Taleban's rise provokes alarm

LONDON: The capture of Kabul by the Taleban on Sept. 27, 1996 has had significant regional ramifications and increased international interest and involvement in Afghanistan. Iran, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and India have all, for different reasons, expressed their alarm at recent developments, while Pakistan has tacitly welcomed the Taleban's success.

Even though subsequent military setbacks have indicated that expectations of further Taleban victories were exaggerated, the higher level of foreign interest continues. Several countries have offered to host an international conference to examine ways of finding a political settlement, while the UN Security Council held a meeting on Oct. 22 at Russia's request to discuss the crisis. Moscow also convened a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit at Almaty, Kazakhstan, on Oct. 4.

In September 1994, the Taleban emerged in the south of Afghanistan and quickly gained control of many regions. Taleban members are ethnically Pashtun and most originally come from one of three distinct groups. Many of the movement's leaders - including its founder, Mula Mohammed Omar - were members of the mujahedin who fought against Soviet forces in the 1980s.

A second important Taleban sub-component are Durrani Qandaharis, who have traditionally supported the former Afghan royal family. The third and perhaps largest element has been the young graduates of the madrasa (religious schools) in western Pakistan. Islamabad's Jamiat-i-Ulema-Islam party, headed by Fazlur Rahman, ran these schools, where many of the Afghan pupils were orphans or children of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The schools' teachings offer some insights into the Taleban's political and theological beliefs, including their literalist interpretation of Islam, and particular emphasis is placed on limiting a woman's right to education and employment. Politically, the Taleban emphasis a strict application of Islamic law, the Shari'a.

Mula Omar launched a new Jihad in autumn 1994 in Maiwand district aimed at disarming numerous local warlords who allegedly brought insecurity, moral decay and lawlessness to the country. His example was soon followed by other Mulas and Talebs in Kandahar, while Afghan religious students in Pakistan swelled the Taleban ranks. Initially the movement demanded that local commanders remove road blocks and toll gates in their areas and abide by the Shari'a.

Some non-Taleban commanders tried to manipulate the movement against their factional rivals. This led to the eventual removal of the toll gates and the beginning of a dialogue among provincial elders to try to bring about an effective administration in Kandahar. But the refusal of the Spin Boldak commanders served as a precursor to the violence which led to the seizure of the district government in July 1994. Shortly afterwards, the movement expanded its control across the Kandahar province.

Taleban's military success since 1994 stems from two sources. First, is the desire of the people in the Pashtun regions to escape the anarchy caused by the brutal civil war; and second, the alleged zeal and determination of Taleban fighters, even though a number of their recent and most spectacular advances seem to have been the result of local negotiations. The group received external support, particularly from Pakistan's military- dominated Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI).

There appear to be differences among the Taleban on the nature of a future government. Some favor a transitional arrangement that would include some of their opponents, technocrats who live in the West and even the former king, Mohammed Zahir Shah. Others want a monopoly of power and a strict Islamic state. Although the Taleban have declared their leader as the 'Commander of the Faithful', Mula Omar has not moved to Kabul and does not appear to be running the 'government'.

Initial Russian and Iranian alarm not only reflected the countries' anger at the success of the Taleban, but also their fear that the movement might quickly defeat the remaining centers of power in Afghanistan - Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum's Uzbek forces and the Tajik troops headed by commander Ahmad Shah Masoud. Iran convened a meeting in Tehran on Oct. 29 to discuss the Afghan crisis; it called for the formation of a government of national unity and criticized the Taleban's human-rights violations.

Moscow was also worried that the Taleban would support the Tajik opposition outside Afghanistan. In Tajikistan, Imamoli Rakhmonov's government and the Russian border troops suffered a major blow when the United Tajik Opposition took control of the Garm Valley and threatened the government position in western Tajikistan. In response, Russia made a deal with the Rabbani government to prevent the Tajik opposition from using the adjacent Afghan territory as a safe haven.

Not everyone shared Russia's perspective on developments in Afghanistan. Turkmenistan, for example, did not participate in the CIS summit. Its attitude, along with that of Pakistan and the initial reaction of U.S. and Saudi oil interests, is linked at least in part to 'pipeline politics'. There is particular concern about the implications of recent developments on the proposed oil and gas pipeline routes through the Afghanistan corridor. Islamabad and Ashkhabad want stability in Afghanistan so that the projected construction of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via western Afghanistan into Pakistan can finally go ahead.

While instability and insecurity existed in Afghanistan, the U.S. oil company Unocal and its minority partner Saudi Arabian Delta Oil would be unable to begin this US$2 billion project. The ideal route to transport Turkmen gas would have been through Iran, but U.S.-Iranian antipathy and Washington's economic sanctions quashed that option. Turkmenistan, not wanting to rely on the Russian route, did not mind whether the gas pipeline went through Afghanistan or Iran. But if Iran were politically inaccessible, Afghanistan and Pakistan were its only options.

After deliberations in Almaty, Moscow and several other CIS states moved on three fronts: * First, Russia hedged against a Taleban victory by strengthening its military forces along the Afghan border in Tajikistan; Uzbekistan did the same on its border; * Second, Russia became active internationally, by attempting to organize an international conference to explore ideas for a political settlement. Moscow also increased its contacts with various Afghan political and military forces, including the former king of Afghanistan; and * Third, Russia encouraged greater cooperation among Afghan forces opposed to the Taleban. The Russians and Iranians encouraged Dostum and Masoud to join forces. The Russian Counsel in Mazar-i-Sharif was present at the signing of the military alliance between Dostum and Masoud. Russia, Uzbekistan and Iran may also be providing financial and military assistance to the alliance.

Islamabad, on the other hand, assisted the Taleban economically and diplomatically. Pakistan also became more active in promoting a settlement between the Taleban and its opponents, especially Gen. Dostum. Islamabad sent its Minister of Interior Naseerullah Babar and Jamiat-i-Islami leader Fazel Rahman - both of whom have some influence with the Taleban and are known to other Afghan groups - to seek an understanding among the Afghan factions.

Following the military successes of Dostum and Masoud's forces in late October, the Taleban appear to have been fought to a standstill, at least for the moment. The current stalemate is to the evident satisfaction of the initial losers, namely, Moscow, New Delhi, Tehran, Tashkent and Dushanbe. However, all these capitals know that the strategic situation remains fluid, with very little prospect of one force succeeding in gaining control over the entire country and creating the stability and security that its people desperately needs. In the coming months, the Afghan crisis could develop in several ways, with different implications for the country and the region.

First, prospects for a total victory by the Taleban have diminished. The speed and nature of their initial military successes stunned analysts and regional capitals, both of which knew little about the Taleban and the implications of their victories.

While the Taleban are determined and highly motivated fighters, they are not invincible. They have been defeated before (in 1995) and have recently suffered reverses of fortune. The Taleban do not control the strategic Salang highway leading to the north, and thus they do not have any influence over the country's northern provinces. They were unable to prevent former government officials fleeing Kabul and were unable to decisively defeat government forces.

Finally, the Taleban have lost much of the goodwill they had when they began their latest offensive. When they captured Jalalabad and Kabul they were welcomed as liberators, overthrowing a discredited and demoralized government that had been unable to bring peace and security to Afghanistan. Once in power, however, they implemented a harsh and unforgiving form of Islamist governance in line with their extremely conservative social beliefs. Many residents of Kabul who were used to a free style of living now resent the Taleban's social agenda. Moreover, the potential for ethno-linguistic differences between the more sophisticated Dari (Persian) speakers of Kabul and the Pushto- speaking Taleban still exists. The result has been a decline in support for the movement and an exodus from Kabul.

A de facto partitioning of the country is now possible if the Dostum-Masoud alliance holds and manages to check the Taleban advance northwards. The country would then be split into a Tajik- Uzbek-Turkmen north and a Taleban-run and Pashtun-dominated center and south. Both Dostum and Masoud maintain powerful and effective forces. Dostum's troops are a well-trained conventional army equipped with modern Russian weaponry. Furthermore, they have been recently refurbished with a further influx of arms and particularly anti-aircraft artillery from Russia and Uzbekistan.

Masoud, who previously controlled the conventional military forces of the former Rabbani government, is a master of mobile guerrilla warfare, having fought former Soviet forces to a standstill in the Panjshir valley in the 1980s. Masoud has repeated this strategy against the Taleban in October when he inflicted severe casualties on them at the Panjshir valley. If the combatants decide to wage low-level warfare with limited risks, as they did in late October, they can maintain combat for a prolonged period of time without much need for external re- supply from regional powers.