Strategies to contain terrorism

Strategies to contain terrorism

Hermawan Sulistyo
Jakarta

After the Bali bombings on Oct. 12, 2002, the National Police
strengthened their antiterror unit, Special Detachment 88 Anti-
Terror. To be accepted as a member of this unit is indeed
prestigious. And yet the unit is one of the least rewarding in
terms of position, rank and material benefits, compared with
other police units.

Despite the funds the National Police received from their
success in the investigation of the first Bali bombings, many
investigators found that they never received any special rewards.
They did not receive promotions, and some investigators even lost
the strategic positions they had held before the investigation.
This was also true for personnel from other supporting units,
such as forensics and intelligence. As a result, they now only
half-heartedly share information with their new investigation
counterparts.

Similar situations may be found among local police forces. If
they succeed in locating or apprehending a terrorist suspect, the
credit usually goes to someone else. Thus, refining the merit
system within the police would clearly increase the effectiveness
of counterterrorism efforts. Assignment to counterterror units
should be an important, if not extraordinary, step in the
careers of officers, and these assignments must be rewarding.

Strengthening the police's capacity could also include the
adoption and implementation of community policing. This is indeed
a new philosophy that the National Police are now gradually
adopting and integrating into their system and operations.
Effective community policing means a strong early warning system,
similar to the socio-security function of the newly revived
military territorial commands.

Community policing activities related directly to
counterterrorism measures could include special campaigns
designed for opinion makers as well as the general public. The
community police should be proactive in providing proper
information to the community concerning the devastating impacts
of terrorism. The police could ask for the cooperation of
religious leaders in approaching some communities that
traditionally are the sources of new terror recruits.

Among the best ways to shift the focus of the public discourse
on the perpetrators and/or their motives -- expressed in
statements like "America is the real terrorist" -- is to espouse
the perspective of the victims. Survivors of a bombing may tell
of their traumatic experience. Graphic pictures of the victims
and survivors would be a big help in explaining why we all must
perceive terrorism from the victims' perspective.

No bombings would occur without the availability of
explosives, whether low or high explosives. This means that tight
controls over the sale of explosives is a must. High explosives
are mostly organic and belong to the military, police and other
government offices authorized to use explosives. Most of the
components of low explosives are available in the retail market.

The military could contribute significantly to
counterterrorism measures by tightening controls over the
(mis)use of explosives, or more specifically "organic" high
explosives. In addition to formal controls over the official
production of explosives, including production by PT Pindad, the
military also has to reach into the black market. For the past
couple of years, undisclosed records have contained reports of
stolen munitions from military warehouses.

Although there is no proof yet that the stolen munitions have
been used in bombings, the potential for this is great. Korean
grenades (nicknamed "pineapple grenades", commonly used in
military training) contains a high percentage of RDX, a high
explosive element also used in C-4 types of bombs. But God knows
what the stolen munitions have been used for.

Explosives are not necessarily from domestic stocks. The
detonators found at many blast sites were made in India, the
cheapest detonators that can be found on the black market. TNT,
PETN and other high explosives used in some large blasts,
including the first Bali bombings, were also quite possibly from
the foreign black market.

Students of terrorism studies can easily trace the
"traditional lines" of smuggled explosives from the southern
Philippines to North Sulawesi, before the explosives are
transported to Maluku, the hinterlands of Sulawesi and other
parts of Indonesia. This fact alone should be enough to support
the decision on the part of the military to increase its
surveillance and operations along the country's northern borders.

If the goal of government policy in strengthening the military
is to increase its counterterrorism capacity, its budget is
certainly sufficient. Selected areas of operations -- in this
case, along the northern border -- will require less of a budget
than reviving the socio-security function of the military
territorial commands. The policy will in turn provide a benefit
as the first step toward incrementally strengthening the military
in its external defense role.

Thus, the capsule strategy contains efforts to:

Increase the capacity of the National Police by implementing a
proper reward system for personnel in antiterror units and
supporting units;

Assign the police to effectively control the trade of
explosive substances in the free market; for example, shopkeepers
must report to the police if someone buys two kilograms or more
of explosive substances like KClO3;

Establish a more effective community policing system as an
early detection and warning system;

Assign the military to control the use of official explosives;

Assign the military to patrol certain borders traditionally
used as smuggling corridors;

Intensify campaigns among potential new terror recruits in
certain areas, giving them a religious as well as the victims'
perspective of terrorism.

The writer is a historian specializing in political killings,
terrorism and violence. He is also the CEO of Bukafe (bookstore &
cafe) and can be reached at kikiek@centrin.net.id.