Structuring of Asian security
By Hermawan Sulistyo
SURABAYA (JP): There is no doubt that in the last decade there has been a significant increase in the arms expenditures of Southeast Asian countries, as Dewi Fortuna Anwar eloquently wrote (The Jakarta Post, June 6 and June 7). Yet, to conclude that this is a sign of balancing post-Cold War security in Southeast Asia is too much. Rather than analyzing external threats and power configurations, I would rather look deeper into internal structures of the area's security arrangements and related problems.
Southeast Asian countries have similar domestic problems. By the end of the Cold War, the communist insurgences (which rose to power in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) dragged and trapped the elites into regionally outside interests. Now the problem has shifted and has transformed into more domestic and internal issues. Economic gaps, restless students and intellectuals have all contributed to heightening domestic security issues rather than international ones.
Under this pretext, I doubt that arms spending and acquisitions follow the patterns Anwar argues. It is difficult to assess precisely the composition of Southeast Asian countries' latest arms acquisitions, mainly because of security reasons but also because of the economic interests of each country's military-industrial complex. But it is safe to say that the amount of various arms for local security measures is much higher than we may expect. It also might be true that the budgeted expenditure for the main weaponry system for defense against outside powers is more than the expenditure for small weapons to fight internal and domestic insurgencies. However, this fact alone does not explain the shift in Southeast Asian defense issues and patterns.
We should not see the future of the Southeast Asian security arrangement merely in an international context. From an internal context there are several security and defense concerns that Southeast Asian countries face. The first is technical. Due to different economic interests and political leanings, it is impossible to have a compatible system of weaponry. At the top of the pinnacle, some countries possess quiet different types of arms and ammunition obtained from different companies. And in every country there is even a substantial incompatibility of weaponry.
Incompatibility in weaponry is closely related to the economic competition and interests of each country's military-industrial complex. If needed, military-industrial complexes would put their relationships with a country at stake in order to save other market opportunities. Instead of strengthening their cooperative base with PT Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara for producing and repairing choppers, for instance, Aerospatiale decided to establish similar business with their counterpart in Thailand. It is well-known that Southeast Asia is an appealing region for underground arms trade.
On the surface, any Southeast Asian defense "arrangement" seems to move toward balancing outside interests. Yet, we should not forget that although the Cold War is over and communism seems to have lost its appeal, communist authorities in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos are on the opposite end of the rightist governments of Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore. For the three latter countries communist issues are still alive and effective as local "political weapons". We may expect that at least for the next decade, both sides will continue to take strong precautions toward a real functional "defense arrangement".
From a more positive standpoint, however, we actually may start with more realistic steps toward a better security arrangement, a more resilient Southeast Asia, and an even more humanistic approach to defense and security issues. First of all, if the real nature of security issues is domestic rather than international, why then is the Armed Forces spending more on advanced equipment such as F-16s, Hawks and others, yet often obsolete equipment such as used ships from East Germany? Further, a more "humane" approach to internal security issues would shift the patterns of arms acquisition to a socially more profitable use.
Instead of buying more advanced airplanes, let alone old used ships, the government could allocate the money for improving the police force. We may expect that two F-16s would make at least two provincial police personnel "cleaner" and better in their service to the public. To execute this shifting policy might be difficult in several Southeast Asian countries, but it would definitely be easier in Indonesia since the police is under the Armed Forces and not under the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Moreover, for the acquisition of small armaments there could be also a significant shift. Instead of acquiring more assault weapons such as M-16s and AK-47s (much cheaper if we buy the Chinese version), and domestically producing similar weapons (FNCs of Pindad), we may expect a higher allotted expenditure for nonassault weapons that are less harmful and more useful for controlling riots.
There are abundant examples of such proposed shifting policies. But security and defense issues do not stand on their own; there are also strong political and economic considerations. Unfortunately, it has no social face. Defense in particular, and security in general, is an "untouchable realm" of public business. It is beyond social and even political power, apart from those who deal directly with the formulation of defense policies. Therefore, the above ideas should be rendered a mission impossible. At best, we may play a safer game, such as an international configuration of "defense arrangement and balance", which would indeed be intellectually interesting.
The writer is former managing editor of TSM (Teknologi- Strategi-Militer) magazine, now a fellow with the Program for Southeast Asian Studies, Arizona State University, United States.