Strategies to contain terrorism

Hermawan Sulistyo Jakarta

After the Bali bombings on Oct. 12, 2002, the National Police strengthened their antiterror unit, Special Detachment 88 Anti- Terror. To be accepted as a member of this unit is indeed prestigious. And yet the unit is one of the least rewarding in terms of position, rank and material benefits, compared with other police units.

Despite the funds the National Police received from their success in the investigation of the first Bali bombings, many investigators found that they never received any special rewards. They did not receive promotions, and some investigators even lost the strategic positions they had held before the investigation. This was also true for personnel from other supporting units, such as forensics and intelligence. As a result, they now only half-heartedly share information with their new investigation counterparts.

Similar situations may be found among local police forces. If they succeed in locating or apprehending a terrorist suspect, the credit usually goes to someone else. Thus, refining the merit system within the police would clearly increase the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts. Assignment to counterterror units should be an important, if not extraordinary, step in the careers of officers, and these assignments must be rewarding.

Strengthening the police's capacity could also include the adoption and implementation of community policing. This is indeed a new philosophy that the National Police are now gradually adopting and integrating into their system and operations. Effective community policing means a strong early warning system, similar to the socio-security function of the newly revived military territorial commands.

Community policing activities related directly to counterterrorism measures could include special campaigns designed for opinion makers as well as the general public. The community police should be proactive in providing proper information to the community concerning the devastating impacts of terrorism. The police could ask for the cooperation of religious leaders in approaching some communities that traditionally are the sources of new terror recruits.

Among the best ways to shift the focus of the public discourse on the perpetrators and/or their motives -- expressed in statements like "America is the real terrorist" -- is to espouse the perspective of the victims. Survivors of a bombing may tell of their traumatic experience. Graphic pictures of the victims and survivors would be a big help in explaining why we all must perceive terrorism from the victims' perspective.

No bombings would occur without the availability of explosives, whether low or high explosives. This means that tight controls over the sale of explosives is a must. High explosives are mostly organic and belong to the military, police and other government offices authorized to use explosives. Most of the components of low explosives are available in the retail market.

The military could contribute significantly to counterterrorism measures by tightening controls over the (mis)use of explosives, or more specifically "organic" high explosives. In addition to formal controls over the official production of explosives, including production by PT Pindad, the military also has to reach into the black market. For the past couple of years, undisclosed records have contained reports of stolen munitions from military warehouses.

Although there is no proof yet that the stolen munitions have been used in bombings, the potential for this is great. Korean grenades (nicknamed "pineapple grenades", commonly used in military training) contains a high percentage of RDX, a high explosive element also used in C-4 types of bombs. But God knows what the stolen munitions have been used for.

Explosives are not necessarily from domestic stocks. The detonators found at many blast sites were made in India, the cheapest detonators that can be found on the black market. TNT, PETN and other high explosives used in some large blasts, including the first Bali bombings, were also quite possibly from the foreign black market.

Students of terrorism studies can easily trace the "traditional lines" of smuggled explosives from the southern Philippines to North Sulawesi, before the explosives are transported to Maluku, the hinterlands of Sulawesi and other parts of Indonesia. This fact alone should be enough to support the decision on the part of the military to increase its surveillance and operations along the country's northern borders.

If the goal of government policy in strengthening the military is to increase its counterterrorism capacity, its budget is certainly sufficient. Selected areas of operations -- in this case, along the northern border -- will require less of a budget than reviving the socio-security function of the military territorial commands. The policy will in turn provide a benefit as the first step toward incrementally strengthening the military in its external defense role.

Thus, the capsule strategy contains efforts to:

Increase the capacity of the National Police by implementing a proper reward system for personnel in antiterror units and supporting units;

Assign the police to effectively control the trade of explosive substances in the free market; for example, shopkeepers must report to the police if someone buys two kilograms or more of explosive substances like KClO3;

Establish a more effective community policing system as an early detection and warning system;

Assign the military to control the use of official explosives;

Assign the military to patrol certain borders traditionally used as smuggling corridors;

Intensify campaigns among potential new terror recruits in certain areas, giving them a religious as well as the victims' perspective of terrorism.

The writer is a historian specializing in political killings, terrorism and violence. He is also the CEO of Bukafe (bookstore & cafe) and can be reached at kikiek@centrin.net.id.