Thu, 07 Oct 2004

Susilo can learn from Filipino Fidel Ramos

W. Scott Thompson, Bali

When Filipino defense minister General Fidel V. Ramos became his country's president in 1992, he was nine years older than Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will be when he assumes Indonesia's presidency and was far better known in both his own country and to the world at large: he had pioneered 'people power' to overthrow his cousin dictator, Ferdinand Marcos, for example. But unlike Susilo came in by a narrow electoral squeak and so had no strong mandate.

Beyond these differences the similarities are far more striking in the two situations. Both followed indecisive women during whose presidencies their countries had merely marked time. Both have and had the same advantages and disadvantages in wearing military khaki: a sense of order, an ability to organize, and more than enough knowledge of the use of force.

But both were the most obvious reformers in their respective--and very similar countries. Both came to power knowing that extensive reforms were required if the country were to get moving, if the unemployed were to find jobs, if ancient attitudes that deterred investment and reform were to be swept away.

And both are stylistically highly similar, excellent bureaucratic military types, not charismatic men on horseback--men who give great attention to detail--and to considering the feelings of those around them. Both had strong commitments to the democratic process.

That being said, is there anything Susilo can learn from the early Ramos presidency, back in 1992-93? I think so.

The first thing was the signals Ramos sent out on corruption, in the highly personal way that informs a traditional developing society. His team included nobody with a KKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism) reputation. He gave incentives to his team to come in with stories about how they repelled attempts by old friends to buy favor from the new government. Soon, the anecdotes were legion--and directive.

He appointed his most powerful associate, the famous strategist General Jose Almonte, to the bureau of customs--temporarily--to send a direct message.

Ramos posted him a letter that quickly and intentionally leaked, giving Almonte the full names of his five daughters and wife, telling him if any of them interfered with the release of dutiable items, not to call him but to call the police. And his spouse, Ming Ramos, kept at her job as registrar at the International School. No spousal greed to steal in the back while prexy was looking clean in the front.

Secondly, while drawing up an extensive reform agenda for the legislature to pass, he planned extensive foreign travel--but not in the slightest to fan a sense of importance or to show the flag, but to scoop up investment for the creation of new added- value jobs in the stagnant economy.

There was always criticism of his extensive travel, but he kept his eye on the ball; he took huge teams of business leaders on his trips and at day's end assembled them in his suite to 'grade' them on their achievements--on the net investment promised or gained. They all wanted to sleep but Ramos kept on until late. What mattered was not what the press said but rather the numbers--net added investment, net added jobs.

Third, he showed by personal example the value of hard work. Cabinet members driving in to work at seven would already have received faxes from him at home asking if the papers they had delivered the evening before were 'the best they could do' and there would be hand-written 'NLT' (not later than) instructions of the deadline for response or results.

Ramos had been up since four going over the day's agenda and goals. Even back then he was able to devise a computer-driven system for keeping track of deadlines and of the paper flow. The then most powerful Filipino, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Catholic prelate, wrote -- for our biography of Ramos--that it was the reports he began to get of Ramos's work habits that highly impressed him--and took the edge off his suspicion of the president's Protestantism.

Fourth, he was superb at the 'little things' that keep people motivated. He attended birthday parties of his associates and sent constant notes of appreciation when jobs were well done. If you were waiting to see him at Malacanang and he was late, you could expect to receive personal notes from him expressing regret--and including the latest data on his administration's achievements to date. He knew that we would save and frame these little acts of thoughtfulness.

But finally and overwhelmingly most importantly, he not only had a vision, he had a highly intricate systems-analysis sense of how to get the job done.

Ramos understood economic development professionally, knew his country backwards and forwards, and knew all its leading politicians personally. Ramos brilliantly juggled political, economic, regional and strategic goals to find the best fit for advancing the country's interests with its limited resources.

It is not difficult to see an Indonesian writer in several years writing almost the same account of Susilo's first years as national leader as I have of Ramos's; the two former generals are cut from the same cloth. And both countries, culturally Malay and in many ways so similar, can react the same way.

One just hopes that, if Susilo is as successful as Ramos was in his first term he will have another--as Ramos was constitutionally prevented from having--to consolidate his achievements.

The writer is adjunct professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He resides part time in Bali.