The 1998 student movement revisited

Ari A. Perdana Centre for Strategic and International Studies Jakarta Ari_Perdana@csis.or.id

Calling for reform, follow us! Calling for succession, follow us! No need to doubt, friends, just hold our hands. Ever onward, we will win! That was one of the most popular chants yelled by students during the 1998 movement.

It has been four years since the student movement in 1998 successfully brought Soeharto down from power. It was unpredicted, even unexpected, that Soeharto could be toppled by such a movement. Similar previous movements and political attempts to bring him down from power had never been successful. For more than 30 years, Soeharto had built a system that generated some kind of shield that protected against any disturbances to his power.

But May 21, 1998, was the last day he was in power. The drama of the student movement that began in late 1997 and early 1998 culminated in mid-May 1998. The death of four Trisakti University students in Jakarta, followed by a citywide racial riot, were the turning points. In the following weeks, thousands of students occupied the House of Representatives, calling for the impeachment of Soeharto. But Soeharto, without waiting for the legislature to impeach him, announced his resignation as president.

Undoubtedly, the student movement was one of the most, if not the most, influential aspects in bringing Soeharto down from power.

But it is also a fact that the 1998 student movement only succeeded in forcing Soeharto to step down. The movement did not topple the New Order regime totally. Many actors of that era still survive on the current political stage. But more importantly, the movement was not able completely to transform the system and paradigm of the New Order. The current system inherited many things from the past that were supposed to be corrected. For example, corruption continues, and is even getting worse. In other words, the 1998 movement was unable to bring about a complete revolution.

Senior sociologist Arief Budiman once said that historical revolutions had to meet several requirements to be considered successful. First, there has to be a solid, organized mass. Second, the presence of a strong, symbolic leadership. Third, usually a revolution is triggered by a certain event. In some cases we can add a fourth aspect, which is an alternative ideology.

The 1998 movement mainly relied on historical momentum, which was the economic crisis. The masses were not completely solid and organized. Some campuses and action units may have already had a solid basis, but in general the students did not yet have a common ground regarding the direction of the movement. There was even friction among the students, which after Soeharto had resigned resulted in the movement splitting up.

The 1998 movement did not have a charismatic and symbolic leadership. Even the students at the time tended to reject the leadership of any certain public figure or university. The movement also was not based on any ideology. Some might have declared themselves to be "leftists" or "Islamic activists", but the student movement in general was not ideologically driven. This was understandable as any ideological movement might have been easily repressed by the ruler.

To some extent, the absence of an organized mass, symbolic leadership and an alternative ideology provided the students some advantages. The students could claim their movement was a moral, rather than a political movement. In this way, they could also claim to be speaking for the people suffering in the economic crisis, without being suspected of acting as agents for certain political interests.

But the student movement appeared to lack a strong basis to be a long-term sustainable movement. The movement was supposed to broaden its scope to become a people's movement, in which other elements of civil society would have melted into a single unity. However, the Trisakti incident happened before this collaboration became solid. As a result, the student and non-student elements were no longer hand-in-hand after Soeharto resigned.

Even the students themselves seemed to be split when B.J. Habibie replaced Soeharto. Some students, especially those affiliated with the Islamic factions, supported Habibie. Others considered him as someone from the past who should also be toppled.

The lack of a long-term common platform among the students paved the way for politicians to steal the show. The reform agenda was then brought into the formal state institutions. However, the existing institutions and political system were the same as those in the New Order era. For example, the election system still produces legislators who do not represent voters. Rather, they look after the interests of their parties in trading for power.

And now, after four years, the reform movement has yet to pay the appropriate dividends. Some may even consider that the movement died prematurely. Hence, corrective measures to bring the reform movement back on track should be taken. This will require contributions from those who still are concerned about reform. But it should be done collectively, by all elements of civil society, including students, academics, non-governmental organization activists and many more.

And how about politicians? Well, we can drop them from the equation.