who were already in place remaining where they were
posted and the rest replaced by Thai monitors.

25. And yet the general effect of the signing of the Agreement
had been widespread optimism verging on euphoria all over the
province -- and that is because the Agreement is already
perceived to be a peace agreement. The fact is that the guns are
not yet altogether silent and it will not be until the end of
July that these guns will be removed from politics. But the
people believe that they already have peace in their hands and
would not let go of it. Sick and tired of decades of armed
conflict during which more than 10,000 persons, mostly civilians,
died, the Acehnese want peace that badly. With hopes and
expectations raised so high, the risk is that if the peace
process failed, the letdown could be very severe.

26. In Jakarta, the signing of the Agreement was greeted with
approval but with a more cautious sort of optimism. No sector of
society and no faction in parliament came out critical about the
agreement. President Megawati herself demonstrated her
government's commitment to the Agreement by visiting Aceh soon
after it was signed. GAM units were heading back to their bases.
A multi-agency United Nations team visited Aceh in order to
assess the requirements of the rehabilitation of the province.

The initial finding of the team was that the province was in
dire need of financial aid to rebuild school and health
facilities destroyed in the course of the conflict. In Jakarta,
the government organized a team to distribute humanitarian aid.
The government also pledged to give priority to the hundreds of
thousands of Acehnese who had been displaced during the conflict.

Within the month, the Joint Security Committee, which monitors
the cease-fire, was partly deployed. There was a dramatic
reduction in the incidence of killings in the province. These
positive developments could have gained tremendous momentum --
but that did not happen. Instead, the process got bogged down and
at one point it became difficult to see how it could still go
forward.

27. It did not take long before the Indonesian military and the
GAM accused each other of cease-fire violations. There were press
reports of civilians intimidating members of the Joint
Security Committee, a charge that the military denied. At any
rate, for their safety, the monitors were withdrawn from the
field. The government complained that the Committee had become
ineffective in the field because of the negative statements of
GAM personalities.

In fact the GAM was brazenly holding pro-independence rallies
and carrying out a public disinformation campaign to promote a
public perception that the final result of the implementation of
the agreement would be independence for Aceh. It also undertook
heavy recruitment in the villages to swell the ranks of GAM
fighters and appointed new officers of its fighting force. It
smuggled in weapons to arm that expanded fighting force. At the
same time, it continued to build and expand its political
structure in the villages, which competed with the provincial
government for administrative control of the province.

This underground government went so far as to collect what it
calls a "Nanggroe tax." This was, of course, a form of extortion
and a crime. The government also noted that with very little time
left before the end of the demilitarization phase of the
implementation of the agreement, there was no indication of the
system, plan and process of placement of GAM weapons, which would
be overseen by the HDC. This greatly damaged the HDC's image.
With very little time left to act, it was regarded as highly
improbable that the GAM could still comply with the provision on
the placement of GAM weapons as stipulated in the agreement.

28.The government then registered a strong protest with the
Henri Dunant Foundation, charging that the GAM was in material
breach of its obligations under the COHA. On this basis it
demanded the immediate convening of the Joint Council, which is
composed of high officials of the government, the GAM and the
HDC. The Joint Council was created by the COHA itself to settle
disputes arising from its implementation that could not be
resolved by the JSC created by the agreement. The demand for a
meeting of the Joint Council was conveyed to the HDC in the early
part of April 2003 on what the government called a last-ditch
effort to save the COHA.

29. Soon after that, President Megawati sent a Special Envoy to
the Prime Minister of Sweden to formally inform the Swedish
government that a number of its citizens, referring to Di Tiro
and some of his prominent lieutenants, were engaged in rebellion
and other criminal activities that have caused enormous loss of
lives in a friendly country like Indonesia. The Swedish
government responded by requesting for more concrete evidence to
back up Indonesia's grievous allegations. Indonesia seems to be
preparing to accommodate this request.

30. Initially, the GAM responded to the Indonesian government's
demand for a convening of the Joint Council by sending a letter
indicating its decision not to attend such a meeting. The
government at once started preparing for military operations in
Aceh, as it seemed that the process toward peace was falling
apart.

In mid-April, however, the GAM communicated through the HDC
that it was ready to attend the Council meeting and the
government welcomed this change of mind. They still had to agree,
however, on the date and place of the Joint Council meeting. The
government proposed Tokyo. The GAM wanted it to be held in
Geneva. The government reluctantly agreed and set it on April 25,
a Friday, considering that in the past the GAM preferred to meet
on weekends. The GAM indicated its agreement but not long after
that, changed its mind again.

The government offered a compromise where the opening
formalities would be held on April 25 with the respective advance
parties in attendance, and the actual discussions will be held on
April 26 and 27. But, for no clear reason, the HDC could not
persuade the GAM to agree to this compromise. The GAM would agree
to meet only on April 27, a Sunday but what could be accomplished
in only one day when there were so many sensitive and complex
issues to straighten out? The HDC was not able to bring the GAM
to the meeting , so it could not be held..

31. The government had taken all pains to be flexible even when
its patience was stretched to the limit. On the other hand, the
GAM was not only inflexible without any clear reason, it also
displayed a streak of obstructionism and disdain for the
government's demonstration of goodwill.

32. The big question now is: What next? The answer may be derived
from a consideration of the past behavior of the GAM. Since
negotiations began in early January 2000, the GAM 's behavior has
followed a pattern of perfidy.

It would accept an arrangement such as the humanitarian pause
but would use it only for the purposes of consolidating its
forces, only to resume fighting when it would be confident that
it had sufficiently gathered political and military strength. On
the other hand, the government's behavior has always been
consistent with its statement of Aug. 19 that it would adhere to
a strategy of exhausting all peaceful means before deciding on an
"appropriate action," which many would interpret as a military
operation.

33.The Joint Statement of May 10 and the COHA of Dec. 9 are not
perfect documents but these constitute a sufficiently clear road
map, with the acceptance of the NAD law as a starting point,
followed by cessation of hostilities, an all-inclusive dialog and
finally the election of 2004.

While the precise format and schedule of the all-inclusive
dialog are yet to be decided, the election specified in the COHA
is clearly the election in Indonesia in 2004. There is no way the
wording of the COHA could be interpreted as pertaining to a
referendum or independence.

34. The fact is that the fundamental commitment of both the
government and the GAM is expressed in the preambule section of
the COHA, which states that "the GOI and GAM share the common
objective to meet the aspirations of the people of Aceh to live
in security with dignity, peace, prosperity and justice." So,
while the HDC-facilitated talks are important, they do not
represent the heart of the matter. Their shared mission is not to
find the road to peace, but to make peace the way to achieve
their common objective. And the only way to achieve that common
objective is to adhere to the letter and spirit of the COHA and
to sustain the focus on the common objective.

35. By exercising patience and flexibility in the face of the
GAM's intransigence and arrogance, the government believes that
it has secured the higher moral ground. If it must now
reformulate its policy on Aceh in the face of GAM's unwarranted
behavior, it is important that it must do so in a way that it
keeps its hold on that higher moral ground.

The government, therefore, can take either of two options: It
can undertake some kind of military action, or it can retry the
peace process.

36. Resuming the peace process does not appear to be a
politically attractive option for some, while on the other hand,
the view that peace should be endeavored at all cost has been
strongly expressed by many prominent politicians, ulema and
Achenese in general. But as the agreement provides for a five-
month period during which the placement of arms is to be
accomplished, theoretically the government still has the option
to wait until after July 9, which is the deadline for the
placement of the GAM's weapons, before it can be justified in
carrying out a military operation in the province. As of this
writing the debate is still ongoing.

37. When a decision is finally made to take military action,
operations should be carefully planned so that what is waged is
not war in the traditional sense but a "humanitarian war" that is
based on a recognition that the exceedingly complex political
situation in Aceh cannot be resolved through military force
alone.

Moreover, there is the risk that military action may backfire
if sizeable civilian casualties are incurred. Hence, the military
operation should be designed not only to win battles and
skirmishes but primarily the hearts and minds of the people of
Aceh. The spirit of the time demands that even the justified use
of military force must take all precaution against "collateral
damage."

A large number of civilian casualties could engender a new
sense of grievance on the part of the people of Aceh, thereby
frustrating the attainment of the objectives of a humanitarian
war. Indeed, it is imperative that the people of Aceh support the
operation at least to some extent, and should therefore be
conducted in such a way that it is perceived as not in disregard
of their interests and their lives. The humanitarian aspect of
the operation should be of primary consideration.

38. This means that it should not be an effort of the military
forces alone. Social, political, economic and, indeed, public
relations considerations should be integrated into the substance
of the operational plan, and should involve appropriate
operational contributions from the government agencies concerned
with the delivery of social services.

This means that the flow of humanitarian aid to communities
that suffer collateral damage will be as important as the
availability of ammunition and other war materiel. Above all,
military personnel in the field must not only actually respect
the human rights of the people of Aceh even in the heat of the
fighting, but must also be seen as doing so by an observant world
that will be keenly monitoring the progress of the operation.

39. Above all, the effort should be as brief as possible. As the
Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu put it, "There is no
instance of any nation having gained a benefit from prolonged
war." Certainly not if it will take another 26 years, as it has
happened in Aceh.

The writer is Indonesia's chief negotiator in the Aceh issue.
The views expressed in this article are entirely personal.