Sukhoigate: Politicization of weapons procurement

Sukhoigate: Politicization of weapons procurement

Bantarto Bandoro, Editor, The Indonesian Quarterly,
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta,
bandoro@csis.or.id

Is it wrong for a country with a vast geographical area, a
high degree of vulnerability to internal threats and a strategic
location in the Asia-Pacific region, like Indonesia, to acquire
more sophisticated weapons and use them in defending its
territorial integrity? The government's decision to defend the
homeland, by using high-tech weaponry, will no doubt be supported
by the majority population. But when it comes to the buying of
new military equipment, everybody can express an opinion, for or
against such an idea.

The process of Indonesia's military modernization has recently
been the subject of heated discussions here. It is not only
because of the plan to procure more reliable and considerably
cheap Russian jetfighters and helicopters, but it also because of
the way the decision to buy them was made.

The government signed last month the purchased agreement for
Russian Sukhoi jetfighters and helicopters worth US$192.6
million. The agreement marked a significant leap in the country's
military modernization process as well as a new era in the
Indonesia-Russian military relationship. President Megawati
Soekarnoputri brought the deal home hoping to inspire the Air
Force to improve its air defense system and performance.

When she returned home, President Megawati seemed to have no
problem with the deal until very recently when a few members of
the House of Representatives (DPR) and other interested parties
brought up some possible irregularities, arguing that it did not
follow the right laws and regulations. The arms deal,
unintentionally, had drawn part of the government bureaucracy and
legislative body into a fight.

It was reported that the purchase of the arms equipment from
Russia involved only the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the
State Logistics Agency (Bulog). The Ministry of Defense, where
the authority should have come from, was never involved in the
discussion to buy the Russian aircraft.

Here we can identify at least seven actors involved or related
to the defense deal, namely: Bank Bukopin, the Ministry of
Finance, the Air Force, the President, Bulog, the Ministry of
Industry and Trade, the House of Representatives (DPR) and the
Ministry of Defense. These bureaucracies have their own interests
that may be different from the uniform national interests. In the
Sukhoi deal, Megawati is acting as a principal who wants
something done and whose policy is not supposed to be questioned
by people below her.

As the case has shown, the Ministry of Industry and Trade and
Bulog, as instructed by the President, executed the policy on the
assumption that the deal would go smoothly without any resistance
from other branches of government or agencies. Bulog, upon a
request from the Ministry of Industry and Trade, asked Bank
Bukopin to pay US$26 million to Russian Rosoboronexport as a
downpayment. The House, however, argues that the deal violates
important laws on defense and budgetary spending, as well as
banking procedures and regulations.

The President defended the Sukhoi deal, arguing that her
administration did not violate any laws whatsoever. Here the
power politics come into play, meaning that the decision has been
taken unilaterally by the President and bypassed other related
agencies such as the Ministry of Defense, the House and perhaps
the Air Force.

What seems strange is, however, the position expressed by the
Ministry of Defense and the Air Force. It is true that according
to Article 16 of the Defense Law, the defense minister has the
authority over budgets and recruitment as well as procuring
defense and military equipment for the Indonesian Military (TNI).
But this legal authority was proven meaningless when faced with
the "urgency" created by the President's decision. We have hardly
heard anything from the Ministry of Defense on the Sukhoi deal.

In their hearing with the Commission I of the House, Minister
of Defense Matori Abdul Djalil and TNI Chief Gen. Endriartono
Sutarto reportedly claimed that they were never involved in the
planning or the purchase for the aircraft. Such confessions
reflect the fact that her subordinates may not know what the
President actually wants. Her own bureaucracy and top aides may
not know the president's priorities. Or it may be assumed that
they cannot do anything because the decision has already been
made. The unilateral decision by Megawati, if this is truly the
case, can mean she may not be very interested in the opinions of
her own Cabinet members.

The position of the Air Force, at least as reported by the
media, was not at all clear. The view seems to be divided.
Official sources within the Air Force expressed objection to the
deal. Many of them said it was far more urgent for the Air Force
to procure transport planes, to replace the old Hercules C-130s,
rather than jet fighters.

However, Kusnadi Kardi, Air Force chief of staff's deputy
assistant for planning and budgetary affairs, defends the
government in the Sukhoi deal, saying that the fighters are
sophisticated and have more advantages than U.S. made F-16s. The
Air Force therefore should have at least one squadron (12 to 16
jets) of Sukhoi jets to protect the country's airspace
adequately.

The different views within the Air Force probably may have
something to do with reluctance, if not resistance, on the part
of the Air Force to do what the President wants them to do.
Factors at work can be self interest, policy differences and
professional judgment in and by the Air Force. Assuming that the
Air Force has no problem with the President's decision, it may be
attributed to the way the Air Force influenced the President that
the interests of the Air Force should be promoted and protected.
When it comes to the air defense business, the Air Force, after
all, has better and more accurate information than the President.

The jet fighters are scheduled to arrive here in early
September and the Air Force hopes to show them off to the public
on Oct. 5 when the TNI celebrates its 58th anniversary, despite
the move by the House to form a special committee to investigate
the whole procurement process.

The lessons we can learn from the Sukhoi deal is that every
public policy decision here, on military or non-military affairs,
tends to drag players into opposing camps, meaning that policy
decisions are bound to be politicized. The playing of power
politics in our policy formulation process cannot be avoided when
it comes to defending one's own political, economic as well as
military interests.