Superficial and real reforms in the Indonesian Military
Superficial and real reforms in the Indonesian Military
Competing agendas remain one hindrance to reform within the
Indonesian Military, says Damien Kingsbury, the Executive Officer
of Monash Asia Institute, who recently wrote Guns and Ballot
Boxes: East Timor's vote for independence. In this recent
interview at Monash University in Melbourne, he shared with The
Jakarta Post his guarded optimism and concern for hurdles facing
Indonesia's democracy in relation to the changing role of the
military. An excerpt of the interview follows:
Question: In your research and observation of the Indonesian
Military (TNI), what struck you as the most optimistic and most
pessimistic aspects?
The most optimistic aspects are the strength and vitality of
the reform movement. I think there is some political opportunism
there, but on the whole we are seeing open discussions about a
set of ideas that only a few years ago would not have been
allowed at all.
On the down side, while superficial reform has been and will
continue to be achievable, fundamental reform will be much
slower, I think, and not as successful.
The main impediments to a more fundamental reform of the TNI
revolve around the evolution of a distinct and particularistic
military culture, more broad notions of authority and hierarchy
and the practical difficulties of separating senior officers from
what have been lucrative or powerful positions.
Very few people anywhere are happy to give up something that
enhances their status or power, and TNI is no different. Indeed,
many officers went into TNI attracted by status and power, and it
is a challenge to now say this must change.
It is not as easy as having a benchmark of military
disengagement and reaching that in, say, five years. There will
be some hangover into the indefinite future. But I hope I'm
mistaken.
President Abdurrahman Wahid, or Gus Dur, seems to have certain
designs for TNI. He regards Agus Wirahadikusumah, the new chief
of the Army's Strategic Reserves Command, as a thinker. Do you
see attempts by Abdurrahman to "intellectualize" TNI?
No, TNI was already "intellectualized" under (retired
generals) Wiranto and through (Susilo Bambang) Yudhoyono. Agus
Wirahadikusumah is following that lead, although he's pushing it
further. His appointment was made, I think, because he will shake
up TNI.
He may not be successful in overhauling it, but he will
certainly force it to reconsider some basic issues, such as the
territorial structure. Of course, he may also be sacrificed in
the process, although he could also be groomed as a potential
commander.
Who else can you categorize as intellectuals or thinkers in
TNI?
Bambang Yudhoyono is the obvious example, as is Agus Widjoyo.
Although now out of TNI, Hendropriyono might also fit that mold.
Hendropriyono was seen as one of a group of senior officers, also
including Agum Gumelar, (Muhammad) Yunus Yosfiah, mostly after
his appointment as information minister, and others, who were in
favor of limited reform.
This mostly revolved around breaking Soeharto's control of
ABRI/TNI and establishing it as an independent organization.
However, this did not necessarily imply an end to its dwi
fungsi (dual function), so reform from some of these officers was
quite limited.
Bambang Yudhoyono, on the other hand, suggested a more far-
reaching program of reform, and articulated several key policy
points.
But even here, while Bambang was clearly a reformist he was
also cautious, in particular over the period of transition from
TNI's political role to a nonpolitical role.
Possibly his biggest success was in ensuring that TNI did not
interfere in last June's general election, and that it formally
broke its links with Golkar.
However, since going into the Cabinet, Bambang has been much
quieter on such issues, perhaps reflecting his acknowledgement
that he is in the process of no longer being a serving officer.
In one sense, most of the leading officers now are
"intellectuals" of one sort or another. None can afford to simply
rely on being a good soldier -- they also need to be political
thinkers and strategists, and to do this they need some sense of
vision for both TNI and for Indonesia.
How effective are they?
So far, they have been very effective, especially compared
with, say, when Try Sutrisno was the commander. He was definitely
not an intellectual.
The reform process which TNI is grappling with is indicative
of their intellectual strength, although this covers a range of
positions.
But it should be remembered that "reform" is not synonymous
with "intellectualism" and that some TNI "intellectuals" have a
limited commitment to reform.
How good is this pooling of thinking cadres in TNI? Will it
help TNI's professionalism?
"Professionalism" in TNI really means taking the military
completely out of politics, which means making it a defensive
force only, completely loyal and beholden to the civilian
government.
This is the goal of the reformists, although as I've noted
many of even the reformists have trouble in thinking about
achieving such goals outside the political arena.
Perhaps this indicates just how entrenched TNI is in the
political process. The "pooling" of "thinking cadres" in TNI was
demonstrated by the launch of Agus Wirahadikusumah's last book,
Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI (The New Indonesia and TNI's
challenge), and the officers who contributed to it.
But factionalism within TNI has somewhat divided the capacity
for TNI's thinkers to be "pooled" as such.
How does the situation differ from under Soeharto?
The current environment concerning TNI reflects the competing
political agendas in society at large. Under Soeharto such
competing agendas were not allowed to exist in the open. Perhaps
the most obvious difference is that the generals are slowly being
parted from the economic process and having their direct
political influence curtailed.
In part this happened under Soeharto too, and in part
Abdurrahman is cultivating his own personal clique within TNI, as
Soeharto did with the Armed Forces (ABRI).
But Abdurrahman's political style is very different -- much
more liberal -- and this is reflected in the gradual
reorientation of TNI. TNI is no longer the ideologically driven
security apparatus that it was, especially in the first part of
the New Order, although elements of that still exist.
If "reform" is not synonymous with "intellectualism" in TNI,
isn't the idea of politically astute military officers rather
incongruous with the ultimate objectives of depoliticizing the
military?
There is, of course, a contradiction within elements of TNI
over its depoliticization, in particular through the political
processes being used to achieve this outcome.
This in part reflects the deeply entrenched political position
of TNI. But it also reflects a fundamental inability of most
senior officers to think of themselves or TNI in other than
political terms.
There appears to be a process of contraction in TNI, because
many civilian positions have been removed from TNI career
avenues. Would this lead to gradual elimination of the military's
dual function?
It is a step in that direction and it is a part of the "New
Paradigm" developed by Bambang in the mid-1990s. But in one sense
it only removes the New Order excesses of ABRI under Soeharto,
and does not deal with the core elements of dwi fungsi as
developed under (former commander Gen. A.H.) Nasution in the late
1950s.
Do you think Nasution had any idea his concept of dwifungsi
would develop into what it was under Soeharto?
According to Agus Wirahadikusumah, the evolution of dwi fungsi
was a product of its circumstances -- "a bastard child whose
birth could not be prevented," he said.
Regardless of whether Nasution intended its outcome -- and I
think it can be demonstrated by his later comments that he did
not -- it was a logical consequence of establishing the military
as a parallel structure to civil government.
Soeharto simply used that mechanism and elevated it to a more
elaborate position. But the seeds of its evolution were planted
by Nasution.
Perhaps he had not read enough of Latin American or Central
European history to know the likely outcome of his plan, or
perhaps he did.
It must be remembered that a major philosophical contribution
to the founding of the state of Indonesia in 1945 was Japanese
organicism -- also known as fascism -- and that this Japanese
model also had parallel structures for the military and the
government. In this sense, Imperial Japan was perhaps a less than
ideal midwife to the birth of the new state of Indonesia.
Another side effect of this contraction is the concentration
of middle-ranking officers in the middle, because they cannot be
"dispersed" into civilian positions. Will this cause a great deal
of dissatisfaction and create a boiling pot effect?
Perhaps, I've seen some of that. But perhaps such middle-
ranking officers will also need to be educated, over time, about
the role of the officer core being to obey orders and to serve
the state, without regard for personal enrichment or political
advancement.
Many say there is a lot of feudalism and primordialism in TNI.
When Lt.Gen. Suaidi Marasabessy was replaced with Lt.Gen. Djamari
Chaniago as TNI's chief of general affairs there were protests
from Maluku, because they felt no longer represented by TNI
leadership. How do you think feudalism and primordialism will
fare in the immediate or distant future? Will they hinder the
overhaul of TNI as presumably planned by Abdurrahman?
The question of feudalism is an interesting one, mostly
because theoretical analysis of Indonesian politics and the Armed
Forces have focused on patrimonial tribalism, which is a single,
central authority dispersing patronage.
However, elements of TNI have increasingly been divided from
the government and have split between themselves, creating a sort
of feudal structure in which there are many power bases under an
overarching power, in this case the presidency.
The main advantage of such feudalism is that it creates
political "gaps" and allows and even encourages differences of
views to be expressed.
This is a fundamental requirement for the development of a
real democracy, toward which I think Indonesia is still heading.
Of course, such feudalism is a long way off from democracy
itself, but recognition of a plural political constituency is
absolutely necessary for such political maturation.
However, such feudalism does pose threats to the longer term
stability and security of the state. It also has the potential to
establish a type of "warlordism", especially under the proposed
decentralization plans.
This could place the regions under the control of powerful
elites and actually hinder the development of political
participation in the regions.
In terms of primordialism, all societies retain degrees of
"tribalism" and Indonesia is no different.
Indeed, such primordialism could be seen as a way for regions
that feel vulnerable to excessive central control to assert some
degree of autonomy.
This is okay if it is expressed through a participatory,
representative political framework which includes the interests
of the minority as well as the majority. But it can be very
destructive if it reverts to a "winner-take-all" scenario.
If this was to develop now -- and there are elements of it in
places like Ambon and some other trouble spots -- there would be
a greater potential for the fragmentation of the state.
Any examples of a winner-take-all scenario?
The scenario is basically that which reflects more primordial
forms of political dominance, in which power is centralized and
in which any questioning of authority is implicitly a challenge
to that authority.
This was noticeable under Soeharto. For example, if Islamic
separatists in Aceh were to be successful, it is unlikely that
they would opt for a compromise state.
Rather, it would seem that the type of state that would be
established there would allow little room for meaningful dissent
or disagreement.
In terms of Indonesia overall, if one group was to achieve
power, or power was to again become centralized in the hands of
an individual or a small, cohesive group, we could see that group
assisting its friends and fellow travelers at the expense of
other groups.
Fortunately, the tendency at the moment is not in that
direction. But if, say, in Ambon, the situation is settled in a
way that results in long-term exclusion of Christians from power
and economic advantage, it would almost certainly further
destabilize the region.
It really does depend on how decisions about difficult
situations are made. If they are not inclusive there will
continue to be trouble, and the continuing potential for
fragmentation.
So, if this was to genuinely threaten, we could see a return
to TNI asserting its authority as "guardian" of the state, as it
did in 1958, which led to the dwifungsi in the first place.
Let's just say that Abdurrahman has a big job ahead of him on
a number of fronts. (Dewi Anggraeni)