Taiwan's dilemma in search of sovereignty

Chien-min Chao, Project Syndidate

To allay China's fury over his private trip to Taiwan this summer before becoming Singapore's prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong said that his country will not support Taiwan should it declare formal independence from mainland China. Indeed, no country, declared Lee, would take a different line.

This diplomatic strike occurred at roughly the same time that Taiwan was failing (for the thirteenth time) in its bid to reenter the United Nations, having been expelled when China was admitted in 1971.

While Taiwanese athletes competed in the recent Athens Olympics, advertisements supporting the team were removed on its arrival at Athens airport. Returning home from a trip to three Central American allies, Premier Yu Shyi-kun's entourage was forced to transit in Okinawa to escape the effects of Typhoon Aere, inciting a protest from China against Japan's government.

Such symbolic politics forms a key part of the mainland's relentless effort to isolate Taiwan internationally. To display its displeasure at Lee Hsien Loong's visit, China's government warned Singapore that a bilateral free-trade deal might be in jeopardy. Commenting on Taiwan's UN application, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan demanded that Taipei stop pursuing its 'two China' policy.

China's diplomatic offensive against Taiwan escalated in early August, when President Hu Jintao telephoned U.S. President George W. Bush to demand a halt to the sale of advanced weapons to Taiwan. Hu told Bush that the Taiwan issue was very sensitive, and that China would absolutely not tolerate Taiwan independence.

As a result of such pressure, Taiwan has become the most isolated country in modern history, which is all the more glaring in view of its economic and political success. Indeed, that anomaly, if not rectified, is increasingly dangerous.

Frustrated by a lack of recognition, popular disgust in Taiwan with terms like China and Chinese is rising. So is support for distinct countries on each side of the Taiwan Strait. Although opinion polls indicate that a majority still supports the status quo, many are beginning to believe that if the countrys official name, the Republic of China, is not acceptable to the international community, then another name might be. Millions of people took to the streets during the presidential election last March to demand a name change.

The latest source of contention both on the domestic front and in relations with the mainland concerns whether to write a new constitution. Enacted in Nanjing before the Chiang Kai-chek's Kuomintang government resettled in Taipei after the Chinese Civil War of the 1940s, Taiwan's constitution is considered by some an anachronism, unfit for a democracy with a population of over 23 million.

Within Taiwan, the debate over constitutional reform has led to disturbing developments. Most worryingly, it has heightened tensions between Taiwan's various ethnic groups over national identity and relations with China.

Of course, Taiwan's parlous relations with China have suffered further as a result, with China's government denouncing calls for a new constitution as a calculated move towards independence. China's Taiwan Affairs Office issued a warning on the eve of President Chen Shui-bian's inauguration in May, forcing Taipei to choose between war and peace.

Alarmed by a potential conflict between the two archrivals, the Bush administration urged Chen, who won a second term in March, to exercise restraint. Consequently, in his inauguration speech on May 20, Chen promised to amend the constitution via the current mechanism, rather than adopting an entirely new constitution via referendum.

But the passage of recent constitutional reforms by the Legislative Yuan illustrates the continuing volatility of the situation. In addition to replacing the multi-member-district, single-vote electoral system with a single-member-district, two- round voting system, the amendment reduces the number of seats in the Yuan by half. The reforms have been lauded as a crucial step towards a more stable two-party system. Similarly, a higher electoral threshold for winning seats should counter vote buying by candidates.

For China, however, the reforms are a smoke screen erected by Taiwan's government. China fears that the government still wants to write a new constitution-- one from which Taiwanese independence would be derived.

This senseless political warfare has hampered cross-strait economic relations. Bilateral trade turnover reached US$50 billion in 2003, and Taiwanese took almost four million trips to the mainland. It is imperative for both economies that direct transport links be established immediately.

But, here, too, political sensitivities loom large. China wants the link defined as domestic in nature, with rights reserved exclusively to airlines registered on either side, while Taiwan insists that services be open to foreign competition.

Thus does the fight over sovereignty overshadow all bilateral issues. Indeed, with China bent on unification, it refuses even to define relations with Taiwan as bilateral, while China's growing global influence suggests that Taiwan's diplomatic fortunes are not about to improve. That, however, may merely strengthen support in Taiwan for independence as the only way out.

Chien-min Chao is Professor of Politics at National Chengchi University in Taiwan. He writes extensively on subjects concerning cross-strait relations and Chinese politics.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, October 2004.