Stable Beijing-Taipei ties crucial

By Rizal Sukma

JAKARTA (JP): Recent developments in relations between China and Taiwan are unfortunate. With signs of economic recovery emerging in East Asia, the region cannot afford to have diplomatic tension open up the possibility of military conflict between its key players.

China and Taiwan are two economies which have not been greatly affected by the financial crisis. Therefore, stable relations between the two parties will enable them to effectively participate in a regional economic recovery and accelerate the return of the "East Asian miracle". Moreover, cross-strait tension between Taipei and Beijing is likely to affect the United States in one form or another.

The recent tension began when Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui indicated that Taipei might shift its "one China" policy, which recognized mainland China and Taiwan as two parts of the same country.

In a recent interview with German radio, President Lee maintained that China should deal with Taiwan on a "state-to- state" basis. Lee also maintained that under the formula of "special nation-to-nation relations, there is no longer any need to declare Taiwanese independence". On July 15, Taiwan made it clear that it now adhered to an official new policy of "one nation, two states".

As many predicted, the shift in Taiwan's China policy was followed by strong reaction from mainland China. The People's Republic of China (PRC), which considers Taiwan as a renegade province, immediately denounced Taipei's move as a serious step in the direction of "splitting the motherland".

Beijing also warned Lee Teng-hui "not to play with fire". The military's Liberation Army Daily even reported that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was "determined enough and strong enough to safeguard the nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity" (Reuters, July 14, 1999). President Jiang Zemin himself has stated strong action should be taken to counter what he called Lee's "growing proindependence conspiracy".

In fact, many are puzzled by Taipei's recent move. The most common interpretation points to local political factors, namely the general election next year. Many believe President Lee Teng- hui is attempting to garner support for his Kuomintang Party by wooing backers of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which favors a formal declaration of independence from China.

Apart from domestic political concerns, there is also speculation the move might have been intended to test America's attitude and commitment to Taipei at a time when United States- China relations are at a low-point following the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.

However, considering the great risks Taipei could face with such a controversial move, it is likely the policy shift is the result of much more complex calculations growing out of deep resentment and frustration over its abnormal legal status. The move also reflects Taiwan's growing belief that it is entitled to a better-defined place in world politics and commerce.

Taiwanese officials, for example, say the new definition of Taipei-Beijing relations reflects "disappointment over the Communists' 'one China' principle", which has been used by the mainland "to squeeze Taiwan internationally ... and undermine the legitimacy of the Nationalist Party" (New York Times, July 13, 1999).

Regardless of the real motive behind the move, however, Lee's announcement caught many by surprise. The immediate reaction from Taiwan's main ally, the United States, has been disappointing. Washington has reaffirmed its policy of recognizing one China ruled from Beijing and maintained that the future of Taiwan was "a matter for Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to resolve".

Japan also reiterated its one China policy and made it clear that Tokyo still respected Beijing's view of Taiwan as an "inalienable" part of China. However, both the U.S. and Japan stressed the point that both sides should settle their dispute peacefully through peaceful means.

More importantly, Taiwan's policy shift also sends the significant message that the cross-strait issue is a crucial security issue for the region. It is true that China has always insisted the question of Taiwan falls within the jurisdiction of its domestic affairs and outsiders should not interfere in the matter.

However, China should also understand and acknowledge that this domestic issue, when it resurfaces, could bring about both economic and security implications well beyond the boundaries of both mainland China and Taiwan.

Recent tension between Beijing and Taipei also serves as a crucial test for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), whose foreign ministers are to hold their sixth ARF meeting in Singapore later this month. ARF has been criticized for its inability to contribute significantly to core security issues, especially in Northeast Asia.

In fact, there has been criticism that ARF is ASEAN-centered to the exclusion of all other regions. Indeed, ARF has been largely silent on many regional critical issues in Northeast Asia. It has not played any substantive role with regards to the Korean peninsula, nor has it played a significant role in finding solutions to disputes in the South China Sea.

On the one hand, ARF's inability to play a significant role in managing security in Northeast Asia is quite understandable. The forum is an ASEAN-centered undertaking in which ASEAN is expected to play a role as "the primary driving force". Given its central procedural and managerial role, ASEAN naturally leaves a strong imprint on both the agenda and process of ARF.

However, ASEAN's experience in managing regional security problems in Southeast Asia is not readily applicable to Northeast Asia. Within Southeast Asia, ASEAN has successfully played a role in conflict-avoidance among more-or-less equal middle powers. Therefore, ASEAN has only limited experience in the area of conflict resolution. Meanwhile, Northeast Asia is a subregion where patterns of enmity and conflicts involve both major and lesser powers.

On the other hand, however, ASEAN has been criticized precisely for its minimal role in managing security issues in Northeast Asia. ASEAN, in fact, has not demonstrated sufficient interest in placing Northeast Asian security problems on ARF's agenda.

For their part, Northeast Asian countries feel that their problems are ignored. Moreover, ASEAN's insistence on extending "the ASEAN way" to Northeast Asia has been cited as an example of ASEAN's insensitivity to the nature of security problems in that subregion.

Therefore, due to its uncertain contribution to Northeast Asian security, critics maintain ASEAN "can do little to promote security" because "North Asia and not Southeast Asia is the locus of regional strategic tension" (Robyn Lim, Contemporary South East Asia, April 1999, p. 115).

Indeed, ASEAN's dilemma in driving ARF has been reinforced by "the China factor". China is an important player both in regional politics and in ARF. In fact, there is a tacit understanding within ASEAN that ARF was created with the prime object of drawing China into a web of multilateral security dialog.

For that reason, ASEAN has always been careful not to antagonize China. This explains why ARF has never considered Taiwan as a crucial regional security issue, let alone invite representatives from Taipei to participate in ARF meetings. Because any inclusion of Taiwan by ASEAN would be strongly opposed by Beijing.

Since ASEAN has not relinquished its role as "the primary driving force of ARF", in fact, it reinforced that claim in December 1998, it should play a greater diplomatic role in order to demonstrate it really deserves the position. While ASEAN does not have to pretend that it will bring ready solutions to cross- strait relations, the association can use its experience in defusing conflicts. It should remind Beijing that military means or the use of force will not solve the problem.

Taiwan, on the other hand, should also be convinced that any move toward independence will not be in its interests. ASEAN should convince both parties that stable Beijing-Taipei relations are crucial for East Asia.

Therefore, ASEAN should initiate diplomatic efforts to encourage both sides to go back to the negotiating table and resume a dialog.

Sitting idle and doing nothing will invite further criticism and even strengthen doubt about ASEAN's ability to be in the driving seat of ARF. Indeed, like it or not, it is difficult to deny that the Taiwan question serves as the most visible issue linking the security of Southeast Asia with that of Northeast Asia. The cross-strait issue will become even more relevant to ASEAN's role in promoting ARF as a vehicle through which the search for a more stable and predictable regional order should be undertaken.

Introducing the Taiwan issue during the upcoming ARF meeting in Singapore will partly fulfill that objective. However, the problem is that China might reject the idea on the grounds that Taiwan is a domestic problem.

Therefore, ASEAN should convince Beijing that, as a friend of China, it has no intention to meddle in what Beijing considers a domestic issue. What ASEAN wants to see is a peaceful solution to the current tension. If ASEAN cannot even manage this minimum requirement, then critics might have some ground to question ASEAN's prerogative to lead ARF.

The writer is director of studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta.