Spain could become a model for Indonesia

By Percival Manglano

JAKARTA (JP): As Indonesian politics lurch into uncharted territory, it may seem advisable for parallels to be sought that may shed light on things to come.

Looking around for countries with historical circumstances parallel to those of Indonesia now, one obvious example comes to mind: Thailand. Just like Indonesia's, Thailand's military has traditionally played a central role in its politics.

Thailand, especially those events that occurred in 1973 and 1992, has found itself in situations similar to that Indonesia is going through now.

In 1973 student demonstrations toppled a military government. Subsequently, a democratic regime was installed but failed to implement order and was itself brought down by a military coup three years later.

In 1992, massive street demonstrations were staged against Gen. Suchinda's decision to stay on as prime minister despite his promises to the contrary. The ensuing massacre of demonstrators by the army resulted in the resignation of Suchinda and a common wisdom that the army was dealt a terrible blow that might keep it away from politics for good.

This parallel may seem adequate if only because of Thailand's proximity to Indonesia. Yet, geographic proximity is not necessarily directly correlated to general relevance.

In fact, Spain is a geographically distant country whose recent experience of transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime is directly relevant to Indonesia's present situation.

Indonesia may be becoming a democratic country and, in doing so, it should learn from the experiences of other countries. It could do worse than to look at the Spanish transition example.

In November 1975, Spain's long-standing dictator, Gen. Franco, died. His appointed successor was Prince Juan Carlos. Spain's lack of a democratic tradition and the weakness of Juan Carlos' public support did not bode well for the future. Indeed, Juan Carlos was commonly nicknamed El Breve (the Short-Lived).

And yet, more than 20 years later, King Juan Carlos is the popular head of state of a flourishing democracy that no one in his right mind would dream of putting into question. Could something similar happen in Indonesia?

The long list of parallels between Soeharto's Indonesia and Franco's Spain are surprising.

Both men were conservative ex-generals; both came to power following traumatic bloody events involving communist and military forces (the massacres of 1965 and 1966 in Indonesia, the 1936 through 1939 Spanish Civil War); both remained in power for more than 30 years (31 in Soeharto's case, 36 for Franco; both were extremely reluctant to appoint a successor; (Franco ignored his ministers' appeals for an appointment until 1969, when, at age 77, he decided in favor of Prince Juan Carlos); both appointed economic technocrats as ministers who were successful in achieving extraordinary rates of economic growth for their countries.

Indonesia now and Spain at the time of Franco's death in 1975 also shared two important political characteristics. The first is their unsuccessful experiments with democracy. President Sukarno's attempts at democracy building were short-lived and gave way in 1956 to the period of "Guided Democracy".

In Spain, the republic, created in 1931, lasted only five years until a number of generals, including Franco, launched a coup against the republican government.

The second characteristic is a lack of national cohesiveness: the hostility provoked in certain regions by Java's dominance within Indonesia is paralleled by (mainly) Catalan and Basque nationalist backlashes against Castillian predominance in Spain.

Despite these parallels, important differences do exist between the two political systems.

Three differences stand out. The first is the role of the Armed Forces. Franco, after having used the army to rise to power, gradually diminished its political power during his rule. This clearly cannot be said about Indonesia.

The second is the existence in Spain of an institutional alternative to Franco's rule in the form of the monarchy. Spain benefited from the existence of a historical political institution that represented an alternative to the Franco regime. Again, Indonesia has no such alternative.

The third concerns the economic situation of the two countries. Although the effects of the first oil crisis affected Spain in 1975, its growth rate and general economic development remained well above Indonesia's miserable present situation.

Indonesian developments over the past two months have produced a situation not dissimilar to those in Spain following Franco's death. In both cases, the past rulers' appointed successors have been installed in power. Prospects for democracy for both countries seemed and seem extremely dim, particularly considering the precariousness regarding the heads of state. Uncertainty ruled.

We can only speculate on what will happen in Indonesia in the future. But we do know what happened in Spain. Aware of the weakness of his position, particularly given that he had been appointed by the previous ruler, King Juan Carlos decided to appeal to the support of the largest political group in Spain, the Spanish people. By giving the people the chance to act as an agent of change, he laid the foundations for a bloodless transition to democracy and, at the same time, ensured the survival of the institution at the source of his legitimacy, the monarchy.

Perhaps President B.J. Habibie is not a democrat at heart, but this should not prevent him from ensuring a rapid transition to democracy in Indonesia.

If he cares about peace in Indonesia, as the Spanish example shows, the best option available is for the Indonesian people to be involved in the process of political change. This will happen by holding elections as quickly as they can be safely organized.

Nothing guaranteed that the Spanish transition would be peaceful. Precedents were discouraging but it was ultimately successful.

The same can happen in Indonesia. By ensuring such a legacy, President Habibie, like King Juan Carlos, would ensure for himself a prominent position in his country's history.

Percival Manglano received his M.A. from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University.