Taiwan's search for stable security setting

Bantarto Bandoro, Editor, 'The Indonesian Quarterly', Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, bandoro@csis.or.id

Taiwan, represented by the President of Academica Sinica, the Nobel prize-winner Lee Yuan-tsen, took part in the recent Mexico APEC meeting. But Taiwan was frustrated over its exclusion from a meeting of foreign minister to discuss counterterrorism efforts. The international community has, in fact, acted discriminatively in its efforts at building international coalition against terrorism. The snub occurred because Taiwan's foreign minister was not allowed to attend the summit. The argument was that Taiwan had signed a "memorandum of understanding" before APEC that excluded it from ministerial meetings.

The adherence to the One-China principle by most of APEC's members has prevented Taiwan from becoming a full part of the forum's activities. But, the problem is, perhaps, not about a memorandum. It is about the fact that Taiwan is situated in a very critical position in the Asia Pacific region. This region, as all other parts of the world, is not free of terrorist attacks. Every country in the region needs to shoulder the responsibility of countering terrorism. Taiwan, therefore, should not be excluded from any discussion on antiterrorist strategies. It was reported that some leaders at the meeting reacted with surprise upon hearing of Taiwan's absence. Taiwan's enthusiasm in joining the antiterror campaign must be seen as part of Taiwan's attempt at securing its strategic environment.

Taiwan's challenge is not only about joining the global coalition against terrorism, but to gain more international respect from international society for its political existence. Taiwan is also out to build a more stable security environment which would guarantee the continuation of its process of democratization.

A recent meeting on the Strategic Assessment of Taiwan 2003 revealed that Taiwan's strategic environment would be shaped by, among others, the following factors: (a) stability in U.S. relations with China; (b) China's military modernization and its response to its immediate environment; (c) Taiwan's own political behavior; (d) developments on the Korean Peninsula; and (e) regional conflicts. Taiwan's international and national policy would have to be built on the basis of the functioning of these factors.

Taiwan is used to living under threat. The antagonist it faces across the Taiwan Straits is far larger, better armed and in every way more formidable perhaps than North Korea. But Taiwan has survived all the political and security turbulence. Over the past two years, Taiwan has been overcome by euphoria following certain "diplomatic victories" . Following Japan's granting of a visa to former president Lee Teng-hui, international opinion declared a victory for Chen Sui-bian's administration . Then, George W. Bush's U.S. administration announced details of its arms sale to Taiwan. The "surprise" visit to Indonesia of Taiwanese Vice President Annette Lu has added more weight to Taiwan's diplomatic maneuvers.

Each of those events is significant in its own right, representing a breakthrough in Taiwan's relationships with the countries in the region, particularly the U.S. and Japan. For the Chen administration, unable to get things going on the domestic front nearly a year after taking office, these events have offered some kind of redemption in the form of diplomatic successes.

However, the global situation remains fickle. China's successes regarding high-tech weaponry, the unpredictability of U.S. behavior toward China and the seemingly decreasing level of international economic transactions due to the threat of terror, all have serious repercussions for the security environment of Taiwan. Facing the probability of turbulence in respect of its security and its position in the international order, Taiwan must develop its own long-term strategic plan. Thus, while the events of the past years are worth celebrating, it is nevertheless important for Taiwan to adopt a prudent approach in evaluating the impact of those events on Taiwan's strategic planing and environment.

Cross-Strait relations are one of the salient political and security issues facing Taiwan. China's adherence to the One-China principle might be the basis for action against Taiwan if Taiwan were to go against the said principle, meaning that an independent Taiwan could risk a major war in the Straits of Taiwan. If Taiwan behaves the way a good boy would behave, it is unlikely that China would initiate destructive action against Taiwan. Thus, stability in cross-Strait relations is also influenced by the way Taiwan handles its internal and external behavior.

There is a strong debate over whether China would initiate a nuclear attack against Taiwan if Taiwan were to declare itself independent. One side argues that it is very unlikely that China would do so as it would provoke the U.S. to initiate a counteraction against China based on the Taiwan Relations Act. The other side argues that such an option should not be ruled out given China's uncompromising stand on the One-China principle. Both arguments may be right, but both also may be wrong. Whether such an attack would materialize or not depends largely on the degree of sensitivity China and Taiwan have toward each other. Thus, it is important that China and Taiwan manage their sensitivities in such a way as not to provoke the other.

The differences between China and Taiwan are fundamentally political and cannot be solved by military means. Whether China chooses peace or coercion to resolve its differences with Taiwan will tell the world a great deal about the kind of relationship China seeks with its neighbors.

Taiwan's strategic environment assessment must not be undertaken in isolation from other structural factors, be they US-Japan security relations, China-U.S. relations, Taiwan's own relations with the U.S and Southeast Asia, or developments on the Korean Peninsula. Those structural factors will not only determine Taiwan's threat perception, but also its future defense posture and the degree of Taiwan's participation in the international arena.

Taiwan's political progress in recent years has won attention worldwide, but Taiwan must reflect deeply upon its status and position within the overall context of East Asia. Since turning to pragmatic diplomacy, Taiwan has often made strategic moves resulting in transitory satisfaction, enough to boost its international status. But such political progress will serve nothing once Taiwan is faced with a crisis-type situation in the Straits of Taiwan. Taiwan will certainly look to the United States for a kind of security assistance, indicated by, among other things, Taiwan's recent eagerness to acquire a Kidd class destroyer from the U.S.

But the reality of the global order and its characteristic fickleness demands that Taiwan avoid excessive reliance on allies or believing that it can always play the "American card" or "Japan card" against Beijing. Such maneuvers within cracks to achieve temporary victories keep Taiwan vulnerable to the control of others. Taiwan cannot avoid tying itself up in a knot in reacting to changes in its external environment. At this time and in the future, Taiwan's chief concern should be to make choices informed by self-awareness and autonomy.

The writer was invited to a five-day workshop on the Taiwan Strategic Assessment 2003, organized by the National Defense University and held in Taipei, Oct. 27-Nov. 1.