Staying out of Iraq
The security situation in Iraq has spiraled from bad to worse since the day American forces entered Baghdad eight months ago. Despite the vast superiority of U.S. and coalition forces, resistance has become unwieldy with every passing week as more fall victim to insurgent and terrorist attacks. The handover of local authority to a Washington-picked, Iraqi civilian administration seems only to have intensified these strikes.
As frustration grows, senior officials from Saudi Arabia discussed, during a meeting with the Iraqi prime minister and U.S. secretary of state last week, the possibility of augmenting the foreign troop presence in Iraq with a special contingent from Muslim countries around the world.
So far, the idea has received a lukewarm response at best. Some countries, Egypt being one example, have rejected the idea altogether.
Being a country with the world's largest Muslim population and experience in peacekeeping missions dating back to the 1960s, Indonesia is politically and strategically a candidate for such an operation.
But like most other Muslim countries, Indonesia has been cool toward the idea, displaying its reticence in a terse comment that any operation should be conducted only under the aegis of the United Nations.
As a nation, Indonesia in morally and constitutionally bound to assist in peacekeeping and peacemaking initiatives whenever sought. The predominant faith of the country in question should have no bearing on our eagerness to assist.
However, the case of Iraq is a special one. Even if this new initiative does attain UN support, we do not believe that it justifies Indonesia's immediate intervention in Iraq.
Indonesia did not support the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, but that does not mean we do not support the reconstruction of Iraq as a democratic society.
The dilemma is that the issues at stake in Iraq are too heavily intertwined with U.S. policy interests.
Furthermore, in any foreign policy decision, it is prudent to weigh it against a set of criteria relevant to our own immediate interests.
Indonesia, at present, has a larger domestic agenda (the presidential elections) which it must conclude. It is best for any decision on involvement in Iraq to wait after this all- important national task is completed and a new government is installed in Jakarta.
The circumstances surrounding the proposal tabled by Saudi Arabia are such that there is no need for a new multinational contingent in Iraq to be formed instantly. There is no particular military advantage that this new force could bring that the thousands of highly equipped U.S. and British soldiers have not already served. Furthermore, Indonesia's role, if it were sought, could easily be filled by other countries that are more willing at this juncture to partake in this endeavor.
We do not believe that forces arriving as a so-called "Muslim" contingent would have greater success or be subject to preferential treatment. Terrorist elements in Iraq are not fighting for a true religious cause and have shown no reluctance to attacking Muslims. The proposed new contingent would likely be faced with attacks of the same ferocity as currently experienced by U.S. forces in Iraq.
At the heart of the issue is how this new foreign contingent would be perceived by the Iraqi people: As an extension of the U.S. occupation force or as peacekeepers helping in the reconstruction of Iraq?
While we would not be so bold as to say the present Iraqi administration is illegitimate, we believe that it would also be best for Indonesia to wait until a truly representative Iraqi government is established -- through a democratic process -- before committing its efforts to Iraq.
Just because Washington and its allies might eventually be successful in transforming their operations into a UN-sanctioned mission does not sanctify U.S. policy in Iraq and turn it into a justifiable cause that countries like Indonesia should heed.
The world must be careful of the politics involved: Of a ruse to put others, namely Muslim states, in the front line of what is essentially a U.S.-made crisis.