Strait must be secured from the land

Strait must be secured from the land

Begi Hersutanto, Jakarta

Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore signed on July 20 an
agreement to carry out an operation to secure the maritime
channel. The three littoral countries in this regard chose to
establish coordinated patrols, in which each country is
authorized to trespass the border of another in the event of hot
pursuit.

Security concerns in the Strait of Malacca focus mainly on the
threat of piracy against vessels passing through it. The
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) published earlier this year a
report on the incidence of piracy in the strait. According to the
report, the Malacca Strait is regarded as one of the most
vulnerable maritime areas for piracy.

This report triggered a debate over security in the strait, in
which one of the options was a proposal by Thomas Fargo, the U.S.
Admiral of the U.S. Navy fleet in the Pacific, on U.S. troop
deployment to secure the strait. The three littoral countries had
their differences on this matter. At the time, Singapore
preferred to consider the proposal by Admiral Fargo as an option,
while Indonesia and Malaysia rebuffed the proposal for reasons of
national sovereignty.

Finally, the three littoral countries reached an agreement to
carry out a coordinated patrol to secure the Malacca Strait, in
which the three countries will deploy 17 battleships. In this
arrangement, Indonesia operates seven battleships, with Malaysia
and Singapore each contributing five.

We should salute this achievement because Indonesia, Malaysia
and Singapore finally managed to shrug off the burden of their
differences on this matter and work together to reach agreement
on the operation.

However, this cooperation is far from adequate. Additional
initiatives are still required to support the arrangement so that
it will achieve its goal effectively: namely, a secure Malacca
Strait. The missing element in this arrangement is coordination
with the local civil security authorities on the surrounding
land.

The arrangement focuses more on patrolling the sea, whereas
the actual threat source emanates from the land. The pirates here
are people who live on the land and islands surrounding the
Malacca Strait. They live on the land even though they commit
crimes on the sea.

Pirates living in the area surrounding the Malacca Strait
cannot be considered terrorists: They are simply criminals. In
order to be considered terrorists, their activities would need to
have an element of political motivation. On the contrary, the
pirates commit their crimes purely for personal economic gain.

Piracy is like any other crime committed by criminals on the
land. The difference between them is that crimes such as robbery
and burglary occur on land whereas piracy takes place on the sea.

For these reasons, the sea patrols need to have the support of
and be coordinated with the local police. The function of the
local police in the surrounding land is to prevent the potential
pirates from being operational at sea.

Meanwhile, the local police on the land should be able to take
action against pirates who succeed in getting away from the sea
patrol after committing piracy. They usually move stolen goods
from the sea to the land in order to be able to exchange them for
cash.

Such coordination would leave no room for the pirates, either
on land or sea. It would also be harder for them to commit their
crimes at sea, and also difficult for them to sell the goods thus
stolen.

The Malacca Strait is divided into two territorial seas, one
belonging to Indonesia and the other to Malaysia. There are
indications that most of the criminals committing piracy in the
Malacca Strait come from Indonesia. They live on the land and on
islands within Indonesian territory.

In this regard, the idea that patrols in the Malacca Strait
needs to have support from the local police on the land should be
addressed to the Indonesian police (POLRI). POLRI should be able
to carry out surveillance of the suspected group of potential
pirates, and perhaps prevent them from becoming operational.

POLRI has to be able to identify suspected pirates groups
while they are on the land and also to intercept them when they
manage to escape sea patrols to the land.

It is therefore crucial to have not only Coordinated Patrol
arrangement to secure the Malacca Strait but also coordination
with the local police on the land.

Since it is suspected that most pirates in the Malacca Strait
come mainly from Indonesia, POLRI should be able to play a
proportionate role in this exercise.

The writer is a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS).