Sukhoi strikes at bureaucracy

Sukhoi strikes at bureaucracy

Bantarto Bandoro
Editor, 'The Indonesian Quarterly'
Centre for Strategic and
International Studies
(CSIS)
Jakarta
bandoro@csis.or.id

It is a normal thing when a jetfighter like F18 Hornet,
Sukhoi, or F16 maneuvers to create panic in the air as well as on
the ground, strikes at certain enemy targets, and forces air
force of certain countries to react accordingly. It is also
normal when the state procures more sophisticated weapons for its
national defense. But it is perhaps extraordinary when a
jetfighter like the Russian Sukhoi strikes instead at the state
bureaucracy.

The current "Sukhoi" drama involves among others government
bodies, business and pressures groups. The House of
Representatives is acting as if it is the producer, for example
by summoning those who could be best appointed as the main
casting directors.

Those allegedly involved in or looked over in the Sukhoi deal
appeared one by one to testify before the House, expressing with
conviction either their involvement or disengagement from the
purchase of the four jetfighters and two helicopters from Russia.
The purchase shows a kind of coalition between elements of the
bureaucracy with interest groups, for instance. It is suspected
that decision of the purchase came from bargaining among the main
coalition members.

The arguments put forward by each of the state bureaucracies
and other parties regarding the purchase had confused the public
as to how the final decision was reached. One wonders how our
bureaucracy, who is supposed to reflect a clear cut line of
command and adhere strictly to formal rules, has been dragged
into such situation that they are accusing other government
bodies for being part of or ignored from the Sukhoi deal.

A probe into the purchase, initiated by certain legislators,
is still underway and is only at its initial stage, but it has
already caused the public to become more cynical to the way the
government of President Megawati Soekarnoputri manages policy
issues.

The decision to buy the Russian aircraft, intentionally
perhaps, has involved at least up to four state bodies -- the
Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the
State Logistic Agency (Bulog) and the military headquarters --
and other related agencies. This is where problems emerge, where
certain state bodies are bypassed, hence denying their
involvement or suspectedly doing things they are not supposed to
do. It can also mean that there are people placed in control over
resources that are not their own, but who use these resources in
the interests of other persons or groups closed to the president.

Was the President thinking of advancing the interests of her
inner circle through the rules of the game set for the
implementation of the "Sukhoi policy"?

The conflicting views expressed by the officials in meetings
with the legislators reflects policy conflict in the bureaucracy,
and it has thus caused further confusions as to how the Sukhoi
policy was formulated. Different parts of the bureaucracy may
have different policy perspectives. There may be differences over
objectives, over the means to those objectives and over the best
way of making sense of a situation.

In his hearing with Commission I of the House, for instance,
that the TNI Commander Gen. Endriartono Sutarto claimed that his
office was never involved in the planning or purchase of the
Russian aircraft. But later, during his second meeting with the
House, the Commander admitted involvement in the deal, but denied
that he had bypassed the Ministry of Defense.

In his third appearance before Commission I of the House on
July 8,, the TNI Chief again stressed that there was no violation
of procedure in the purchase and that the deal was known to the
Ministry of Defense. But the Defense Ministry's Director General
for defense strategy Maj.Gen. Sudradjat recently told the inquiry
committee of the House that his ministry was not involved in the
deal, thus confirming previous reports of procedural violations
in the purchase.

The Sukhoi drama has not reached its epilogue. But the
statement made by Minister of Industry and Trade, Rini M.
Soewandi, that the President was the architect of the Sukhoi deal
and that all ministers knew of the decision, seems to have
encouraged the inquiry team to take further measures to uncover
the deal.

The case shows how pressure on bureaucrats given greater
responsibility to pursue the policy of the president leads them
to become defensive and rigid.

One might have expected to see how a decision was taken in
accordance with approved guidelines and procedures rather than
merely reflecting the personal preferences of the president.

Instead, the temporary conclusion so far is that apart from
their lack of political savvy, the officials had a problem of not
knowing what was going to happen, what was happening and why.