Tue, 23 Jul 2002

Thailand's 'trifling' role in Sri Lankan peace process

Kavi Chongkittavorn, The Nation, Asia News Network, Bangkok

With the Sri Lanka peace talks fast approaching, the Thai government has yet to figure out its role other than to provide the venue for the direct discussions between Colombo and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

The government has suffered from withdrawal symptoms as it has not shown any further commitment or understanding of the complexity of the upcoming peace negotiations.

Recent arms seizures in the South have raised questions regarding the lack of the government's seriousness in dealing with illegal arms smuggling. This month alone police have seized a large cache of arms that were destined for abroad in two separate raids in Satun and Phuket.

In Phuket, police sized a shipment of rocket-propelled grenades, AK-47 bullets and hand grenades heading for Tamil Tiger fighters in northern Sri Lanka.

If these trends continue unabated, prospects for the planned peace process could be threatened. For one thing, under the Feb. 22 cease-fire agreement, neither Colombo nor the LTTE are supposed to engage in arms shipments.

It is an open secret that the coastal provinces along the Andaman Sea in southern Thailand have become popular trans- shipment routes for arms smuggling. Apart from Phuket, Phang-nga and Krabi are two other popular spots for easy access to international waters.

Similar arrests were made in past years but the Thai authorities have not given any serious thought to stopping these activities.

The prevailing feeling among officials is that as long as these arms shipments are not targeted at Thai people, they should be treated as ordinary arms heists. Few Thai officials know that the LTTE has been declared a terrorist organization in the United States and is on anti-terrorism lists in Canada, Britain and Australia.

Without a serious investigation, it will be difficult to establish whether the arms shipment to the LTTE was made before or after the February agreement. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, which oversees the cease-fire, has accused the LTTE of truce violations when its two monitoring officials were held temporarily last week for trying to inspect the LTTE, raising suspicions of arms smuggling. Fortunately, this incident and others have not been used so far by either side as a pretext to derail talks.

Thailand, which prides itself as having been the host to several peace talks in the past, has yet to understand the implications of having LTTE agents operating on its soil. With its extensive financial networks here and the country's well- known loose immigration rules and corruption, the LTTE has been able to establish cells and procure arms both in Thailand and neighboring countries and ship them to their fighters.

During the Cambodian conflict, Thailand played an active role in persuading warring factions to converge in Pattaya to work out a cease-fire agreement and a settlement plan that subsequently led to the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and the restoration of peace in Cambodia. But for the Sri Lanka peace talks, Bangkok does not have any knowledge of the decades-long ethnic conflict, which has killed 64,000 people.

For instance, the Thai attitude towards UN resolution 1373 - passed by the UN Security Council 17 days after the September 11 terrorist attack - is that of negligence.

This resolution requires UN member states, under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, to take concrete steps to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts, including the criminalization of the willful provision or collection of funds for the carrying out of terrorist acts.

Western countries such as Canada, Britain and Australia with large Tamil communities have complied with the resolution and cut off financial links and banned fund-raising in their countries. Thailand has yet to understand the resolution, let alone comply with it. In addition, there are other UN Security Council resolutions - especially 1267, 1269 and 1333 - which require UN members to freeze assets related to the Taleban and Osama bin Laden, his associates and the al-Qaeda organization.

Although Thailand has enacted an anti-money laundering law, it is primarily aimed at combating drug smuggling, prostitution rings, and money laundering by translational crime syndicates, without specifically targeting terrorist networks.

Talks between Colombo and the LTTE will take a long time. Both sides realize that they have to give peace and dialogue a chance. It is in their mutual interests to keep stop fighting and look beyond. So far, the cease-fire agreement has survived almost five months.

The peace talks were at first scheduled to be held in May, but were delayed to June and then much later still. Accusations of violating the cease-fire and disagreements over the agenda were the main reasons.

The LTTE insists that the talks must zero in on deciding the administrators of the disputed areas. It has demanded the exclusive control of the interim administration for the northeastern province. Colombo argues that elections should be the key factor to decide who will eventually control the areas. It is highly likely now that the talks will start in mid-August and will be held somewhere near Pattaya.

Therefore, it is imperative that Thailand changes its mindset and plays its rightful role for the historic talks, apart from providing hospitality. Bangkok should encourage both sides to engage in the peace process and provide incentives as necessary. It should send a strong signal to the LTTE that its full cooperation and reconciliation in the upcoming talks will be rewarded, and that its networks inside Thailand will not be affected and could be put to good use.