Fri, 12 Mar 2004

Thaksin's chance for leading role in the region

John D. Ciorciari, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore

When Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad stepped down last October, he brought an end to an era of Southeast Asian politics. Mahathir was the last of a generation of core ASEAN leaders, including Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew and Indonesia's Soeharto, to depart from office.

His longevity and relative economic success, combined with his bold and outspoken foreign policy, made him a leading voice for ASEAN, both within and beyond the region. Consequently, his retirement arguably left something of a vacuum in ASEAN leadership.

Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra appears the most eager to seize this opportunity for a greater role in the region. The question is how effective he can be in augmenting his position.

Thai prime ministers have rarely bid for regional leadership. Unstable domestic politics, tenuous civil-military relations, a dogged southern separatist movement and protracted border conflicts have provided ample preoccupation for Thaksin's predecessors.

Demonstrations and military intervention in 1992 undermined the country's image as a stabilizing democracy, and the 1997 Asian financial crisis hit Thailand hard, derailing many years of progress towards a greater economic role in Southeast Asia. Discomfort with English-language diplomacy and scant experience in foreign affairs also limited many Thai leaders' ambitions abroad.

Only with Thaksin has Thailand seen a prime minister with the apparent mix of will and capability to exercise greater regional and sub-regional leadership. Thaksin speaks English, exhibits comfort in front of the camera, and travels abroad more often than any Thai leader in recent history.

As a former communications magnate, he enjoys extensive contacts in the international business community. He also shows no lack of initiative.

In 2002, he launched the Asia Bond project to promote investment in Asian economies and the Asia Cooperation Dialogue, which engages 18 states from East Asia to the Middle East with Thailand as its hub.

Thailand is also centrally positioned in the region, with extensive access to both the South China and Andaman seas.

Planned intra-ASEAN roads and railways, a new international airport and seaport, and the planned trans-isthmian canal should further add to the country's economic and political centrality.

But with about one-eighth of ASEAN's population and one-fifth of its combined gross domestic product, Thailand is no regional hegemony. It does not have the size or demographic weight that have long made Indonesia the "natural" leader of Southeast Asia. It also faces ambivalent neighbors, wary of what they see as traditional Thai designs to dominate its immediate neighborhood on the mainland peninsula.

Indeed, Thaksin's opportunity for a larger regional role derives primarily from default. Indonesian President Megawati Soekarnoputri faces considerable challenges at home and an uncertain political future. She has demonstrated little apparent interest or ability in driving the ASEAN agenda, as her predecessors have. Filipino President Gloria Arroyo is similarly beset with domestic challenges and faces accusations of excessive closeness to Washington.

Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong has quietly maintained Singapore's economic and military position, but the city-state's small size, ethnic composition and strategic vulnerability place restraints on the roles it can play abroad. Singapore has spearheaded ASEAN's engagement with Europe, Northeast Asia and Latin America, and led the regional drive towards free-trade agreements with external powers.

But as he prepares to step down, Goh continues to take a subtle, cautious approach to foreign policy.

The same is true of new Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, who has made much of his intention to pursue a "quieter" policy than his controversial predecessor. His approach may yield considerable dividends, but given his country's modest size and resources, a Malaysian leader less outspoken than Mahathir is unlikely to assume his stature in regional affairs.

By contrast, Thaksin is highly outspoken and appears relatively unafraid to take political risks. Strong economic performance has won him unprecedented political popularity at home and places his Thai Rak Thai party in a very strong position for the coming general election.

Although widely accused of stifling political opposition, co- opting the media, and catering to big business interests, he appears to have achieved at least short-term dominance on the Thai political landscape. Many believe Thaksin is attempting to fashion a political order akin to that in Singapore or Malaysia, in which one dominant party leads a democratic state with a heavy hand in security and economic affairs.

Thaksin has also been controversial but strong-willed on the security front. His "war on drugs" last year brought about the death of roughly 2,500 people and drew heavy fire from human- rights activists and the Democrat Party. But his unrelenting attack on the Thai drug trade has brought him more domestic support than opposition.

Thaksin's ambition, economic success and relatively strong domestic position make him the most likely ASEAN leader to seek a greater regional voice in the post-Mahathir period.

It is highly unlikely that Thailand will ever achieve the primacy that Indonesia enjoyed at selected points in ASEAN's history; it's also improbable that Thaksin will take on the same degree of vocal leadership that Mahathir sometimes exercised.

He will not be able to push Indonesia and Malaysia to back major political or security initiatives, and he will not dominate ASEAN economic expansion, but Thailand is well positioned to enhance its role as the leading mainland node in the regional political system. He can also play a vocal and instrumental role in coordinating economic and security initiatives among like- minded countries inside and outside of the region.

For Singapore, a modest rise in Thailand's regional influence could prove a blessing. The two countries share basic free-market ideology and close military ties. Their views on a number of key political issues, such as free trade, managed free-market economics, terrorism, American and Chinese regional influence, domestic law and order and the Myanmar question are roughly aligned.

Singapore may benefit from a larger neighbor willing to take the lead and, occasionally, the brunt of other countries' criticism in pushing its agenda. As Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong prepares to take the reins, he will face the same dilemmas his father did in asserting the nation's interests.

A modest reorientation of the Southeast Asian power structure and development of a stronger mainland node may prove even more conducive than the old "ASEAN core" to the pursuit and realization of Singaporean interests.

The writer is a visiting research fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies and a Wai Seng Senior Research Scholar at Oxford University.