Wed, 20 Nov 2002

Strategic significance of U.S. midterm elections

J. Soedjati Djiwandono, Political Analyst, Jakarta

In his famous classic of 1833, On war, the Prussian general, strategist and military historian Karl von Clausewitz said that "In the 18th century, war was still an affair for government alone, and the people's role was simply that of an instrument." This was the state of affairs at the outbreak of the French Revolution. Suddenly war again became the business of the people.

Since Napoleon Bonaparte, war "became the concern of the people as a whole [and] took on an entirely different character" (quoted in Col. Harry G. Summers, Jr. [ret], The New World Strategy, 1995).

Thus while Article II of the American Constitution appoints the President as the commander in chief of the armed forces, Article I gives Congress ("representatives of the People, periodically elected") the sole power to raise the military, provide rules for its regulation and government and declare war.

Indeed, the cornerstone of the American Constitution, as emphasized by James Madison among those who framed the constitution, who were mostly veterans of the American revolutionary war for independence, was that "the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone".

That is the moral imperative, that those American citizens whose sons' and daughters' lives are put in jeopardy ought to have some say in their commitment. At any rate, there is the practical argument, if Congress does not approve, who then would pay for the war?

It was reportedly constitutional provision that forced the withdrawal of the U.S. military from Somalia in 1994. The peculiar relationship between the American Army and the American people was forged during the Revolutionary War, a bitter and divisive eight-year struggle where public support was by no means assured, Summers wrote.

The Americans had to pay a high price at some crucial point in their history for breaking away from the continued value of their revolutionary experience embedded in their constitution. That was the episode of the Vietnam War, when they believed in the conduct of a limited war.

It was proven wrong in the end by the development of nuclear weapons and an uncontrollable (strategic, nuclear) arms race between the U.S. and the then Soviet Union, the two superpowers of the Cold War, to the point of the achievement of a mutually assured destruction (MAD), the focus of their strategic relationship.

Fortunately for the world, the fear of unlimited escalation that would ultimately mean literally a complete destruction of humankind and human civilization many times over finally led the Americans to abandon the war. Indeed, the Vietnamese knew that the Americas had the means to totally destroy North Vietnam with nuclear weapons at any time of their choosing. But they also knew that the Americans would never do that.

Underlying the problem were such public-be-damned arguments as reportedly put forward by the then secretary of defense Robert McNamara, echoing limited-war theorists, that "The greatest contribution Vietnam is making -- right or wrong is beside the point -- is that it is developing an ability in the U.S. to fight a limited war, to go to war without arousing the public ire."

And a noted political scientist among the limited-war theorists concluded that even though the American people would be hostile, because of their traditions and ideology, to the kind of strategy he proposed, that strategy had still to be adopted. The rest is a well-known story.

The spirit of Article 2 of the American Constitution, and thus their relationship with the military, was revived and their role in the country's future war restored by secretary of defense Caspar Weinberger who under the Reagan Administration announced his so-called Weinberger doctrine in 1984. The fifth of his six major tests to be applied when weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad was that there must be some reasonable assurance of the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.

That is the strategic significance of the result of the congressional midterm elections in the U.S. earlier this month. Indeed, President George W. Bush had previously got the majority support from Congress for his policy, particularly on his plan to attack Iraq.

He had managed to unite the nation behind his leadership following the terrorist attack on Sept. 11, 2001. But the current domination of both Houses of Congress as a result of this year's midterm congressional elections means a reconfirmation and strengthening of that support.

For President Bush, that is more significant than would have been for any of his predecessors in light of the fact that his election as president was not only one of the most marginal, but perhaps also the most controversial in American history. It took weeks before the American Supreme Court decided on the final result of the presidential election in his favor.

The strengthening of that domestic support is significant also in light of his lack of support not only from the international community, but also particularly from among his allies. From the outset, he has enjoyed only the backing of Britain, particularly Prime Minister Tony Blair. Even in this case, there have been reports on a split among the governing party, the Labor Party, on the issue of attack against Iraq, thereby weakening that support.

In the international community, especially as reflected in the UN Security Council, not only France and Germany, American allies in NATO, but also the other two big powers each with the right to a veto, Russia and China, have not been forthcoming in their support for the U.S. position regarding Iraq.

Indeed, now that the U.S. has succeeded in engineering Resolution 1441 by unanimous vote, it just has to wait for the final outcome of work by the UN inspection team on the alleged development by Iraq of weapons of mass destruction to decide whether or not to go ahead with an attack on that country.

However, now with the overwhelming support of Congress for his war plan against Iraq, President Bush is also fulfilling the conditions of Clausewitz' idea on what he called "remarkable trinity", now known as trinitarian war.

The first aspect concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government, Summers wrote. The above analysis confirms what concerns the people. As regards the second aspect, while the commander of what may be designated as the U.S. second Gulf War is probably yet to be determined, President Bush is himself supreme commander of the U.S. armed forces, who is planning to send 200,000 forces to carry out his war plan.

Indeed, with regard to the third aspect, Bush may still be caught between the "moderates" led by Secretary of State Colin Powell and the "hawks" led by Vice President Dick Cheney.

However, even if the majority of the members of his entire government should say "aye" to something not palatable to President Bush, he could well do what president Lincoln did in the face of the opposition of his entire cabinet, "The 'nay' has it". He has the backing of the American people behind him.

It is therefore not surprising that despite the unanimous vote for Resolution 1441, Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, could well remark, "American policy is not formulated by the UN Security Council."