Stable Beijing-Taipei ties crucial

Stable Beijing-Taipei ties crucial

By Rizal Sukma

JAKARTA (JP): Recent developments in relations between China
and Taiwan are unfortunate. With signs of economic recovery
emerging in East Asia, the region cannot afford to have
diplomatic tension open up the possibility of military conflict
between its key players.

China and Taiwan are two economies which have not been greatly
affected by the financial crisis. Therefore, stable relations
between the two parties will enable them to effectively
participate in a regional economic recovery and accelerate the
return of the "East Asian miracle". Moreover, cross-strait
tension between Taipei and Beijing is likely to affect the United
States in one form or another.

The recent tension began when Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui
indicated that Taipei might shift its "one China" policy, which
recognized mainland China and Taiwan as two parts of the same
country.

In a recent interview with German radio, President Lee
maintained that China should deal with Taiwan on a "state-to-
state" basis. Lee also maintained that under the formula of
"special nation-to-nation relations, there is no longer any need
to declare Taiwanese independence". On July 15, Taiwan made it
clear that it now adhered to an official new policy of "one
nation, two states".

As many predicted, the shift in Taiwan's China policy was
followed by strong reaction from mainland China. The People's
Republic of China (PRC), which considers Taiwan as a renegade
province, immediately denounced Taipei's move as a serious step
in the direction of "splitting the motherland".

Beijing also warned Lee Teng-hui "not to play with fire". The
military's Liberation Army Daily even reported that the People's
Liberation Army (PLA) was "determined enough and strong enough to
safeguard the nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity"
(Reuters, July 14, 1999). President Jiang Zemin himself has
stated strong action should be taken to counter what he called
Lee's "growing proindependence conspiracy".

In fact, many are puzzled by Taipei's recent move. The most
common interpretation points to local political factors, namely
the general election next year. Many believe President Lee Teng-
hui is attempting to garner support for his Kuomintang Party by
wooing backers of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP), which favors a formal declaration of independence from
China.

Apart from domestic political concerns, there is also
speculation the move might have been intended to test America's
attitude and commitment to Taipei at a time when United States-
China relations are at a low-point following the bombing of the
Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

However, considering the great risks Taipei could face with
such a controversial move, it is likely the policy shift is the
result of much more complex calculations growing out of deep
resentment and frustration over its abnormal legal status. The
move also reflects Taiwan's growing belief that it is entitled to
a better-defined place in world politics and commerce.

Taiwanese officials, for example, say the new definition of
Taipei-Beijing relations reflects "disappointment over the
Communists' 'one China' principle", which has been used by the
mainland "to squeeze Taiwan internationally ... and undermine the
legitimacy of the Nationalist Party" (New York Times, July 13,
1999).

Regardless of the real motive behind the move, however, Lee's
announcement caught many by surprise. The immediate reaction from
Taiwan's main ally, the United States, has been disappointing.
Washington has reaffirmed its policy of recognizing one China
ruled from Beijing and maintained that the future of Taiwan was
"a matter for Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait
to resolve".

Japan also reiterated its one China policy and made it clear
that Tokyo still respected Beijing's view of Taiwan as an
"inalienable" part of China. However, both the U.S. and Japan
stressed the point that both sides should settle their dispute
peacefully through peaceful means.

More importantly, Taiwan's policy shift also sends the
significant message that the cross-strait issue is a crucial
security issue for the region. It is true that China has always
insisted the question of Taiwan falls within the jurisdiction of
its domestic affairs and outsiders should not interfere in the
matter.

However, China should also understand and acknowledge that
this domestic issue, when it resurfaces, could bring about both
economic and security implications well beyond the boundaries of
both mainland China and Taiwan.

Recent tension between Beijing and Taipei also serves as a
crucial test for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), whose foreign ministers are to hold
their sixth ARF meeting in Singapore later this month. ARF has
been criticized for its inability to contribute significantly to
core security issues, especially in Northeast Asia.

In fact, there has been criticism that ARF is ASEAN-centered
to the exclusion of all other regions. Indeed, ARF has been
largely silent on many regional critical issues in Northeast
Asia. It has not played any substantive role with regards to the
Korean peninsula, nor has it played a significant role in finding
solutions to disputes in the South China Sea.

On the one hand, ARF's inability to play a significant role in
managing security in Northeast Asia is quite understandable. The
forum is an ASEAN-centered undertaking in which ASEAN is expected
to play a role as "the primary driving force". Given its central
procedural and managerial role, ASEAN naturally leaves a strong
imprint on both the agenda and process of ARF.

However, ASEAN's experience in managing regional security
problems in Southeast Asia is not readily applicable to Northeast
Asia. Within Southeast Asia, ASEAN has successfully played a role
in conflict-avoidance among more-or-less equal middle powers.
Therefore, ASEAN has only limited experience in the area of
conflict resolution. Meanwhile, Northeast Asia is a subregion
where patterns of enmity and conflicts involve both major and
lesser powers.

On the other hand, however, ASEAN has been criticized
precisely for its minimal role in managing security issues in
Northeast Asia. ASEAN, in fact, has not demonstrated sufficient
interest in placing Northeast Asian security problems on ARF's
agenda.

For their part, Northeast Asian countries feel that their
problems are ignored. Moreover, ASEAN's insistence on extending
"the ASEAN way" to Northeast Asia has been cited as an example of
ASEAN's insensitivity to the nature of security problems in that
subregion.

Therefore, due to its uncertain contribution to Northeast
Asian security, critics maintain ASEAN "can do little to promote
security" because "North Asia and not Southeast Asia is the locus
of regional strategic tension" (Robyn Lim, Contemporary South
East Asia, April 1999, p. 115).

Indeed, ASEAN's dilemma in driving ARF has been reinforced by
"the China factor". China is an important player both in regional
politics and in ARF. In fact, there is a tacit understanding
within ASEAN that ARF was created with the prime object of
drawing China into a web of multilateral security dialog.

For that reason, ASEAN has always been careful not to
antagonize China. This explains why ARF has never considered
Taiwan as a crucial regional security issue, let alone invite
representatives from Taipei to participate in ARF meetings.
Because any inclusion of Taiwan by ASEAN would be strongly
opposed by Beijing.

Since ASEAN has not relinquished its role as "the primary
driving force of ARF", in fact, it reinforced that claim in
December 1998, it should play a greater diplomatic role in order
to demonstrate it really deserves the position. While ASEAN does
not have to pretend that it will bring ready solutions to cross-
strait relations, the association can use its experience in
defusing conflicts. It should remind Beijing that military means
or the use of force will not solve the problem.

Taiwan, on the other hand, should also be convinced that any
move toward independence will not be in its interests. ASEAN
should convince both parties that stable Beijing-Taipei relations
are crucial for East Asia.

Therefore, ASEAN should initiate diplomatic efforts to
encourage both sides to go back to the negotiating table and
resume a dialog.

Sitting idle and doing nothing will invite further criticism
and even strengthen doubt about ASEAN's ability to be in the
driving seat of ARF. Indeed, like it or not, it is difficult to
deny that the Taiwan question serves as the most visible issue
linking the security of Southeast Asia with that of Northeast
Asia. The cross-strait issue will become even more relevant to
ASEAN's role in promoting ARF as a vehicle through which the
search for a more stable and predictable regional order should be
undertaken.

Introducing the Taiwan issue during the upcoming ARF meeting
in Singapore will partly fulfill that objective. However, the
problem is that China might reject the idea on the grounds that
Taiwan is a domestic problem.

Therefore, ASEAN should convince Beijing that, as a friend of
China, it has no intention to meddle in what Beijing considers a
domestic issue. What ASEAN wants to see is a peaceful solution to
the current tension. If ASEAN cannot even manage this minimum
requirement, then critics might have some ground to question
ASEAN's prerogative to lead ARF.

The writer is director of studies at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta.