Structuring of Asian security

Structuring of Asian security

By Hermawan Sulistyo

SURABAYA (JP): There is no doubt that in the last decade there
has been a significant increase in the arms expenditures of
Southeast Asian countries, as Dewi Fortuna Anwar eloquently wrote
(The Jakarta Post, June 6 and June 7). Yet, to conclude that this
is a sign of balancing post-Cold War security in Southeast Asia
is too much. Rather than analyzing external threats and power
configurations, I would rather look deeper into internal
structures of the area's security arrangements and related
problems.

Southeast Asian countries have similar domestic problems. By
the end of the Cold War, the communist insurgences (which rose to
power in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) dragged and trapped the elites
into regionally outside interests. Now the problem has shifted
and has transformed into more domestic and internal issues.
Economic gaps, restless students and intellectuals have all
contributed to heightening domestic security issues rather than
international ones.

Under this pretext, I doubt that arms spending and
acquisitions follow the patterns Anwar argues. It is difficult to
assess precisely the composition of Southeast Asian countries'
latest arms acquisitions, mainly because of security reasons but
also because of the economic interests of each country's
military-industrial complex. But it is safe to say that the
amount of various arms for local security measures is much higher
than we may expect. It also might be true that the budgeted
expenditure for the main weaponry system for defense against
outside powers is more than the expenditure for small weapons to
fight internal and domestic insurgencies. However, this fact
alone does not explain the shift in Southeast Asian defense
issues and patterns.

We should not see the future of the Southeast Asian security
arrangement merely in an international context. From an internal
context there are several security and defense concerns that
Southeast Asian countries face. The first is technical. Due to
different economic interests and political leanings, it is
impossible to have a compatible system of weaponry. At the top of
the pinnacle, some countries possess quiet different types of
arms and ammunition obtained from different companies. And in
every country there is even a substantial incompatibility of
weaponry.

Incompatibility in weaponry is closely related to the economic
competition and interests of each country's military-industrial
complex. If needed, military-industrial complexes would put their
relationships with a country at stake in order to save other
market opportunities. Instead of strengthening their cooperative
base with PT Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara for producing and
repairing choppers, for instance, Aerospatiale decided to
establish similar business with their counterpart in Thailand. It
is well-known that Southeast Asia is an appealing region for
underground arms trade.

On the surface, any Southeast Asian defense "arrangement"
seems to move toward balancing outside interests. Yet, we should
not forget that although the Cold War is over and communism seems
to have lost its appeal, communist authorities in Vietnam,
Cambodia and Laos are on the opposite end of the rightist
governments of Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore. For the
three latter countries communist issues are still alive and
effective as local "political weapons". We may expect that at
least for the next decade, both sides will continue to take
strong precautions toward a real functional "defense
arrangement".

From a more positive standpoint, however, we actually may
start with more realistic steps toward a better security
arrangement, a more resilient Southeast Asia, and an even more
humanistic approach to defense and security issues. First of all,
if the real nature of security issues is domestic rather than
international, why then is the Armed Forces spending more on
advanced equipment such as F-16s, Hawks and others, yet often
obsolete equipment such as used ships from East Germany? Further,
a more "humane" approach to internal security issues would shift
the patterns of arms acquisition to a socially more profitable
use.

Instead of buying more advanced airplanes, let alone old used
ships, the government could allocate the money for improving the
police force. We may expect that two F-16s would make at least
two provincial police personnel "cleaner" and better in their
service to the public. To execute this shifting policy might be
difficult in several Southeast Asian countries, but it would
definitely be easier in Indonesia since the police is under the
Armed Forces and not under the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Moreover, for the acquisition of small armaments there could
be also a significant shift. Instead of acquiring more assault
weapons such as M-16s and AK-47s (much cheaper if we buy the
Chinese version), and domestically producing similar weapons
(FNCs of Pindad), we may expect a higher allotted expenditure for
nonassault weapons that are less harmful and more useful for
controlling riots.

There are abundant examples of such proposed shifting
policies. But security and defense issues do not stand on their
own; there are also strong political and economic considerations.
Unfortunately, it has no social face. Defense in particular, and
security in general, is an "untouchable realm" of public
business. It is beyond social and even political power, apart
from those who deal directly with the formulation of defense
policies. Therefore, the above ideas should be rendered a mission
impossible. At best, we may play a safer game, such as an
international configuration of "defense arrangement and balance",
which would indeed be intellectually interesting.

The writer is former managing editor of TSM (Teknologi-
Strategi-Militer) magazine, now a fellow with the Program for
Southeast Asian Studies, Arizona State University, United States.