Structural impediments facing the new president

Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, Jakarta

After more than six years of disorder in the post-Soeharto era, many are once again erroneously looking at institutional changes and the introduction of a more democratic electoral system as a quick fix to Indonesia's chaotic transformation.

Instead of positioning this process as a means to a more justifiable end, the elections are being perceived as ends in themselves. That the final product -- a democratically elected president -- is the cure for all that has gone amiss since the start of the reform movement.

Javanese folklore is seeped in the myth of a benevolent savior (Ratu Adil): A leader of divine character sent by providence to confer justice and glory on the nation. Many cling to this illusion, giving rise to personality cults that eventually lead to demagogy and authoritarianism.

Indonesia's history has twice, in the form of the Sukarno and Soeharto regimes, provided ample evidence that the birth of a new (self-) righteous regime/leader is more of a placebo than a panacea for democracy's ills.

People ignore the reality that the political process is also defined by innate circumstances beyond the control of one person (the president). The idealism and benevolence of a president alone are insufficient to ensure the shaping of a better society if structural obstacles are not addressed.

Despite the new system that has been installed, Indonesia is brimming with forces that work to negate the expedition of a smooth democratic transition. Consequently, our expectations that the new president can induce seismic changes should be tempered proportionally to the gravity of the obstacles that lie before us.

Paramount among the forces at work in a country undergoing transition is the level of economic growth. Transformation toward democracy, by its very nature, implies fundamental social and economic change. Economic growth is the decisive factor in not only determining whether a nation succeeds in crossing the systemic divide to become a democratic state, but how well the transition permeates down through society.

More often than not, societal changes are propelled by an established middle class. This is why sound economic growth is vital, since only under conditions of relative economic prosperity will a society have a politically aware middle class that seeks to influence the political dynamics. Under these conditions, transitions tend to be more meaningful since they are built upon fundamental socio-economic change rather than short- term political gains.

Under situations where economic growth is less encouraging, the democratic transition tends to be shallower as many changes tend to be essentially cosmetic in nature. There is little underlying change as transformations are driven more by seasonal discontent toward a decaying regime rather than a new equation in the national polity.

It is too early to tell if Indonesia will undergo a deep or shallow democratic transition. But the recent annual average of three to four percent growth, driven by consumer spending, is simply not enough. If the depressed economic outlook persists, the fallout could be disastrous for democratic consolidation.

"Democracy" itself could eventually be blamed for the economic downturn. Transition fatigue would quickly set in as the public becomes apprehensive about further change.

In such a situation, the growing sense of apathy would be compounded by a perception that democracy has become irrelevant to the public. The politicking of the elites, which has little if anything to do with improving public welfare, would then create a disconnection between democratic politics and public policy. Eventually, democracy would become a mere slogan and come to be seen as ineffective as regards furthering the aspirations of the public.

Another significant obstacle hindering democratic consolidation is the continued practice of political patronage. In a true democracy, power is regulated, distributed and transferred via established institutional means, e.g., democratic elections. But not so in Indonesia where the patronage system perpetuates an asymmetrical generation of power in which authority is not acquired through formal processes.

Abdurrahman Wahid's tenure as president amply demonstrated this inherent frailty in the Indonesian political system. Despite being handed the presidency by the People's Consultative Assembly, he was denied the intrinsic powers associated with the office. In the end, he was forced to compromise in order to build a new power base within the confines of the Presidential Palace.

The key driver in this predicament is the innate strength of "embedded elites" vis-a-vis the "free floating elites". The levers of change remain in the hands of those from the former category.

Embedded elites are individuals and organizations who are connected to the previous regime. While they may have been disgraced and dealt political blows during the preliminary phase of regime change, their networks and resources allow them to weather the initial storm and quickly regain their privileged roles in high politics. The Golkar Party, Gen. (ret.) Wiranto and other individuals linked to the New Order are examples of how embedded elites continue to shine in the political firmament.

Unfortunately, pro-democracy advocates, like Amien Rais, Nurcholish Madjid and Sjahrir, while churning out attractive rhetoric really have little impact when it comes to real politik. These free-floating elites neither have the savvy nor the constituencies to hold sway in the practical world.

In the end, they resort to jargonistic platforms and abstract slogans about democracy that are unappealing to the public.

While the role of the free-floating elites is symbolically significant, it is the embedded ones that we ultimately have to turn to in order to induce true change. Given the sluggish rate of economic growth, we cannot expect change to emerge from the middle class.

Profound democratic change in Indonesia will ultimately be achieved only by acquiring the support and commitment of the embedded elites to the slow process of reestablishing the link between democratic politics and policy-making.

In many respects, this process has already begun via constitutional changes and the introduction of a new electoral system.

However, the price that has had to be paid is that in present day Indonesian politics, the vanguard of the new process still consists of organizations and individuals whose histories can be traced back to the past regime. But at the very least, they now have to pay some heed to the voice of the people.

Meidyatama Suryodiningrat is a staff writer for The Jakarta Post.