Sukarno fell victim of his political vision

Sukarno fell victim of his political vision

A recently launched book written by former ambassador Manai
Sophiaan has sparked a controversy on the role of former
president Sukarno in the 1965 coup. Noted historian Onghokham
looks into this issue.

JAKARTA (JP): Recently there has been a renewed and heated
debate on Sukarno's involvement in the attempted coup of the so-
called Sept. 30 Movement and the Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI).

From the latest publications, including a book by Manai
Sophiaan and the government's white book, Sukarno's direct
involvement in the coup was never proven, nor is there any
evidence of his direct involvement in the coup attempt itself. In
fact both the White Book as well as Manai's book Kehormatan Bagi
Yang Berhak (Honor for the One Who Deserves It) showed that
Sukarno was not involved in the coup itself nor had any knowledge
of it beforehand.

This non-involvement should not be confused with suspicions or
prejudgments of Sukarno's involvement in the coup attempt. A
prejudgment, probably strengthened by his pro-PKI policies after
the coup, might be interpreted as pro the movement. I believe
this latter part to be undeniable, these are the facts of
history. Nevertheless Sukarno's different roles in September 1965
and after should be kept separate, at least seen from a
historical and non-political point of view.

First of all, what was the Sept. 30 Movement of 1965? The coup
leader, Lt.Col. Untung commander of the palace guards, usurped
the power of the president and Great Leader of the Revolution, as
he was called at the time. The coup declared the cabinet
dissolved and formed a Revolutionary Council. The coup, however,
claimed that it took action in order to save the revolution and
its Great Leader Sukarno from a "Council of Generals" who planned
a counter-revolution.

At the same time the Sept. 30 coup movement captured and
killed six top Army generals including A. Yani, chief of the
army, S. Parman, chief of intelligence, and others, while the
defense minister, Gen. A.H. Nasution barely escaped. His young
adjutant, Lt. P. Tendean was killed though and also Nasution's
little daughter. The coup plot claimed that the action was
necessary in order to clean the army of counter-revolutionaries.

Although the Sept. 30 Movement was a coup against the Sukarno
government by its act of usurpation of power, public suspicions
immediately fell on Sukarno because for months there had been
tensions and conflicts between the palace and the army
leadership. Since May there had already been the issue of the so-
called Council of Generals whose existence as a policy making
body was denied by the army. Then there were the rumors and
gossip of the so called Gillchrist (British ambassador) letter to
the American Ambassador, discussing "our local army friends".

Up to now there is no evidence that Sukarno had any knowledge
or involvement of the Sept. 30 Movement. It is indeed unthinkable
that a president would make a coup against himself, as his
involvement in the Sept. 30 Movement would have meant. Sukarno
was above all no adventurer, throughout his life he seemed even a
bit wary of physical adventurism, as shown by his refusal to join
the guerrilla forces in 1948, among others things, when the Dutch
occupied Yogyakarta.

Sukarno's role in the Sept. 30 Movement became more pronounced
when he tried to protect the air force high command and the PKI
leadership from involvement or from being tainted by the Sept.30
Movement. And they certainly were, if not involved, then at least
tainted in some way or another. Its historical truths are still
heavily debated among scholars. More important as far as
immediate politics were concerned was the army's wrath over
Sukarno's policy of protecting the guilty and suspects of the
Sept. 30 coup movement.

Where the air force was concerned, some compromise solutions
could be found. The air force high command was dismissed and new
acceptable commanders found. However, when youth demonstrators
and the army demanded the dissolution of the PKI the president
refused to do so, although it would have been politically wise to
do so.

Since 1926 Sukarno had a vision of a united struggle of
Indonesians, consisting of the three political forces of that
time: Nationalists, Religion and Communists, against colonialism.
In short the communists were an essential part of his
revolutionary dreams. In his old age, in bad health and a policy
of isolating his country from the west through his anti-
imperialist confrontations, Sukarno chose to stand for his
visions rather than being an opportunist. He disappeared in a
tragic way from the national and international scene which was
probably his moment of true greatness. Indeed the revolution
ended without the realization of his vision.

In the current Cold War and post communist world one should be
able to evaluate Sukarno's pro-communist attitudes
dispassionately.

The writer is a former staff lecturer at University of
Indonesia.

White book -- Page 2