Stopping bioterrorism before it starts

Lauren T. Hickok and Reynolds M. Salerno, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, Albuquerque, U.S.A.

The anthrax attacks in the U.S. in fall of 2001 were a reminder that bioterrorism is no longer a matter of science fiction. These incidents and the rapidly expanding global biotechnology industry have redefined bioterrorism as a credible threat to human security and certainly to U.S. national security. However, the world has been slow to wake up to the new challenge.

The U.S. policy to mitigate the biological weapons threat encompasses a number of initiatives, among them the national implementation of biosecurity-that is, security systems and practices to protect dangerous biological materials in legitimate research facilities from theft and sabotage. By mitigating the biological weapons threat at the source, biosecurity aims to stop bioterrorism before it starts.

In 2003, the U.S. Government published regulations requiring facilities and individuals that use, store, and/or transport any of 82 Select Agents to register with either the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. These regulations demand that such facilities and individuals adhere to specific biosecurity procedures designed to maintain oversight and control over those materials.

However, securing only U.S. bioscience facilities does not adequately address the threat. Dangerous pathogens can be acquired from overseas labs, made into weapons, and easily transported to the U.S. or other countries, where they can then be deployed. Thus, efforts to achieve biosecurity domestically are only effective if the U.S. is committed to international biosecurity as well.

Implementation of biosecurity on a global scale is particularly important given today's rapidly expanding biotech industry, and its corresponding proliferation of biological materials, technologies, and expertise. Many countries are looking to biotech, and with good reason: The industry holds great promise for improving human health and well being.

Recent years have brought the development of new vaccines and therapies, and such advances will accelerate. What's more, the decoding of the human genome may provide the ability to prevent many forms of human suffering. And the rise of genetically modified organisms may bring agriculture to a new frontier, where hardier crops provide poorer countries opportunities to develop as never before.

Given such possibilities-and the associated economic benefits- developing countries have chosen to enter the global biotech race in increasing numbers; many consider it the silver bullet that could provide recession-hit industrial sector a new fillip. In countries as diverse as Brazil, South Africa, and Bulgaria, the trend is taking root. Biotech is booming in Eastern Europe and more still in Asia, where numerous countries-Singapore, India, China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, to name but a few-have allocated billions of dollars to promote bioscience research.

Regrettably, by increasing the availability of dangerous biological materials, the biotech revolution has inadvertently increased the risk of bioterrorism, in any part of the globe. The result is a need to protect the dangerous biological materials in these many emerging markets -- and that's the domain of biosecurity.

For a contemporary example, consider Southeast Asia. Biotech has exploded in the region. There, heavy government subsidies are the norm -- take Malaysia's US$26 million investment to build three institutes in the new Biovalley Malaysia, an enormous public/private bioscience park that is part of a plan to attract at least $10 billion in investment in biotechnology by the decade's close.

Singapore, a more developed neighbor, in 2001 embarked upon "One North," a 15-year plan that allocates $8.2 billion to make Singapore a high tech hub with a strong focus on biotech. The plan's specific biotech-related expenditures include the $500 million Biopolis Complex, opened in 2003 and touted as a gem among the region's industrial bioparks. These promising developments have inspired other Southeast Asian nations to jump on the trend.

Indonesia -- among others -- sees biotech as the new solution and plans to expand its existing infrastructure, which includes three Inter-University Centers on Biotechnology as well as numerous research facilities and culture collections.

Yet recent years have also brought an increase in terrorist activity to the region. Recall the Bali bombings of 2002, which claimed over 200 lives. Similarly sobering was this past August's bombing in Jakarta, which claimed 10 lives and suggested that terrorist ambitions had not dimmed. The group Jamaah Islamiyah is held responsible for both, and is allegedly linked to al-Qaeda.

To be sure, a penchant for terrorism does not mean a penchant for bioterrorism. But we would do well to be wary. The increasing ease and decreasing cost of producing a biological weapon may motivate terrorists to introduce and spread highly infectious disease as well as rely on conventional explosives.

Even today, a knowledgeable and skilled individual could easily remove a microscopic amount of a pathogen from a lab, then grow, process, and deploy that material as a weapon using commercially available equipment. Because of this, the conjunction of expanding biotech and increased terrorist activity amounts to a serious concern for international security. Biosecurity is an important part of the solution.

Despite concerns about bioterrorism and the propagation of facilities that house dangerous pathogens and toxins, the concept of protecting those materials from theft and sabotage -- that is, biosecurity -- has not been widely embraced. Currently, only a handful of countries have promulgated comprehensive biosecurity legislation, let alone fully implemented the requirements therein.

One reason for the general lack of biosecurity is that the concept is in fact relatively new. In the United States, biosecurity regulations went into effect less than a year ago. The international community has only just begun to address the issue.

Although the subject was discussed at recent meetings of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva, these preliminary discussions have yet to produce a consensus on a clear definition of biosecurity. No international biosecurity standards currently exist.

But protecting dangerous pathogens and toxins from theft and sabotage should not be postponed until an international organization establishes biosecurity guidelines. Individual nations can and should take responsibility for securing their own collections of high consequence biological agents. And the United States, a leader in the new field of biosecurity, can help. By sharing expertise with interested nations, the U.S. can expand the reach of biosecurity and enhance national and international security.

Establishing national biosecurity legislation worldwide will be a critical first step, and the U.S. can greatly improve global biosecurity by helping interested countries to draft such laws. These laws should establish standards for both facility security and the secure transport of dangerous biological materials; they should also establish regulations governing exports of materials and technologies that could be used in biological weapons proliferation.

Many U.S. government agencies -- all with various experiences in this new field -- can collaborate to develop a comprehensive U.S. policy for international biosecurity. The policy should address a range of issues, from the specifics of implementing biosecurity at a facility to the general principles of establishing biosecurity nationwide.

To bring these issues effectively to an international audience, the U.S. will need to demonstrate that biosecurity will bring great benefits for both national and international security. The U.S. must also be prepared to provide resources to critical nations that cannot achieve adequate levels of biosecurity without international assistance.

Only when such measures have been put in place can the U.S. state with confidence that appropriate action has been taken to stem the international proliferation of biological weapons.

Lauren T. Hickok is a Biosecurity Analyst at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Reynolds M. Salerno is a Principal Member of the Technical Staff at Sandia and director of the Sandia biosecurity program.