Thailand must avoid quick fix in the South

Thailand must avoid quick fix in the South

Kavi Chongkittavorn, The Nation, Asia News Network, Bangkok

It was thought, at first, to be a relatively commonplace
flare-up in the predominantly Muslim southern provinces, where
bandits, good and rogue police officers, good and rogue soldiers,
corrupt officials and remnants of Muslim separatist groups have
long associated with, robbed and occasionally killed each other.

But this time it really was different.

The well-executed attack on an armory in Narathiwat and the
torching of 20 southern schools, followed by the government's
knee-jerk response and hypermobilisation of all sorts of
instruments of security, only highlights the central government's
sense of vulnerability and the possibility of a further increase
in violence in the country's southern tip. Failure to resolve or
contain it could alter the country's political landscape in the
five predominantly Muslim provinces, particularly Narathiwat,
Yala and Pattani, and even beyond the South.

The timing of the attack was important, coming as the
government's first term enters its final year. Campaigning for
the election, still a year away, has started in earnest, as has
the buttering up of voters with the registration of low-income
families and other fiscal stimulus packages.

A week on since the incident, security officials and
government leaders have concluded that the culprits are a mixed
bag of Muslim insurgents with links to international terrorist
networks. This is a departure for the government, which has
steadfastly branded every violent incident in the troubled region
for the past three years the work of bandits.

This time Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has admitted that
the attack was the work of professionals. But he stopped short of
identifying specific groups. He left his lieutenants to speculate
on which individuals or groups might have been involved.

The fact that several members of the government, including
Deputy Prime Minister General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh and Defense
Minister General Thamarak Isarangura, made similar comments
linking the attackers to overseas terror groups particularly
Jamaah Islamiyah, was significant. The willingness to acknowledge
such a link reflects changes brought about by Thailand's anti-
terrorism campaign and unwavering support of the reconstruction
effort in Iraq. A total of 443 Thai troops were dispatched to
Iraq more than three months ago.

Two days after Christmas two of those soldiers were killed
when a car bomb exploded at Lima Camp in Karbala. The blast also
claimed the lives of 17 others, including Iraqis and troops from
other countries. That day for the first time Thailand paid a
price for its support of the war on terror. Like other coalition
partners, its soldiers have shed blood.

Doubtless Thailand is now on the ever-growing list of
terrorist targets. This helps explain why the government's
leaders have been so ready to accept the linkage with foreign
terror groups. Increased foreign assistance on anti-terrorism
campaign is to be expected This further complicates the political
situation the South.

Thailand's willingness to participate in the U.S.-led
reconstruction of Iraq after taking a "neutral" stance during the
major combat phase of the war has caused a heightening in
tensions between Muslim and non-Muslim Thais. Coinciding with
this, Thaksin has increased the powers of provincial governors in
the South along the lines of his CEO approach without showing
concern for the special aspects of the region's Muslim faith,
identity and culture.

The government's growth oriented policies and stimulation of
domestic spending and the Ua-athorn, or "we care", campaign have
been viewed with skepticism by the Muslim communities there. The
jury is still out related to their overall effectiveness.

As the government targets Muslim insurgents and their reported
links with outside terrorists, it will be more inclined to
overlook the sensibilities of the Muslim communities -- a
hallmark of the previous government. The abolition of the
Interior Ministry's Administrative Center for Southern Border
Provinces was a great policy faux pas, because it destroyed the
process of dialogue for all parties concerned. Harsher security
measures are likely in the weeks and months to come.

Under these conditions, the Muslim community's sense of
alienation will certainly grow. As it does, Muslims' perception
of the Thaksin government could deteriorate. There is a danger
that local authorities' wielding of their new powers, which
include the right to interrogate key religious teachers and
search their pondoks, or religious schools, will only deepen the
existing resentment.

The government must avoid the trap of trying to apply quick-
fix solutions to the problems of the South by, for instance,
pouring development money into the area, something it has done
successfully elsewhere. Bangkok should learn a few lessons from
the provincial Islamic leaders' rejection to accept the lottery
fund.

Any policy that is viewed as condescending towards Islam will
encourage resistance to Bangkok in the form of holy war or jihad
against the "satanic" central power. This feeling, albeit at a
nascent stage, is emerging as the perceived threat to the Muslim
way of life including religious and cultural pride grows. It does
not necessarily, however, entail the territorial ambition that
many Thai leaders fear.

If the quick fix becomes a template for action in the South,
the government will be confronted with a new breed of Muslim
insurgents with local support. As the crisis deepens, the
government could be tempted to implement ever tougher measures in
search of quicker results in ridding the country of them.

This vicious circle could drive them deeper underground or to
other countries, the outcome of which would be the breeding of
new recruits for various marginalised insurgency groups and a
solidification of their sense of common struggle -- the very
thing the government has been trying to prevent in the first
place.