Sukhoigate: Politicization of weapons procurement

Bantarto Bandoro, Editor, The Indonesian Quarterly, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, bandoro@csis.or.id

Is it wrong for a country with a vast geographical area, a high degree of vulnerability to internal threats and a strategic location in the Asia-Pacific region, like Indonesia, to acquire more sophisticated weapons and use them in defending its territorial integrity? The government's decision to defend the homeland, by using high-tech weaponry, will no doubt be supported by the majority population. But when it comes to the buying of new military equipment, everybody can express an opinion, for or against such an idea.

The process of Indonesia's military modernization has recently been the subject of heated discussions here. It is not only because of the plan to procure more reliable and considerably cheap Russian jetfighters and helicopters, but it also because of the way the decision to buy them was made.

The government signed last month the purchased agreement for Russian Sukhoi jetfighters and helicopters worth US$192.6 million. The agreement marked a significant leap in the country's military modernization process as well as a new era in the Indonesia-Russian military relationship. President Megawati Soekarnoputri brought the deal home hoping to inspire the Air Force to improve its air defense system and performance.

When she returned home, President Megawati seemed to have no problem with the deal until very recently when a few members of the House of Representatives (DPR) and other interested parties brought up some possible irregularities, arguing that it did not follow the right laws and regulations. The arms deal, unintentionally, had drawn part of the government bureaucracy and legislative body into a fight.

It was reported that the purchase of the arms equipment from Russia involved only the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the State Logistics Agency (Bulog). The Ministry of Defense, where the authority should have come from, was never involved in the discussion to buy the Russian aircraft.

Here we can identify at least seven actors involved or related to the defense deal, namely: Bank Bukopin, the Ministry of Finance, the Air Force, the President, Bulog, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the House of Representatives (DPR) and the Ministry of Defense. These bureaucracies have their own interests that may be different from the uniform national interests. In the Sukhoi deal, Megawati is acting as a principal who wants something done and whose policy is not supposed to be questioned by people below her.

As the case has shown, the Ministry of Industry and Trade and Bulog, as instructed by the President, executed the policy on the assumption that the deal would go smoothly without any resistance from other branches of government or agencies. Bulog, upon a request from the Ministry of Industry and Trade, asked Bank Bukopin to pay US$26 million to Russian Rosoboronexport as a downpayment. The House, however, argues that the deal violates important laws on defense and budgetary spending, as well as banking procedures and regulations.

The President defended the Sukhoi deal, arguing that her administration did not violate any laws whatsoever. Here the power politics come into play, meaning that the decision has been taken unilaterally by the President and bypassed other related agencies such as the Ministry of Defense, the House and perhaps the Air Force.

What seems strange is, however, the position expressed by the Ministry of Defense and the Air Force. It is true that according to Article 16 of the Defense Law, the defense minister has the authority over budgets and recruitment as well as procuring defense and military equipment for the Indonesian Military (TNI). But this legal authority was proven meaningless when faced with the "urgency" created by the President's decision. We have hardly heard anything from the Ministry of Defense on the Sukhoi deal.

In their hearing with the Commission I of the House, Minister of Defense Matori Abdul Djalil and TNI Chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto reportedly claimed that they were never involved in the planning or the purchase for the aircraft. Such confessions reflect the fact that her subordinates may not know what the President actually wants. Her own bureaucracy and top aides may not know the president's priorities. Or it may be assumed that they cannot do anything because the decision has already been made. The unilateral decision by Megawati, if this is truly the case, can mean she may not be very interested in the opinions of her own Cabinet members.

The position of the Air Force, at least as reported by the media, was not at all clear. The view seems to be divided. Official sources within the Air Force expressed objection to the deal. Many of them said it was far more urgent for the Air Force to procure transport planes, to replace the old Hercules C-130s, rather than jet fighters.

However, Kusnadi Kardi, Air Force chief of staff's deputy assistant for planning and budgetary affairs, defends the government in the Sukhoi deal, saying that the fighters are sophisticated and have more advantages than U.S. made F-16s. The Air Force therefore should have at least one squadron (12 to 16 jets) of Sukhoi jets to protect the country's airspace adequately.

The different views within the Air Force probably may have something to do with reluctance, if not resistance, on the part of the Air Force to do what the President wants them to do. Factors at work can be self interest, policy differences and professional judgment in and by the Air Force. Assuming that the Air Force has no problem with the President's decision, it may be attributed to the way the Air Force influenced the President that the interests of the Air Force should be promoted and protected. When it comes to the air defense business, the Air Force, after all, has better and more accurate information than the President.

The jet fighters are scheduled to arrive here in early September and the Air Force hopes to show them off to the public on Oct. 5 when the TNI celebrates its 58th anniversary, despite the move by the House to form a special committee to investigate the whole procurement process.

The lessons we can learn from the Sukhoi deal is that every public policy decision here, on military or non-military affairs, tends to drag players into opposing camps, meaning that policy decisions are bound to be politicized. The playing of power politics in our policy formulation process cannot be avoided when it comes to defending one's own political, economic as well as military interests.