Squeeze out JI by denying political space

Squeeze out JI by denying political space

Kumar Ramakrishna, Head of Studies
Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies
The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore

It is increasingly probable that the bombing of the American-
owned JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta last Tuesday was executed by
the shadowy terrorist network, Jamaah Islamiyah (JI).

The callous targeting of civilians, a car bomb made of the
same chemicals, the apparent involvement of a suicide bomber, and
the timing of the attack soon after the generalized warning by
al-Qaeda of more attacks on United States interests worldwide --
a similar concatenation of factors occurred during the JI bombing
in Bali last October.

In the last few months, until the Marriott blast, Jakarta
seemed to have been on a winning streak in its war against the
JI. Scores of terrorists had been detained and JI appeared
seriously weakened. What has gone wrong?

Part of the answer is that JI, despite its setbacks, still
retains considerable functional space: The circulation of skilled
militants, money and materials throughout Southeast Asia remains.

This is not surprising given the archipelagic configuration of
the region. Policing effectively the long maritime borders has
proven very difficult.

JI's functional space has been enhanced in other ways.
Corruption and uneven professional standards among immigration,
police and military personnel throughout the region, incomplete
computerization and networking of immigration and police
databases, passport and document fraud, the availability of arms
and explosives from Southeast Asia, and the dearth of indigenous
anti-money-laundering expertise have combined to erode the
ability of regional governments to harden their borders against
the flow of militants, money and materials.

But functional space only partially explains JI's apparent
resilience. More importantly, the network enjoys political space
within Southeast Asian Muslim communities as well.

It would appear that JI elicits a degree of sympathy from
scattered Muslim communities, for example in southern Thailand,
northern Malaysia, Indonesia and the southern Philippines. Such
sympathy would explain why the network has been able to generate
funds, arrange safe houses for militants, receive tip-offs on
impending police raids, and secure recruits, including suicide
bombers.

JI's political space complements and empowers its functional
space. Factors that contribute to JI's political space include,
among others, a dearth of educational and employment
opportunities for young Muslim men in Indonesia, the southern
Philippines and southern Thailand, political repression in the
case of the Rohingyas in the Arakan region of Myanmar, and skewed
religious-ideological indoctrination in certain Muslim circles in
Indonesia and in economically better-off Malaysia.

It is important to remember two facts. First, only about 30
people were involved in the Bali operation, out of an estimated
1,000 JI militants in the region. Second, the cost of the Bali
attack ran into tens of thousands of dollars rather than millions
of dollars.

It is likely that similar statistics underlie the Jakarta
attack. The reality is that only a relative handful of militants
with a moderate amount of funding is needed to inflict
catastrophic damage.

Given that JI requires relatively minimal functional space to
inflict a devastating terror strike, it is all the more critical
to destroy its ability to attract adherents in the form of
militants and sympathizers.

In short, one should seek to shut down JI's political space,
and not just its functional space.

Much has already been done to try to close down JI's
functional space: Intensified intelligence exchange and
cooperation, intensified maritime patrols, and international
police support and training assistance to the Indonesian and
Philippine police forces.

These short-term efforts are very important but they are not
enough. JI's critical strength -- and potential critical
vulnerability -- remains in its ability to carve out political
space.

This must be closed down aggressively and systematically
through the implementation of medium- to long-term measures.
These include adequately funded international programs to study
and help resolve political and socioeconomic grievances that
render young Muslims in the region vulnerable to JI appeals,
regional specialist advice to the U.S. on strategies to nuance
its public diplomacy within Southeast Asia, and gentle diplomatic
pressure on Washington to ensure that it modulates its foreign
policy towards the wider Muslim world.

In addition, progressive Southeast Asian Muslims must continue
to promote modern, dynamic interpretations of the faith that
repudiate the binary "us-versus-them" world views favored by JI
and indeed certain regional arch-fundamentalist Muslim political
parties and mass organizations.

A much more aggressive "psywar" campaign must be waged against
JI. The fact that scores of innocent Muslims as well as non-
Muslims have been victims of JI attacks, and the fact that JI
detainees in Singapore and Malaysia were unceremoniously
"abandoned" by alleged JI leader Abu Bakar Bashir during his
trial, can and should be exploited to expose the JI leaders for
what they are: Cold-blooded sociopaths who have arrogated to
themselves the mantle of "defenders" of the Muslim faith.