Taking the fight against terrorism to the high seas

Graham Gerard Ong, Research Associate Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore

The International Maritime Organization's (IMO) meeting on maritime security that opens in London today could not have been more timely.

There is increasing evidence that al-Qaeda's terrorist network has taken sail through their attempts on ports and ships worldwide. ASEAN's maritime states have a crucial interest in seeing that maritime terrorism is kept at bay.

Terrorism expert David Claridge of Janusian Securities believes that the Bali attack on Oct. 12 was a declaration of war on the global economy. Taped statements by two top leaders of al- Qaeda have also alluded to attacks on "economic lifelines". These immediately refer to commercial shipping lanes as a key avenue.

If we delve deeper into Claridge's reading of the Bali attack, then the subtext in the main message becomes apparent: We will take to the waters; your ships will not be safe at port or sea.

Coincidentally or not, the Bali attack corresponded with the second anniversary of al-Qaeda's devastating assault on the USS Cole at a port in Yemen in 2000. The suicide bombing of a French- flagged ship, the Limburg, off Yemen on Oct. 6 this year serves as additional forewarning.

In a recent discovery of a collection of poems written by supporters of al-Qaeda that was meant for public distribution, one piece signed by Mukhtar Said hails the attack on the USS Cole. He urges other young men to follow the path of those "who plunged into the seas steadfastly".

The sudden spate of terrorist plots on ships in Southeast Asia tempers symbolism and verse with reality. According to intelligence sources, masterminds of the USS Cole attack planned another attack on a United States ship visiting a Malaysian port in 2000. Earlier this year, Singapore intelligence disrupted an al-Qaeda plot to attack another US ship.

Detained senior al-Qaeda operative Omar al-Faruq, who helped set up several terrorist training camps in Southeast Asia, also told officials of plans to attack an American naval ship in Surabaya, Indonesia's second-largest port.

The utility of maritime attacks in Southeast Asia and, critically, in the Malacca Straits, the jugular of the region's maritime trade, is unmistakable. The Malacca Straits is a highly strategic sea-lane that handles voluminous amounts of regional import and export cargo, as well as 80 percent of Japan's oil. Between 150 and 900 ships pass through it daily.

Singapore's harbor, the world's busiest transit port, sits on this strait as a hub in the global economic lifeline.

However, maritime terrorism attempts in the region so far have failed.

There may be various reasons explaining their lack of achievement. One of them is the lack of expertise in getting it right. While al-Qaeda may have the material resources to conduct maritime attacks, they do not necessarily possess the skills in maritime craft and seafaring.

Regional authorities should not exclude a nexus between terrorism and piracy. It makes sense for terrorists to co-opt pirates' expertise into their training program. One should not forget that the Sept. 11 attacks were successful largely because the perpetrators were trained as skilled airline pilots.

Pirates in Southeast Asia have already proven themselves. According to the International Maritime Bureau, pirates have carried out 20 successful attacks and hijackings along the Malacca Straits and 72 such activities around Indonesia between Jan. 1 to Sept. 30.

In the end, even if terrorists decide to go it alone, technology will arbitrate the prospect for further failure. According to maritime security analyst Vijay Sakhuja, dual-use technologies such as the Global Positioning System, satellite communications systems, sea-sport scooters, scuba diving equipment and mini-submarines are being added to the inventory list of maritime terrorists. These items are within al-Qaeda's purchasing power.

Naval escorts and anti-boarding measures should be the last line of prevention. The frontline of defense is good intelligence.

The safest gauge of success for states is one that increases the margin between the initial intention of terrorists and their execution of a plan. The best attack is to hunt them down viciously.

The IMO conference would do well to tackle threats to maritime security in several ways. First, there is an even greater need right now to enhance the cooperative efforts between intelligence agencies across states.

Second, it would do well to reclassify piracy under maritime terrorism. This would ratchet the threat of an age-old criminal activity into a crucial security issue. While the two activities operate on different aims, they share a similar medium for action and create a near equal impact on political and economic stability.

Thirdly, the fight against piracy should become the point of entry in the fight against maritime terrorism as both activities are carried out through similar media and tactics. This avoids duplication in formulating counteractive strategies and use of resources.

The intelligence community would also do well to move beyond the conventional calculus in uncovering the next move of terrorists. A stronger grounding in culture and history and a dose of imagination can serve as a bridge over prevailing information gaps. As long as analysts and officials hold on to predictable assumptions about the next step terrorists will take, they will continue to be stumped.

Amid the heat of speculation about how Osama bin Laden would flee Afghanistan, no one suspected that he would utilize his family links with the tribesmen of the Hadhra Maug to assist him in his journey towards Yemen by traditional dhow across the Arabian Sea. This was obviously a means of transport too uninteresting to receive notice by intelligence agencies.

The point here is that all possible avenues and links between militant Islamic groups and other actors such as pirates and organized criminals must be investigated. Analysts must leave nothing to chance.

For the moment, to use Sakhuja's words, Southeast Asia's "maritime infrastructure" will continue to be "the soft belly of states that can be attacked with little effort". An attack to the belly is enough to cause the strongest of people to keel over in incapacitation and defeat.