Spell of power in RI politics
Spell of power in RI politics
By Ignas Kleden
This is the second of two articles on the political culture in
Indonesia.
JAKARTA (JP): The shortcoming of Indonesian politics in the
1950s was that the politicians were so overwhelmed by freedom of
expression that they seemed to forget the necessity to come to a
common consensus from time to time.
Political conflicts became the order of the day and political
stability turned out to be an impossible project. No wonder, when
Sukarno declared the dissolution of the Konstituante (the Old
Order Parliament), there seemed to be no big backlash to that
action. People were fed up with political hustle and bustle
leading nowhere, and politics appeared to be a battlefield where
no party was allowed to win.
Politicians kept talking from day to day without doing
anything for the improvement of the economic and political
situation. This situation has, to certain extent, justified the
Soeharto regime in that politics was made a business notorious
and allegedly incompatible with the new elan for development,
management, technocracy and pragmatism.
Needless to say this is a successful trick because in
propagating it, politics should be treated as only a secondary
affair, the whole monopoly for doing politics was assumed by the
government.
In the same manner, while persuading people to get rid of
ideological idle debates and exhausting conflicts, the government
took all liberty to implement ruthlessly pragmatic
developmentalism and made it a full-fledged ideology without
naming it so. The actual situation was that pragmatic
developmentalism was the only ideology allowed and pursued,
whereas doing politics became the monopoly of Soeharto's
government, while people were persuaded and even forced to
restrain themselves from using their democratic rights of
political participation.
If one wants to embark upon a political reform in the present
political situation, one cannot escape a big question as to how
to define another modus vivendi of consensus and conflict. The
tension between the two cannot be done away with and is,
therefore, constitutive of democratic political culture.
One cannot build democracy on the grounds of conflict alone,
as was the case with the Old Order, nor can one do this on the
basis of consensus alone, as was the case with the New Order. It
seems that democracy can only work in a condition where political
space for differences of opinion and conflicts of interest are
controlled by the willingness to compromise and the ability to
have consensus.
It is also a condition, where a political consensus will not
prevent political initiatives of finding new ways of pursuing
political interest and new modes of expressing political
opinions, as long as this occurs within the confines of the rule
of law.
We are now living in a political situation full of difficult
complications. It is not easy to say where best to start. The
question is: should we settle the problem of political structure
first, in which law enforcement can work, or should we assume
that law enforcement should be treated as an effective means of
political restructuring? Can law function at all in an unjust
political structure?
If the power holders still believe that they are beyond the
law, as was the case with the New Order, law becomes nothing but
a legal means for political oppression or political justification
of human rights violations and offenses against social justice.
Conversely, it is very unlikely to build a more just political
structure without putting it on a legal ground. The case of
Megawati Soekarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) is
particularly interesting in this respect. Megawati is doing her
best to go a long legal way to regain her political and
democratic rights.
In so doing, she is putting to the test, intentionally or
unwittingly, both Indonesia's political system and Indonesia's
legal system.
Is the present government no less untouchable in comparison to
the Soeharto regime? Is Indonesia's legal system a means which is
liable to be used not only by the power holders but also by those
who are victimized by the abuse of power?
This will be an important case, which can exemplify a new
modus vivendi of consensus and conflict. Megawati seems to stick
to her stance that everything which has been done to dissolve or
to bring PDI to total fractionalizing should be examined and
judged according to the law.
On the other hand, her opponent, Soerjadi, and his friends are
more inclined to have a reconciliation without much ado about
what has happened before. This is also the basic attitude of
government officials such as Syarwan Hamid and Feisal Tanjung.
What these people want is: let PDI start anew with two
separate wings reunited, and let us simply forget everything
which has happened. After all, many actions were taken, so it is
argued, not on their own initiatives but because these were
mandated by other people higher up.
We have learned a good lesson in this controversy. What is the
meaning of reconciliation? Does it mean forgetting every
wrongdoing which has been committed? Or does it imply a forgiving
attitude despite full knowledge of the evil one has suffered?
Soerjadi seems to take the first option, while Megawati
definitely takes the second one.
To make a point: unity and harmony are certainly beautiful but
they should never be made a hiding place for social injustice and
political violence, nor a pretext under which to cover up human
rights violations.
Reconciliation is indeed delightful but it should not imply an
intentional ignorance of the political evil which has been done.
It only means, to quote an ancient saying, knowing everything in
order to forgive all.
Democracy is a permanent tension between political knowledge
of every possible evil and political disposition and decision to
look forward to a better future.
Luckily enough, the tension can never be totally overcome
because otherwise, we will only have an authoritarian boss who
forbids any conflict and his underling is only able to give his
consensus.
The writer is a sociologist based in Jakarta.