The Aceh conflict: The long, bumpy road to peace

The Aceh conflict: The long, bumpy road to peace

Wiryono Sastrohandoyo, Senior diplomat, Jakarta

From the outset, it has always been clear that the road to
peace in Aceh would be a bumpy one, especially during the first
two months after the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement (COHA) in Geneva on Dec. 9.

As of Dec. 30, 2002 there were already some 50 incidents of
fighting between Free Aceh Movement (GAM) troops and Indonesian
security forces.

Yet, the general effect of the signing had been widespread
optimism verging on euphoria.

The fact is that the guns are not yet silent, and it will not
be until July that these guns will be removed from politics.

But the people believe that they already had peace in their
hands and would not let go of it. Sick and tired of decades of
armed conflict during which more than 10,000 persons, mostly
civilians, died, the Acehnese want peace that badly. With hopes
and expectations raised so high, the risk is that if the peace
process failed, the letdown could be very severe.

A multi-agency UN team visited Aceh in order to assess the
requirements of the rehabilitation of the province. The initial
finding was that the province was in dire need of financial aid
to rebuild schools and health facilities. In Jakarta, the
government organized a team to distribute humanitarian aid.

The government also pledged to give priority to the hundreds
of thousands of Acehnese who had been displaced by the conflict.

Within the month, the joint security committee, which monitors
the cease-fire, was partly deployed.

There was a dramatic reduction in the incidence of killings.

These positive developments could have gained momentum.

Instead, the process got bogged down.

It did not take long before the Indonesian Military (TNI) and
GAM accused each other of cease-fire violations. There were press
reports of civilians intimidating the peace monitors. At any
rate, for their safety, the monitors were eventually withdrawn.

The government complained that the committee had become
ineffective in the field because of the negative statements of
GAM personalities. GAM has been brazenly holding pro-independence
rallies and carrying out a public disinformation campaign to
promote a public perception that the final result of the
implementation of the agreement would be independence.

It also undertook heavy recruitment in villages. It smuggled
in weapons to arm its expanded fighting force. It continued to
build and expand its political structure in villages. This
underground government went so far as to collect a "Nanggroe
tax." This was, of course, a form of extortion.

The government noted that with very little time left before
the end of the demilitarization phase, there was no indication of
the system, plan and process of placement of GAM weapons..

The government then registered a strong protest with the Henry
Dunant Centre (HDC), charging that GAM was in material breach of
its obligations.

On this basis, it demanded in early April the immediate
convening of the Joint Council, which is composed of high
officials of the government, the GAM and the HDC.

When GAM indicated that it had no intention of attending such
a meeting, the government at once started preparing for military
operations. In mid-April, however, GAM communicated through HDC
that it was ready to attend the meeting. They still had to agree,
however, on the date and place of the meeting.

The government proposed Tokyo, GAM wanted Geneva. The
government agreed, and set it on April 25, a Friday, considering
that in the past GAM preferred to meet on weekends. GAM indicated
its agreement, but not long after changed its mind again. The
government offered a compromise where the opening formalities
would be held on 25 with the respective advance parties in
attendance, and the actual discussions on the 26 and 27. Again,
HDC could not persuade the GAM to agree to this compromise.

GAM would agree to meet on the 27, a Sunday.

But what could be accomplished in one day when there were so
many sensitive and complex issues to straighten out? HDC was not
able to bring the GAM to the meeting, so it could not be held..

The government had taken all pains to be flexible even when
its patience was stretched to the limit. On the other hand, GAM
was not only inflexible, it also displayed a streak of
obstructionism and disdain.

The big question now is: What next?

The answer may be derived from a consideration of GAM's past
behavior. Since negotiations began in January 2000, this has
followed a pattern of perfidy.

GAM would accept an arrangement such as the humanitarian pause
but would use it only for the purposes of consolidating its
forces, only to resume fighting when it would be confident that
it had sufficiently gathered political and military strength.

For its part, the government has been consistent with its
statement of Aug. 19, that it would adhere to a strategy of
exhausting all peaceful means before deciding on an "appropriate
action," which many would interpret as a military operation.

The Joint Statement of May 10, and the COHA of Dec. 9 are not
perfect documents, but they constitute a sufficiently clear road
map, with the acceptance of the Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD)
law as a starting point, followed by cessation of hostilities, an
all-inclusive dialog and finally the election of 2004.

So, while the HDC-facilitated talks are important, they do not
represent the heart of the matter. Their shared mission is not to
find the road to peace, but to make peace the way to achieve
their common objective. And the only way to achieve that common
objective is to adhere to the letter and spirit of the COHA and
to sustain the focus on the common objective.

By exercising patience and flexibility, the government
believes that it has secured the higher moral ground.

If it must now reformulate its policy, it is important that it
must do so in a way that it keeps its hold on that higher moral
ground. The government has two options: it can undertake some
kind of military action, or it can retry the peace process.

Resuming the peace process does not appear to be a politically
attractive option for some. On the other hand, the view that
peace should be endeavored at all costs has been strongly
expressed by many prominent politicians, ulemas and Acehnese in
general. As the agreement provides for a five-month period during
which the placement of arms is to be accomplished, theoretically
the government has the option to wait until after July 9, the
deadline for the placement of the GAM's weapons, before it can be
justified in carrying out a military operation in the province.

When a decision is finally made to take military action,
operations should be carefully planned so that what is waged is
not war in the traditional sense, but a "humanitarian war", that
is based on a recognition that the exceedingly complex political
situation cannot be resolved through military force alone.

Moreover, there is the risk that military action may backfire
if sizable civilian casualties are incurred. Hence, the operation
should be designed not only to win battles and skirmishes, but
primarily the hearts and minds of the Acehnese.

Even the justified use of military force must take all
precaution against "collateral damage." A large number of
civilian casualties could engender a new sense of grievance on
the part of the people of Aceh, thereby frustrating the
attainment of the objectives of a humanitarian war.

Indeed, it is imperative that the people of Aceh support the
operation at least to some extent, and should therefore be
conducted in such a way that it is perceived as not in disregard
of their interests and their lives. The humanitarian aspect of
the operation should be of primary consideration.

This means that it should not be an effort of the military
forces alone. Social, political, economic and public relations
considerations should be integrated into the substance of the
operational plan, and should involve appropriate operational
contributions from the government agencies concerned with the
delivery of social services.

Above all, military personnel in the field must not only
respect the human rights of the people of Aceh even in the heat
of the fighting, but must also be seen as doing so by an
observant world that will be keenly monitoring the progress of
the operation.

Above all, the effort should be as brief as possible.

As the Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu put it, "There is
no instance of any nation having gained a benefit from prolonged
war." Certainly not if it will take another 26 years, as it has
happened in Aceh.

The author, a senior diplomat, is the Indonesian government's
chief negotiator for Aceh. This paper is an abridged paper of his
personal account of his involvement in the Aceh diplomacy. The
full version of the paper will soon be available at our website,
www.thejakartapost.com