Syaifuddin Bantasyam asks whither the Aceh dialog?
As a bill on special autonomy in Aceh is being worked on by legislators, the Acehnese are still trying to avoid violence and lead a normal life, says Care for Human Rights Foundation executive director Syaifuddin Bantasyam in Banda Aceh. The following is an excerpt of a recent long-distance interview:
Question: How do you view the draft law on Acehnese autonomy?
Answer: From the last draft two months ago there are a number of differing principles compared to the earlier draft law on Nanggro Aceh Darrusalam, the latter being quite extreme regarding the return of everything that was "taken" by Jakarta. But I don't know whether the new bill can be seen as a solution. Opinions differ in Aceh alone.
What about the new presidential instruction on Aceh?
If you mean instruction No.4/2001, it's just two weeks old so it is difficult to really judge whether it can improve things here. But ... clearly many people have rejected it. This stance will be evident when people refuse to work with the government in carrying out the instruction.
It seems the government was not willing to discuss the issue with people first before issuing the instruction.
Further, there's nothing extraordinary in it, it's just legal language on what the government should be doing anyway to settle the problem with Aceh and to rebuild Aceh.
What is new is the repeated order to the Indonesian Military (TNI) and the National Police to uphold the law.
But why a presidential instruction? It's like the police and TNI are being given wide opportunity to launch a more harsh offensive against the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). The instruction has provided a legal pretext, or political support.
Military leaders were earlier quoted as saying that they needed legal support to avoid being blamed for any human rights violations in upholding the law in Aceh.
The instruction is not an excuse to violate legal norms and customs in Aceh. No one would blame them if they upheld procedures. I appeal to legislators in Jakarta against buying such talk from TNI; once they violate (procedures) they're wrong and action must be taken against perpetrators.
In the last two years the government failed to come up with any significant measures in the settlement of past human rights violations. This has not been touched on at all.
In the economy, nothing monumental has happened while we still have some 500,000 former refugees and up to 15,000 others still in shelters.
This is an urgent issue ... but the government acts like it can do something later when Acehnese raise demands again. People have become very disappointed.
It is inconceivable that the government does not understand this ... All issues are crucial and related: the unsettled human rights violations; dialog with the Free Aceh Movement which is now stalled because of that instruction; and the humanitarian issues which will continue -- mainly the refugees and the destroying and burning of property.
What is the condition of refugees and those who have returned?
Refugees from Laweung in Pidie (Greater Aceh) who fled to Banda Aceh have returned, likewise those from Woyla in West Aceh. But today's figures differ from tomorrow's. Refugees now are still in east, north and central Aceh and (in areas of) Pidie.
Last December I visited former refugees in Keude Geurebak in East Aceh and refugees in Alue Keurenyai and Lhok Kuyun in North Aceh. We were informed recently that there are now even more refugees in those shelters who are still suffering, particularly the elderly and children. Those in Lhok Kuyun face the threat of starvation.
Those who have returned are still suffering. Thousands live in homes which are not fit to live in. Their homes have been burned down or destroyed. They cultivate their lands from zero, which requires much labor and capital. Children are not studying.
A similar fate is shared by those who fled to Medan, North Sumatra. Humanitarian programs must also prioritize former refugees.
The (local) government seems helpless as it has little money -- besides the political considerations. The East Aceh regent once said there would no longer be aid for refugees.
We need an integrative approach for refugees and ex-refugees. Or else we face a humanitarian disaster that will affect tens of thousands of Acehnese.
What about the programs promised by then president B.J. Habibie, including compensation for victims?
In reality there is no special program. One day some 2,000 refugees might get government aid in food, and then this aid stops when the government can no longer afford it.
Compensation for those whose property was burned down is still at the stage of talks at the governor's office. There weren't many scholarships (for orphans), and there has not even been any follow up on the promise of decent burials (for civilian killed as a result of armed conflict). The government should have continued Habibie's programs.
Yet instead the government has been impatient, claiming that GAM keeps violating the humanitarian pause (first agreed to in Geneva on June 6, 2000).
The humanitarian pause followed the government's agreement to talk with GAM; now it has again taken a firm stance against GAM, which has been declared a separatist group. Then it is said that GAM rejected dialog. Your comment?
What does the government gain by labeling GAM as such? GAM instead gains more confidence -- that its struggle must be toward Aceh's independence as it could interpret this label as the government cutting off communication.
This reflects dualism on the part of the government ... GAM could continue a path of violence, having been placed in an extreme position. In conflict management, no party must be subordinate to the other.
It was very difficult (for the government) to ask GAM to the negotiation table in the beginning. Now it's willing but while talks have yet to be completed, the government seems to have denied (GAM's willingness to negotiate).
The government has not showed maximum results since June 6, but barely a year after, this instruction is issued.
The people still expect the government to be more active in encouraging dialog, but the instruction has been issued.
Is that the feeling in general?
Among people I've met in the capital and in the regions, the question has been, quo vadis (whither) the Aceh dialog?
People repeatedly state that the government pays no attention to Aceh, that it has swindled the people ... students have even branded the government as colonialist; but only a real survey would accurately reveal people's feelings.
At Kuala Tripa (hotel in Banda Aceh) we still have the Peace through Dialog group under the Henry Dunant Center, but then there's the instruction authorizing the military to help police uphold the law.
This will eventually mean a hunt for GAM people, who have some representatives at that hotel. How can a dialog take place?
Officials like (Coordinating Minister for Political, Social and Security Affairs) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono talk of dialog but the news these days is of continuous antiguerrilla drills, the sending of troops, that troops are all ready in Aceh and that any (security officer) shot dead by a GAM member will have a decent burial.
GAM will not accept this offensive attitude, there will be resistance, and even more refugees fleeing armed conflict.
Is there hope that perpetrators of human rights violators will be put on trial?
I've lost hope. Since the end of 1998 up to now, human rights violations have increased in line with escalating conflict. Yet there has been any legal action taken against these cases. The conflict has been used as an excuse to let cases of rights violations pass with no legal process. Cases include arbitrary detention, torture and destruction of property.
Understanding of human rights violations is still very low.
The state can even be said to have committed a violation by inaction (toward such violations), in the absence of state protection for individual security and security of property.
Security officials say this concept is unfair, but that is the international practice. Therefore there must be awareness among security officials against acting arbitrarily.
The people will really respect officials if violators among them are punished. But what happens is the reverse. I feel ashamed when telling people to respect the law when violators among security people just walk away scot-free.
Legal action was taken in the 1999 murder of (religious leader) Teungku Bantaqiah (in which 24 soldiers and one civilian were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 8.5 years to 10 years) but it is shameful to mention this one case as a barometer of the government's seriousness in processing human rights violations.
Are people still hoping for independence while there are indications that security concerns hamper the production of gas, Aceh's main resource?
Human needs are material and immaterial. The halting of ExxonMobil's production is clearly disadvantageous to many parties, including employees and the Acehnese in general. But people also see that (large Aceh-based companies) have not contributed that much to people's welfare. There is a feeling of being neglected.
There is the hope of no longer being oppressed and being able to achieve self determination and dignity.
Do people still look up to GAM, given that its members might be involved in violence and given some skepticism in regard to the identities of its leaders?
Regardless of whether a referendum is agreed upon, it would be the accurate way to learn about the support (for GAM's demand for independence). The reality is that GAM is there and people have identified with the leading figures quoted in the press.
A question still raised now is who is behind the continuing unrest? Third parties, apart from security officials and GAM, are said to have been behind shootings and the burning of homes. Now it's "unknown persons". I wouldn't know about police and military deserters or members acting outside (these institutions), but it wouldn't be new in Indonesia.
What is clear is the pattern of (violence).
In most instances (of armed contact) there will suddenly be many victims followed by the burning of homes, with no party claiming responsibility afterward.
We don't know if this is a form of shock therapy.
Such incidents are also followed by sweeps (in which security personnel search for those involved in attacks). People then move away after armed conflicts in their areas (to avoid sweeps).
Witnesses then report the involvement of security people, and officers then say (any involvement of their members) would be "excessive". This must be avoided; people remain in the dark on who they should report to under such circumstances.
Do people believe that GAM is behind all this?
Not so easily. Investigations by TNI and the police, and also GAM, should follow each incident and this needs openness on all parts, because reports so far indicate violation of operational procedures. The most important thing is to manage conflict and to minimize victims.
The government says it now uses a comprehensive approach. But what makes it believe it can now uphold the law, settle human rights abuses and fix the economy through that presidential instruction? It may have been different in 1998 (after military operations were officially stopped).
There must be maximum efforts for dialog. Studies must be done on why the peace zone (areas where there is a cease-fire) such as in North Aceh failed; what can be done and how can it be applied again and, if possible, how can peace zones be extended -- as demanded by Acehnese who met (President Abdurrahman) Gus Dur recently in Jakarta.
How far can international aid be expected, given the doubt concerning support for political aspirations of independence?
The Acehnese really need international humanitarian aid. Jakarta seems busy with its own political agenda. A number of countries are helping. Fourteen non-governmental organizations are carrying out 24 humanitarian programs geared for conflict areas.
The United Nations Development Program is entrusted to manage funds from Norway.
But the conflict situation has become a dilemma. People are in desperate need of help but aid is hampered because of the lack of security. However little aid can reach people, it must be channeled as long as there is a prior assessment of needs and risks. So the choice of location must be accurate. Aid must meet basic needs, including education.
But with a more offensive approach (by security forces) I deeply fear there will be disruption in humanitarian programs ... The murder of three volunteers of RATA (Rehabilitation Action for Torture Victims in Aceh) last December in North Aceh was traumatic for aid workers.
The International Committee of the Red Cross now only runs a skeleton mission there. International bodies must pay attention to how humanitarian programs can be carried out in partnership with locals, and discuss with them issues of safety, impact and priority. Many countries want to help Aceh, which is why calm and dialog is needed.
There has also been support to settle human rights violations in Aceh. Campaigns by Aceh activists in various international fora have always gained wide support. Aceh's human rights problems have become an international issue.
So if the government is careless in handling the conflict, there might be humanitarian intervention to overcome the problem.
Have NGOs made specific preparations in anticipation of more violence?
I don't know. We face threats which affect some programs. But NGOs keep consulting people, and continue monitoring rights violations apart from humanitarian aid. Some (life threatening) incidents have led NGOs to suspend operations for months while others do what little they can.
Following the murder of a member of South Aceh's chapter of the Monitoring Team for Security Teungku Al-Kamal (on March 29, some 20 kilometers from South Aceh's police resort), along with his lawyer and driver, activists thought that if this can happen to a member of an official team (set up by the government and GAM), when he was not even on duty, what about other volunteers? (Ati Nurbaiti)