Susilo: Popular leader, but weak chief executive

Susilo: Popular leader, but weak chief executive

Yang Razali Kassim, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, as widely predicted by various
polls, is emerging as the most popular choice, with Muhammad
Jusuf Kalla as his vice-president. The emergence of Susilo at the
expense of incumbent Megawati Soekarnoputri is the consequence of
a "deficiency fatigue": Tired of weak government, the people
clamored for change and rejuvenation and swung behind the
candidate who to them came like a gush of fresh air. The result
-- a significant lead of the votes counted so far, cutting across
ideological, ethnic and religious affiliations.

Until the final tally is confirmed by the end of the month, it
is premature to write off Megawati, or for that matter, retired
general Wiranto.

For the second round on Sept. 20, the crucial question is who
he will square off with. That round will be a totally different
ball game -- a fight to the finish with all gloves off. A bloody
outcome is not unlikely, especially if followers of the losing
side prove bad losers.

Already, many are beginning to worry about the prospect of a
thin victory margin, and the high number of spoiled votes, which
can lead to disputes and further uncertainty, if not violence.

Despite his popularity, the Susilo camp is actually not too
pleased that the retired general has not been able to score a
one-round knockout. The stark truth is that, as popular as he may
be now, there is no certainty that Susilo will eventually win in
Round II.

A showdown between Susilo and Megawati will be a clash between
two Cabinet colleagues turned bitter rivals.

In this context, the most crucial support will be that of
Golkar, which together with the National Awakening Party (PKB) of
Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), formed the backbone of Wiranto's
presidential bid.

Golkar is the strongest party in the new House of
Representatives), with 22 percent of the 500 seats, followed by
Megawati's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) with
19 percent. Susilo's Democratic Party (PD) has a weak presence,
with only 7 percent of the seats. Even with its two equally small
allies, Susilo's party can at most marshal 12 percent of the
seats.

So, in this scenario, Golkar's support is crucial to form a
stable government -- a fact both Susilo and Megawati realize,
which explains the current scramble for Golkar's support, in
return for key Cabinet seats and other forms of political
advantage.

But the prospect of a Golkar alliance with Susilo is slim for
two reasons: Firstly, Golkar chairman Akbar Tandjung is more
inclined to team up with PDI-P. A PDI-P-Golkar alliance will form
a strong bloc in parliament to check a Susilo-led government.

Secondly, many Golkar leaders are also furious with Jusuf
Kalla for abandoning his own party at the eleventh hour to strike
an alliance with Susilo. Jusuf Kalla was one of the early Golkar
contenders for presidential candidacy before he jumped ship.

If Susilo fails to get Golkar, he will be forced to turn to
Amien Rais and Hamzah Haz -- the last two in the five-horse
presidential race. Amien is closer to Susilo than to Megawati and
many of his supporters have also voted for Susilo.

As for Hamzah, his supporters are more inclined to Megawati
and Wiranto than to Susilo because of his perceived image as a
proxy of the United States. This image will be exploited to
weaken his chances in the second round.

Megawati has a better chance of getting into Round II, but
should she fail because Wiranto beats her in Round I, it will be
a shoot-out between two former generals in a penultimate fight
for the presidency.

Wiranto will reap benefits from the rivalry between Megawati
and Susilo. Her PDI-P will throw its weight behind Wiranto just
to kill off Susilo's chances of a victory.

Support from Golkar will strengthen, although this had been
half-hearted during the first-round election. Wiranto can also
count on the support of Gus Dur's PKB and its followers. The PKB
draws its support from members of the traditionalist Islamic
body, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).

With Golkar, PDI-P and PKB behind him, Wiranto will be a tough
contender to beat.

He may also win over several smaller parties representing the
Islamic constituency. Wiranto, however, has several weaknesses
which he knows Susilo can exploit: For one, the Akbar Tandjung
camp would not be too unhappy if Wiranto lost because of a
possible purge should he win the presidency and push for control
of Golkar.

Susilo and his running mate, Jusuf Kalla, are clearly a
popular pair as Indonesia's next president and vice-president.
The combination has proven a lethal one, drawing support from
across the country, and even sucking away the traditional voters
of many political parties and non-governmental organizations.

But despite his popularity and the direct support of some 38
million people across party lines and ethnic as well as religious
affiliations, Susilo may actually lose the race eventually,
defeated by the brutality of alliance politics. This is the
paradox of Indonesia's first direct presidential election.

But should he win, he will still have a weak government. That
is why he is rushing to form a viable coalition that can
withstand a potentially hostile parliament. In short, Susilo may
be Indonesia's strongest elected leader since the fall of
Soeharto, but he may also be its weakest Chief Executive.

It will be difficult, though not impossible, for him to avoid
being hostage to barter politics -- a practice that contributed
to the fall of Gus Dur and the weakness of the Megawati
government.

One way for Susilo is to go for a "limited coalition" with
just a few parties that are truly supportive of him. His last
option is to bypass the problem entirely by forming a government
filled with independent, non-party professionals, taking the risk
of a hostile parliament that will stall his every policy.

He may do this because he cannot be easily impeached under new
parliamentary rules. But it will be a weak Susilo-led government,
nonetheless.

In the end, a Susilo-led government may turn out to be the
weakest since the fall of Soeharto. That is why some are already
predicting that his government may not last two or three years,
just like Gus Dur's, or Megawati's.

In short, Indonesia's first direct presidential election will
not end Indonesia's problems in political transition. Indeed, we
can expect a leadership challenge or shake-up in many political
parties, especially those which have failed to win.

The writer is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Defense and
Strategic Studies who was in Jakarta to observe the July 5
presidential election.