Special autonomy for E. Timor

Special autonomy for E. Timor

By Johannes Nugroho

SURABAYA (JP): The post-Soeharto era has laudably brought
soothing breezes to the East Timorese because their territory
will soon enjoy a status of special autonomy.

The trilateral deliberation of Indonesia, Portugal and the
United Nations (UN) has produced a joint communique, which will
grant such a status to East Timor.

The communique has also mandated the recommencement of the All
Inclusive Intra East Timorese Dialog (AIETD), which will enable
the ostracized anti-integration faction to be more fairly
represented.

On a more practical note, the Armed Forces (ABRI) has been
retrenching its military presence in the province, leaving behind
only "organic troops" to carry out "territorial operations
intended for the improvement of the people's welfare".

Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Alatas explained that under
the new arrangement, Jakarta will permit East Timor to have a
"wide-ranging autonomy", which will include self-determining
rights in almost all affairs, except those in international
relations, defense, monetary and fiscal matters. The introduction
of such a semi-sovereign province will be an unprecedented first
among all of Indonesia's provinces as far as autonomy is
concerned.

Consequently, this new "state among provinces" will spell out
more new arrangements in order to ensure that true progresses be
implemented in East Timor.

On the political front, the province will probably have a
separate legislative body almost similar to a state parliament in
Australia or the United States, whose members will be elected at
a different interval from the national general election.

Political parties in East Timor will perhaps possess a
disparate nuance to any other region in Indonesia, owing to the
territory's cultural and historical divergences from the rest of
the country.

Jakarta should also anticipate the emergence of separatist
political factions in East Timor, which may demand full
independence.

In the face of such a potential development, Jakarta will have
to refrain from utilizing military might to subdue the separatist
movement. However, such a matter will rely heavily on who will
rule Indonesia after the next general election, planned for May
1999, and whether ABRI will still exert transcendent influence on
politics as it does now.

While Alatas has dismissed the question of a referendum in
East Timor, the issue, considering the new autonomous status, is
not entirely out of question. In fact, there still remains a fair
chance that East Timor will one day hold a referendum on whether
to secede from Indonesia or not.

History bears witness to Quebec separatism in Canada over a
national identity. It was only a few years ago that the Canadian
Francophone state held a referendum on whether it would remain in
the Canadian federation. While the separatist movement in Canada
was defeated in the referendum by a small margin, the fragile
presence of Quebec within Canada is still open to debate.

Conceptually, Quebec and East Timor are comparable. First, the
originally Portuguese-speaking East Timor is culturally divergent
from the rest of Indonesia as the Francophone Quebec differs from
the Anglophone states of Canada. Having realized this, Jakarta
must take steps to warrant that the point of cultural and
linguistic disparities be recognized.

In due course, the granting of autonomy to East Timor must
necessarily include the recognition of East Timor's mother
tongue, Portuguese, as the region's unofficial language.

Article 4, Clause 3 of the UN Declaration of the Rights of
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic
Minorities (G.A.res 47/135, 1993) specifies that governments
around the world "should take appropriate measures so that
wherever possible, persons belonging to minorities may have
adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue and to have
instructions in their mother tongue".

The existing policy of "Indonesianization" through the
teaching of the Indonesian language at East Timorese schools has
been ignorant and abusive of the region's mother tongue as well
as historical and cultural backgrounds. While, as a part of
Indonesia, East Timor ought to recognize Indonesian as their
official language, it is imperative that their mother tongue,
Portuguese, be legalized. The two languages can go hand in hand
in East Timorese state departments and schools.

The reconciliatory gesture would not be injurious to the unity
and sovereignty of Indonesia as a whole. There are plenty of
instances in history, wherein cultural and linguistic suppression
later resulted in dissatisfaction and disintegration.

The policy of Russification in the former Union of Soviet
Socialist Republic (USSR) and its satellite countries, such as
Finland, was much resented by ethnic minorities and did nothing
to prevent the USSR from crumbling.

Even in the democratic United Kingdom, the cultural dominance
of English has given rise to Scottish and Welsh separatist
movements. The peoples of Scotland and Wales have been
endeavoring to revive the use of their own indigenous tongues of
Gaelic and Welsh.

The sentiments of being "sidelined" and "patronized" by the
predominant English, sections of the Scottish population have
even demanded opting out of the union with England. In the last
decade, Scotland has changed its national anthem from God Save
The Queen to Flowers of Scotland, even going as far as attaining
their own parliament in 1996.

Numerous Scots also feel that their own history has been
treated as subordinate to English history. Mailboxes across
Scotland in the 1980s were in danger of being blown up due to the
fact that they bore the royal insignia EIIR (Elizabetha Secundae
Reginae), meaning Queen Elizabeth The Second.

The Scottish separatist groups claimed that Queen Elizabeth I
(1553-1603) was the queen of England and not of Scotland. The
unification of the two kingdoms had not taken place until the
death of the unmarried Elizabeth I, whereupon James of Scotland
went to London to become the king of both England and Scotland.
Therefore, the present Elizabeth is really Queen Elizabeth I as
far as Scotland is concerned.

By the same token, the ex-Portuguese colony of East Timor is
historically distinct from the formerly Dutch colonized
Indonesia. In consequence, it is fair to assume that the East
Timorese should be allowed to pursue the studies of their own
history. The 1993 UN Declaration of the Rights of Minorities
Article 4 Clause 4 affirms such rights.

Thus the education curriculum ought to be left in the hands of
the planned autonomous regional government. It is paradoxical
that East Timorese students are imbibed with lessons on Sultan
Hassanudin and Sultan Agung of Mataram against the Dutch East
Indies Company (VOC), while they bear no historical relevance
whatsoever to their native land.

On the economic front, the autonomous East Timor will have to
be allowed to run an independent regional budget. In so doing,
East Timor will need to be endowed with the rights to exploit
their own natural resources, such as the hydrocarbon resources in
the Timor Gap. The centralized system of government has so far
disadvantaged East Timor in obtaining maximum benefits from the
lucrative oil-mining venture in the gap.

A taxation system between Jakarta and Dili will have to be
worked out in the future. The distinction between state (Dili)
and federal (Jakarta) taxation systems will need to be thoroughly
defined. Negotiations will be carried out concerning federal
(Jakarta) grants to the autonomous region.

On the legal front, the East Timorese legislative council will
endorse its own criminal law, which might differ in content from
the one for the rest of Indonesia. This system is employed in
countries such as Australia, the United States and Canada, where
every state has its own set of laws. Yet the East Timorese
attorney general will still be required to cooperate with the
Attorney General's Office in Jakarta. The precise legal relations
between the two offices would need to be clearly defined.

Moreover, East Timorese will need to form their own police
force, separate from the National Police (POLRI) to dispel any
assumption of interference by Jakarta in the region's internal
affairs. It would also have to be emphasized that POLRI would
have no jurisdiction over East Timor. The system of appeal must
also be clarified in order to avoid legal and constitutional
disarray.

The region must also be able to negotiate with Jakarta in
relation to the size of military presence there. The sensitive
issue needs to be finalized in the most delicate way which will
be acceptable to the people of East Timor, the Indonesian
government, Portugal and the UN.

The latest developments in Indonesia's "thorn in the flesh"
area are indeed encouraging. The autonomy status for East Timor
will be a testimony in Indonesia's commitment to uphold human
rights in the eyes of the international community. Together,
Indonesia, Portugal and the UN have shown that there is still
hope for everlasting peace on the globe.

Yet, in East Timor's case, what has been lacking in the past
four centuries is consultation with the East Timorese themselves.
The Portuguese never consulted them when they took away their
sovereignty, only to be abandoned without consultation three-and-
a-half centuries later.

Indonesia did not exactly conduct an all-encompassing
consultation when it integrated the region, while Soeharto's
regime was deaf to the cries of East Timorese. It is therefore
crucial that the East Timorese be consulted in the future
development of their own native land.

The writer works at the International Language Program in
Surabaya, East Java.

Window: In due course, the granting of autonomy to East Timor
must necessarily include the recognition of East Timor's mother
tongue, Portuguese, as the region's unofficial language.