Sukhoi hits at bureaucracy

Sukhoi hits at bureaucracy

Bantarto Bandoro, Editor, 'The Indonesian Quarterly', Centre
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta,
bandoro@csis.or.id

It is normal if a jet fighter like an F18 Hornet, Sukhoi, or
F16 maneuvers to create panic in the air as well as on the
ground, strikes at specific enemy targets or compels the air
force of a given country to react accordingly. It is also normal
when a state procures more sophisticated weapons for its national
defense. But it is perhaps extraordinary that a jet fighter like
the Russian Sukhoi has struck instead at the Indonesian state
bureaucracy.

The current "Sukhoi" drama involves, among others, government
bodies, business and pressure groups. The House of
Representatives is acting as if it were the producer, for example
by summoning those who could be best appointed as the main
casting directors.

Those allegedly involved in or questioned in the Sukhoi deal
appeared one by one to testify before the House, expressing with
conviction either their involvement or disengagement from the
purchase of the four jet fighters and two helicopters from
Russia. The purchase appears to indicate a kind of coalition
between elements of the bureaucracy and interest groups. It is
suspected that the decision to purchase came from bargaining
between the main coalition members.

The arguments put forward by each of the state bureaucracies
and other parties regarding the purchase have confused the public
as to how the final decision was reached. One wonders how our
bureaucracy, which is supposed to reflect a clear-cut line of
command and adhere strictly to formal rules, has been dragged
into such a situation that it is accusing other government bodies
either of being part of or being excluded from the Sukhoi deal.

An investigation into the purchase, initiated by certain
legislators, is still under way and is only at its initial
stages, but it has already caused the public to become more
cynical of the way the government of President Megawati
Soekarnoputri manages policy issues.

The decision to buy the Russian aircraft, intentionally
perhaps, has involved up to four state bodies -- the Ministry of
Defense, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the State Logistics
Agency (Bulog) and the Military Headquarters -- plus other
related agencies. This is where problems emerge -- where certain
state bodies have been bypassed, hence they have denied their
involvement or refuted allegations of doing things they were not
supposed to do. It can also mean that people were placed in
control over resources that were not their own, but used these
resources in the interests of other persons or groups close to
the President.

Was the President thinking of advancing the interests of her
inner circle through the ground rules established for the
implementation of the "Sukhoi policy"?

Conflicting views expressed by officials in meetings with
legislators are indicative of policy conflict within the
bureaucracy, and it has thus caused further confusion as to how
the Sukhoi policy was formulated. Different parts of the
bureaucracy may have different policy perspectives. There may be
differences over objectives, over the means to achieve those
objectives and over the best way of making sense of the
situation.

In his hearing with Commission I of the House, for instance,
TNI Commander Gen. Endriartono Sutarto claimed that his office
was not involved in the planning or purchase of the Russian
aircraft. Subsequently, during his second meeting with the House,
the commander admitted involvement in the deal, but denied that
he had bypassed the Ministry of Defense.

In his third appearance before Commission I of the House on
July 8, the TNI chief again stressed that there was no violation
of procedure in the purchase and that the deal was known to the
Ministry of Defense. But Ministry of Defense director general for
defense strategy Maj. Gen. Sudradjat recently told the inquiry
committee of the House that his ministry was not involved in the
deal, thus confirming previous reports of procedural violations
in the purchase.

The Sukhoi drama has not yet reached its epilogue. However,
the statement made by Minister of Industry and Trade Rini MS
Soewandi, that the President was the architect of the Sukhoi deal
and that all ministers knew of the decision, seems to have
encouraged the inquiry team to go further in its investigations.

The case illustrates how pressure on bureaucrats given greater
responsibility, to pursue the policy of the president, has caused
them to become defensive and rigid.

One might have expected to see that a decision was taken in
accordance with approved guidelines and procedures rather than
merely reflecting the personal preferences of the president.

Instead, the temporary conclusion so far is that, apart from
their lack of political savvy, the officials had a problem of not
knowing what was going to happen, what was happening and why.