Taking the long view in countering terrorism

Taking the long view in countering terrorism

Barry Desker, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore

The emergence of the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) threat in Southeast
Asia has spawned a cottage industry of books and commentaries
discussing terrorism in the region.

Most of the analyses are by counter-terrorism specialists,
theorists in international relations and political pundits.

Those who have spent years studying the region, including area
specialists and scholars in Islamic studies, have been absent
from the debate. Instead, they have decried the lack of depth in
these analyses.

One reason for their late involvement: Most were mesmerized by
the moderate character of Islam in the region. There was denial
that there are groups intent on disrupting the peaceful evolution
of societies, such as Indonesia, in a transition to democratic
governance.

Lacking the long view these specialists could provide, the
debate on JI resulted in the perception that militancy in Islam
is a recent phenomenon.

In reality, radical interpretations of Islam are not a new
development. In the 1870s, religious Muslims who returned from
the haj inspired by the austere Wahabi fundamentalism they
encountered in Mecca embarked on the Padri wars in West Sumatra.

The use of the term "padri" was an astute recognition of the
overlap between fundamentalists of different religious faiths:
The white robes of the Wahabi followers and their religious zeal
reminded local villagers of Christian missionaries or padres.

At the beginning of the 20th century, pamphleteers and editors
in Singapore, then the hub of the regional Malay-language media,
spread competing Islamic doctrines around the region. They set
the stage for a political contest between the Kaum Muda (the
reformists) and the Kaum Tua (the traditional establishment).

In the 1950s, the new Indonesian republic faced a major
challenge from the Darul Islam revolt, which was supported by
Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Basyir, the leaders of today's JI.

Colonial regimes in the region, as well as post-colonial
leaderships, agonized over the role of Islam and recognized the
challenge posed by Islamic radicals bent on overturning the
existing state order.

Radical interpretations of Islam will be a recurrent
challenge, as today's JI shows. Like other similar movements in
the Islamic world which describe themselves as Salafi, JI sought
a revival of the pristine Islam of the founding ancestors
(salaf), by replicating the historic conquest of pagan Arabia.

The JI redefined jihad to justify revolutionary violence
against internal and external enemies of Islam. Like Osama bin
Laden, its leaders justified violence against Muslim rulers on
the grounds that they suppressed Islamic law and were therefore
apostates to be punished with death. Violence against Americans
and other "Crusaders" was justified on the grounds that they
promoted secular societies which subjugated Islam.

One fascinating aspect is the unintended consequences of
earlier actions. United States support for the mujahideen who
opposed Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s led to the
creation of a multinational network of Afghan veterans who
returned to their home countries desiring to replicate their
successful jihad.

The late Abdullah Sungkar laid the groundwork for future
cooperation between JI and al-Qaeda when he went to Afghanistan
to participate in the resistance. The decision by the U.S. to
withdraw from Afghanistan after the end of the Cold War allowed
al-Qaeda to use this failed state as a sanctuary and training
ground for a global jihad.

The networks created in Afghanistan formed the building blocks
for al-Qaeda's global reach, as local concerns were fused with
its global agenda.

To appreciate al-Qaeda's global as well as regional impact,
one should look at the organization as a venture capitalist
acting as a revolutionary catalyst. It provides training and
funding while allowing for local initiative and a sense of
empowerment.

Instead of a hierarchical transnational organization, al-Qaeda
is a hydra-headed network linking operatives with shared beliefs.
Although al-Qaeda has provided logistics support and financial
assistance to JI, its most significant role lay in the creation
of a shared identity and a global vision.

It is frequently argued that the rage within Muslim
communities arises from the conflicts in the Middle East -- the
Israel-Palestine conflict and now the American occupation of
Iraq. We should not ignore the radicalizing impact of these
developments.

However, a closer reading of Osama's pronouncements and of
jihadist literature suggests that even if these conflicts were
resolved, a host of new issues would arise, such as Chechnya,
Kashmir, the southern Philippines and domestic governance in
Algeria.

The aborted Singapore JI plan in 2002 to hijack an Aeroflot
aircraft after its stopover in Bangkok and crash it into the
Changi Airport control tower illustrates this new dimension. A
Russian aircraft was chosen to demonstrate Singapore JI's
solidarity with the struggle in Chechnya.

While attention has been focused on the globalising impact of
MNCs, even terrorist movements have become globalised. The CNN
effect has magnified the impact of the Middle East and other
conflicts.

In meeting the threat of terrorism, a critical aspect will be
the use of soft power, the use of non-military strategies to
respond to this threat, which go beyond military, law enforcement
and intelligence collection responses. It is a battle for hearts
and minds.

The important role of strengthening cooperative networks tends
to be underestimated.

In Southeast Asia, counter-terrorism cooperation is at the
bilateral and trilateral levels. ASEAN agreements are primarily
declaratory in intent. ASEAN has been most useful in establishing
norms and in capacity building through the sharing of expertise.

Nevertheless, the current level of intra-ASEAN cooperation is
considerably improved today compared to the mutual recriminations
when the first evidence of the JI network emerged in December
2001.

The writer is director of the Institute of Defense and
Strategic Studies.