Taiwan's search for stable security setting

Taiwan's search for stable security setting

Bantarto Bandoro, Editor, 'The Indonesian Quarterly',
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta,
bandoro@csis.or.id

Taiwan, represented by the President of Academica Sinica, the
Nobel prize-winner Lee Yuan-tsen, took part in the recent Mexico
APEC meeting. But Taiwan was frustrated over its exclusion from a
meeting of foreign minister to discuss counterterrorism efforts.
The international community has, in fact, acted discriminatively
in its efforts at building international coalition against
terrorism. The snub occurred because Taiwan's foreign minister
was not allowed to attend the summit. The argument was that
Taiwan had signed a "memorandum of understanding" before APEC
that excluded it from ministerial meetings.

The adherence to the One-China principle by most of APEC's
members has prevented Taiwan from becoming a full part of the
forum's activities. But, the problem is, perhaps, not about a
memorandum. It is about the fact that Taiwan is situated in a
very critical position in the Asia Pacific region. This region,
as all other parts of the world, is not free of terrorist
attacks. Every country in the region needs to shoulder the
responsibility of countering terrorism. Taiwan, therefore, should
not be excluded from any discussion on antiterrorist strategies.
It was reported that some leaders at the meeting reacted with
surprise upon hearing of Taiwan's absence. Taiwan's enthusiasm in
joining the antiterror campaign must be seen as part of Taiwan's
attempt at securing its strategic environment.

Taiwan's challenge is not only about joining the global
coalition against terrorism, but to gain more international
respect from international society for its political existence.
Taiwan is also out to build a more stable security environment
which would guarantee the continuation of its process of
democratization.

A recent meeting on the Strategic Assessment of Taiwan 2003
revealed that Taiwan's strategic environment would be shaped by,
among others, the following factors: (a) stability in U.S.
relations with China; (b) China's military modernization and its
response to its immediate environment; (c) Taiwan's own political
behavior; (d) developments on the Korean Peninsula; and (e)
regional conflicts. Taiwan's international and national policy
would have to be built on the basis of the functioning of these
factors.

Taiwan is used to living under threat. The antagonist it faces
across the Taiwan Straits is far larger, better armed and in
every way more formidable perhaps than North Korea. But Taiwan
has survived all the political and security turbulence. Over the
past two years, Taiwan has been overcome by euphoria following
certain "diplomatic victories" . Following Japan's granting of a
visa to former president Lee Teng-hui, international opinion
declared a victory for Chen Sui-bian's administration . Then,
George W. Bush's U.S. administration announced details of its
arms sale to Taiwan. The "surprise" visit to Indonesia of
Taiwanese Vice President Annette Lu has added more weight to
Taiwan's diplomatic maneuvers.

Each of those events is significant in its own right,
representing a breakthrough in Taiwan's relationships with the
countries in the region, particularly the U.S. and Japan. For the
Chen administration, unable to get things going on the domestic
front nearly a year after taking office, these events have
offered some kind of redemption in the form of diplomatic
successes.

However, the global situation remains fickle. China's
successes regarding high-tech weaponry, the unpredictability of
U.S. behavior toward China and the seemingly decreasing level of
international economic transactions due to the threat of terror,
all have serious repercussions for the security environment of
Taiwan. Facing the probability of turbulence in respect of its
security and its position in the international order, Taiwan must
develop its own long-term strategic plan. Thus, while the events
of the past years are worth celebrating, it is nevertheless
important for Taiwan to adopt a prudent approach in evaluating
the impact of those events on Taiwan's strategic planing and
environment.

Cross-Strait relations are one of the salient political and
security issues facing Taiwan. China's adherence to the One-China
principle might be the basis for action against Taiwan if Taiwan
were to go against the said principle, meaning that an
independent Taiwan could risk a major war in the Straits of
Taiwan. If Taiwan behaves the way a good boy would behave, it is
unlikely that China would initiate destructive action against
Taiwan. Thus, stability in cross-Strait relations is also
influenced by the way Taiwan handles its internal and external
behavior.

There is a strong debate over whether China would initiate a
nuclear attack against Taiwan if Taiwan were to declare itself
independent. One side argues that it is very unlikely that China
would do so as it would provoke the U.S. to initiate a
counteraction against China based on the Taiwan Relations Act.
The other side argues that such an option should not be ruled out
given China's uncompromising stand on the One-China principle.
Both arguments may be right, but both also may be wrong. Whether
such an attack would materialize or not depends largely on the
degree of sensitivity China and Taiwan have toward each other.
Thus, it is important that China and Taiwan manage their
sensitivities in such a way as not to provoke the other.

The differences between China and Taiwan are fundamentally
political and cannot be solved by military means. Whether China
chooses peace or coercion to resolve its differences with Taiwan
will tell the world a great deal about the kind of relationship
China seeks with its neighbors.

Taiwan's strategic environment assessment must not be
undertaken in isolation from other structural factors, be they
US-Japan security relations, China-U.S. relations, Taiwan's own
relations with the U.S and Southeast Asia, or developments on the
Korean Peninsula. Those structural factors will not only
determine Taiwan's threat perception, but also its future defense
posture and the degree of Taiwan's participation in the
international arena.

Taiwan's political progress in recent years has won attention
worldwide, but Taiwan must reflect deeply upon its status and
position within the overall context of East Asia. Since turning
to pragmatic diplomacy, Taiwan has often made strategic moves
resulting in transitory satisfaction, enough to boost its
international status. But such political progress will serve
nothing once Taiwan is faced with a crisis-type situation in the
Straits of Taiwan. Taiwan will certainly look to the United
States for a kind of security assistance, indicated by, among
other things, Taiwan's recent eagerness to acquire a Kidd class
destroyer from the U.S.

But the reality of the global order and its characteristic
fickleness demands that Taiwan avoid excessive reliance on allies
or believing that it can always play the "American card" or
"Japan card" against Beijing. Such maneuvers within cracks to
achieve temporary victories keep Taiwan vulnerable to the control
of others. Taiwan cannot avoid tying itself up in a knot in
reacting to changes in its external environment. At this time and
in the future, Taiwan's chief concern should be to make choices
informed by self-awareness and autonomy.

The writer was invited to a five-day workshop on the Taiwan
Strategic Assessment 2003, organized by the National Defense
University and held in Taipei, Oct. 27-Nov. 1.