Thaksin's chance for leading role in the region

Thaksin's chance for leading role in the region

John D. Ciorciari, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore

When Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad stepped down
last October, he brought an end to an era of Southeast Asian
politics. Mahathir was the last of a generation of core ASEAN
leaders, including Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew and Indonesia's
Soeharto, to depart from office.

His longevity and relative economic success, combined with his
bold and outspoken foreign policy, made him a leading voice for
ASEAN, both within and beyond the region. Consequently, his
retirement arguably left something of a vacuum in ASEAN
leadership.

Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra appears the most eager
to seize this opportunity for a greater role in the region. The
question is how effective he can be in augmenting his position.

Thai prime ministers have rarely bid for regional leadership.
Unstable domestic politics, tenuous civil-military relations, a
dogged southern separatist movement and protracted border
conflicts have provided ample preoccupation for Thaksin's
predecessors.

Demonstrations and military intervention in 1992 undermined
the country's image as a stabilizing democracy, and the 1997
Asian financial crisis hit Thailand hard, derailing many years of
progress towards a greater economic role in Southeast Asia.
Discomfort with English-language diplomacy and scant experience
in foreign affairs also limited many Thai leaders' ambitions
abroad.

Only with Thaksin has Thailand seen a prime minister with the
apparent mix of will and capability to exercise greater regional
and sub-regional leadership. Thaksin speaks English, exhibits
comfort in front of the camera, and travels abroad more often
than any Thai leader in recent history.

As a former communications magnate, he enjoys extensive
contacts in the international business community. He also shows
no lack of initiative.

In 2002, he launched the Asia Bond project to promote
investment in Asian economies and the Asia Cooperation Dialogue,
which engages 18 states from East Asia to the Middle East with
Thailand as its hub.

Thailand is also centrally positioned in the region, with
extensive access to both the South China and Andaman seas.

Planned intra-ASEAN roads and railways, a new international
airport and seaport, and the planned trans-isthmian canal should
further add to the country's economic and political centrality.

But with about one-eighth of ASEAN's population and one-fifth
of its combined gross domestic product, Thailand is no regional
hegemony. It does not have the size or demographic weight that
have long made Indonesia the "natural" leader of Southeast Asia.
It also faces ambivalent neighbors, wary of what they see as
traditional Thai designs to dominate its immediate neighborhood
on the mainland peninsula.

Indeed, Thaksin's opportunity for a larger regional role
derives primarily from default. Indonesian President Megawati
Soekarnoputri faces considerable challenges at home and an
uncertain political future. She has demonstrated little apparent
interest or ability in driving the ASEAN agenda, as her
predecessors have. Filipino President Gloria Arroyo is similarly
beset with domestic challenges and faces accusations of excessive
closeness to Washington.

Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong has quietly maintained
Singapore's economic and military position, but the city-state's
small size, ethnic composition and strategic vulnerability place
restraints on the roles it can play abroad. Singapore has
spearheaded ASEAN's engagement with Europe, Northeast Asia and
Latin America, and led the regional drive towards free-trade
agreements with external powers.

But as he prepares to step down, Goh continues to take a
subtle, cautious approach to foreign policy.

The same is true of new Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah
Badawi, who has made much of his intention to pursue a "quieter"
policy than his controversial predecessor. His approach may yield
considerable dividends, but given his country's modest size and
resources, a Malaysian leader less outspoken than Mahathir is
unlikely to assume his stature in regional affairs.

By contrast, Thaksin is highly outspoken and appears
relatively unafraid to take political risks. Strong economic
performance has won him unprecedented political popularity at
home and places his Thai Rak Thai party in a very strong position
for the coming general election.

Although widely accused of stifling political opposition, co-
opting the media, and catering to big business interests, he
appears to have achieved at least short-term dominance on the
Thai political landscape. Many believe Thaksin is attempting to
fashion a political order akin to that in Singapore or Malaysia,
in which one dominant party leads a democratic state with a heavy
hand in security and economic affairs.

Thaksin has also been controversial but strong-willed on the
security front. His "war on drugs" last year brought about the
death of roughly 2,500 people and drew heavy fire from human-
rights activists and the Democrat Party. But his unrelenting
attack on the Thai drug trade has brought him more domestic
support than opposition.

Thaksin's ambition, economic success and relatively strong
domestic position make him the most likely ASEAN leader to seek a
greater regional voice in the post-Mahathir period.

It is highly unlikely that Thailand will ever achieve the
primacy that Indonesia enjoyed at selected points in ASEAN's
history; it's also improbable that Thaksin will take on the same
degree of vocal leadership that Mahathir sometimes exercised.

He will not be able to push Indonesia and Malaysia to back
major political or security initiatives, and he will not dominate
ASEAN economic expansion, but Thailand is well positioned to
enhance its role as the leading mainland node in the regional
political system. He can also play a vocal and instrumental role
in coordinating economic and security initiatives among like-
minded countries inside and outside of the region.

For Singapore, a modest rise in Thailand's regional influence
could prove a blessing. The two countries share basic free-market
ideology and close military ties. Their views on a number of key
political issues, such as free trade, managed free-market
economics, terrorism, American and Chinese regional influence,
domestic law and order and the Myanmar question are roughly
aligned.

Singapore may benefit from a larger neighbor willing to take
the lead and, occasionally, the brunt of other countries'
criticism in pushing its agenda. As Deputy Prime Minister Lee
Hsien Loong prepares to take the reins, he will face the same
dilemmas his father did in asserting the nation's interests.

A modest reorientation of the Southeast Asian power structure
and development of a stronger mainland node may prove even more
conducive than the old "ASEAN core" to the pursuit and
realization of Singaporean interests.

The writer is a visiting research fellow at the Institute of
Defense and Strategic Studies and a Wai Seng Senior Research
Scholar at Oxford University.