State security bill

State security bill

In the context of the discussion on the state security bill, I
wish to state that:

1. It is correct that a state security law is needed
according to Article 12 of the 1945 Constitution, which states
that the conditions and consequences of an emergency situation
are determined by law.

2. It is correct that a staatsnoodrecht (state of emergency
law) is already known here. The contents of the state security
bill are indeed the same as that law. We only need reminding of
the state of emergency law as developed by Van Dullemen:

-- The highest interest of the state is the presence or
existence of the state itself.

-- Emergency regulations are absolutely necessary.

-- Emergency regulations are provisional, as long as there is
still an emergency, and afterwards normal regulations are needed
and the emergency regulations no longer apply.

-- When the emergency regulations are in effect, the House of
Representatives cannot hold a session or meet in the normal
manner.

With relation to the above conditions, the following needs to
be asked:

a. Are the conditions and consequences stipulated in the state
security bill adequate to implement a state of special security
system or a state of emergency? If a group of people cause a
disturbance by repeatedly shouting, the bill can interpret it as
a revolt. And with a little engineering, the bill, if passed into
law, can be applied without much ado.

b. Relative to the three-month special security system period
being extendible by three months, why would managing the
situation take so long? What is the consequence if the six-month
period is passed and the situation is still not managed? Will it
be stepped up into an emergency situation or shall the special
system be canceled immediately for the sake of law, meaning the
implementation of normal regulations? Or will the Indonesian
Military (TNI) commander be consistent and resign from office?

c. Why is the state security bill so slack by delegating so
much authority?

The state security bill is as bad as the regulations of the
New Order and the Reform Order which delegated too much. Is it
the intention of the drafters to facilitate the presence of a
military junta? Or is the ability of the drafters so low that
they are not capable of creating stipulations which are oriented
to a state based on laws which uphold basic human rights?

3. I consider Law No. 23/Prp/1959 to be adequate. That law
does not mention, however, that the TNI commander is a member of
the board which will assist the president in a state of
civilian, military or war emergency. Maybe the commander wants to
fulfill a role regulated by law. If that is the problem, it would
be better to simply revise Law No. 23/Prp/1959.

4. If the state security bill is still insisted upon, the
commander must have the courage to bear the logical consequences,
i.e. regional military commands, resort military commands,
district military commands, military headquarters down to the
military officers posted in villages must be liquidated. If the
state security bill is passed into law, it means the state is
currently in a normal situation. So, the commander must first
restore the situation to normal. Consequently Law No.20/1982 on
Defense and Security must first be changed. It is in this context
that the commander's greatness hangs in the balance. If the
commander is able to revert the situation to a normal one, he
deserves a fifth star for outshining his predecessors.

5. It is not right to discuss the state security bill now with
the limited time and the necessity for deep thinking by all
sides. The best thing is to stop the discussions and let the next
House of Representatives consider the bill.

PAUSTINUS SIBURIAN

Jakarta