Squeeze out JI by denying political space

Kumar Ramakrishna, Head of Studies Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore

It is increasingly probable that the bombing of the American- owned JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta last Tuesday was executed by the shadowy terrorist network, Jamaah Islamiyah (JI).

The callous targeting of civilians, a car bomb made of the same chemicals, the apparent involvement of a suicide bomber, and the timing of the attack soon after the generalized warning by al-Qaeda of more attacks on United States interests worldwide -- a similar concatenation of factors occurred during the JI bombing in Bali last October.

In the last few months, until the Marriott blast, Jakarta seemed to have been on a winning streak in its war against the JI. Scores of terrorists had been detained and JI appeared seriously weakened. What has gone wrong?

Part of the answer is that JI, despite its setbacks, still retains considerable functional space: The circulation of skilled militants, money and materials throughout Southeast Asia remains.

This is not surprising given the archipelagic configuration of the region. Policing effectively the long maritime borders has proven very difficult.

JI's functional space has been enhanced in other ways. Corruption and uneven professional standards among immigration, police and military personnel throughout the region, incomplete computerization and networking of immigration and police databases, passport and document fraud, the availability of arms and explosives from Southeast Asia, and the dearth of indigenous anti-money-laundering expertise have combined to erode the ability of regional governments to harden their borders against the flow of militants, money and materials.

But functional space only partially explains JI's apparent resilience. More importantly, the network enjoys political space within Southeast Asian Muslim communities as well.

It would appear that JI elicits a degree of sympathy from scattered Muslim communities, for example in southern Thailand, northern Malaysia, Indonesia and the southern Philippines. Such sympathy would explain why the network has been able to generate funds, arrange safe houses for militants, receive tip-offs on impending police raids, and secure recruits, including suicide bombers.

JI's political space complements and empowers its functional space. Factors that contribute to JI's political space include, among others, a dearth of educational and employment opportunities for young Muslim men in Indonesia, the southern Philippines and southern Thailand, political repression in the case of the Rohingyas in the Arakan region of Myanmar, and skewed religious-ideological indoctrination in certain Muslim circles in Indonesia and in economically better-off Malaysia.

It is important to remember two facts. First, only about 30 people were involved in the Bali operation, out of an estimated 1,000 JI militants in the region. Second, the cost of the Bali attack ran into tens of thousands of dollars rather than millions of dollars.

It is likely that similar statistics underlie the Jakarta attack. The reality is that only a relative handful of militants with a moderate amount of funding is needed to inflict catastrophic damage.

Given that JI requires relatively minimal functional space to inflict a devastating terror strike, it is all the more critical to destroy its ability to attract adherents in the form of militants and sympathizers.

In short, one should seek to shut down JI's political space, and not just its functional space.

Much has already been done to try to close down JI's functional space: Intensified intelligence exchange and cooperation, intensified maritime patrols, and international police support and training assistance to the Indonesian and Philippine police forces.

These short-term efforts are very important but they are not enough. JI's critical strength -- and potential critical vulnerability -- remains in its ability to carve out political space.

This must be closed down aggressively and systematically through the implementation of medium- to long-term measures. These include adequately funded international programs to study and help resolve political and socioeconomic grievances that render young Muslims in the region vulnerable to JI appeals, regional specialist advice to the U.S. on strategies to nuance its public diplomacy within Southeast Asia, and gentle diplomatic pressure on Washington to ensure that it modulates its foreign policy towards the wider Muslim world.

In addition, progressive Southeast Asian Muslims must continue to promote modern, dynamic interpretations of the faith that repudiate the binary "us-versus-them" world views favored by JI and indeed certain regional arch-fundamentalist Muslim political parties and mass organizations.

A much more aggressive "psywar" campaign must be waged against JI. The fact that scores of innocent Muslims as well as non- Muslims have been victims of JI attacks, and the fact that JI detainees in Singapore and Malaysia were unceremoniously "abandoned" by alleged JI leader Abu Bakar Bashir during his trial, can and should be exploited to expose the JI leaders for what they are: Cold-blooded sociopaths who have arrogated to themselves the mantle of "defenders" of the Muslim faith.