Thailand must avoid quick fix in the South

Kavi Chongkittavorn, The Nation, Asia News Network, Bangkok

It was thought, at first, to be a relatively commonplace flare-up in the predominantly Muslim southern provinces, where bandits, good and rogue police officers, good and rogue soldiers, corrupt officials and remnants of Muslim separatist groups have long associated with, robbed and occasionally killed each other.

But this time it really was different.

The well-executed attack on an armory in Narathiwat and the torching of 20 southern schools, followed by the government's knee-jerk response and hypermobilisation of all sorts of instruments of security, only highlights the central government's sense of vulnerability and the possibility of a further increase in violence in the country's southern tip. Failure to resolve or contain it could alter the country's political landscape in the five predominantly Muslim provinces, particularly Narathiwat, Yala and Pattani, and even beyond the South.

The timing of the attack was important, coming as the government's first term enters its final year. Campaigning for the election, still a year away, has started in earnest, as has the buttering up of voters with the registration of low-income families and other fiscal stimulus packages.

A week on since the incident, security officials and government leaders have concluded that the culprits are a mixed bag of Muslim insurgents with links to international terrorist networks. This is a departure for the government, which has steadfastly branded every violent incident in the troubled region for the past three years the work of bandits.

This time Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has admitted that the attack was the work of professionals. But he stopped short of identifying specific groups. He left his lieutenants to speculate on which individuals or groups might have been involved.

The fact that several members of the government, including Deputy Prime Minister General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh and Defense Minister General Thamarak Isarangura, made similar comments linking the attackers to overseas terror groups particularly Jamaah Islamiyah, was significant. The willingness to acknowledge such a link reflects changes brought about by Thailand's anti- terrorism campaign and unwavering support of the reconstruction effort in Iraq. A total of 443 Thai troops were dispatched to Iraq more than three months ago.

Two days after Christmas two of those soldiers were killed when a car bomb exploded at Lima Camp in Karbala. The blast also claimed the lives of 17 others, including Iraqis and troops from other countries. That day for the first time Thailand paid a price for its support of the war on terror. Like other coalition partners, its soldiers have shed blood.

Doubtless Thailand is now on the ever-growing list of terrorist targets. This helps explain why the government's leaders have been so ready to accept the linkage with foreign terror groups. Increased foreign assistance on anti-terrorism campaign is to be expected This further complicates the political situation the South.

Thailand's willingness to participate in the U.S.-led reconstruction of Iraq after taking a "neutral" stance during the major combat phase of the war has caused a heightening in tensions between Muslim and non-Muslim Thais. Coinciding with this, Thaksin has increased the powers of provincial governors in the South along the lines of his CEO approach without showing concern for the special aspects of the region's Muslim faith, identity and culture.

The government's growth oriented policies and stimulation of domestic spending and the Ua-athorn, or "we care", campaign have been viewed with skepticism by the Muslim communities there. The jury is still out related to their overall effectiveness.

As the government targets Muslim insurgents and their reported links with outside terrorists, it will be more inclined to overlook the sensibilities of the Muslim communities -- a hallmark of the previous government. The abolition of the Interior Ministry's Administrative Center for Southern Border Provinces was a great policy faux pas, because it destroyed the process of dialogue for all parties concerned. Harsher security measures are likely in the weeks and months to come.

Under these conditions, the Muslim community's sense of alienation will certainly grow. As it does, Muslims' perception of the Thaksin government could deteriorate. There is a danger that local authorities' wielding of their new powers, which include the right to interrogate key religious teachers and search their pondoks, or religious schools, will only deepen the existing resentment.

The government must avoid the trap of trying to apply quick- fix solutions to the problems of the South by, for instance, pouring development money into the area, something it has done successfully elsewhere. Bangkok should learn a few lessons from the provincial Islamic leaders' rejection to accept the lottery fund.

Any policy that is viewed as condescending towards Islam will encourage resistance to Bangkok in the form of holy war or jihad against the "satanic" central power. This feeling, albeit at a nascent stage, is emerging as the perceived threat to the Muslim way of life including religious and cultural pride grows. It does not necessarily, however, entail the territorial ambition that many Thai leaders fear.

If the quick fix becomes a template for action in the South, the government will be confronted with a new breed of Muslim insurgents with local support. As the crisis deepens, the government could be tempted to implement ever tougher measures in search of quicker results in ridding the country of them.

This vicious circle could drive them deeper underground or to other countries, the outcome of which would be the breeding of new recruits for various marginalised insurgency groups and a solidification of their sense of common struggle -- the very thing the government has been trying to prevent in the first place.