Solving the absence of opposition

By Paige Johnson

WASHINGTON (JP): Since the formation of President Abdurrahman Wahid's National Unity Cabinet, many informed Indonesians have lamented the absence of an organized opposition, considering this dangerous for democracy's consolidation.

The Cabinet seemingly leaves no parties of any size or the military outside of the government. Observers question whether democracy can take hold without the institutionalization of checks on executive authority. Given the past weakness of Indonesia's legislative and judicial institutions as well as the capacity of civil society to serve as a check on government, this is a valid concern.

While much hard thinking needs to go into the issue of the best means for consolidating democracy in Indonesia, this article will attempt to add to the debate by suggesting that party institutionalization and growth in intra-party democracy will lead to better representation of societal interests and eventually to the creation of an opposition by parties seeking to offer not only "opposition" for the sake of opposition but opposition with a view to creating an alternative government.

Grand coalition governments such as Indonesia's National Unity Cabinet are relatively common after periods of prolonged authoritarian rule or other national "trauma," such as war. The first post-Communist governments in many Eastern European nations were national movements turned into governing parties.

In short order, though, the unity of the early transition period was broken. Absent from the overwhelming enemy of the former regime, the press of massive political and economic change led parties to form and re-form, creating in many countries competitive (though still volatile) party systems along the way.

Given other nations' experiences in democratic transitions, then, the grand coalition in Indonesia is not an insurmountable problem for the consolidation of democracy.

In fact, because of the magnitude of tasks Indonesia faces: overcoming the economic crisis, addressing separatist demands, confronting the authoritarian past and crafting a democratic future, one might argue that a broadly inclusive government can be helpful in encouraging all parties to sign on to difficult solutions to difficult problems.

This brings us to the nature of Indonesia's political parties themselves. Thus far, the evidence suggests that party decision- making is tightly controlled at the center. Of course, to some degree, parties must develop strategies and tactics without making these publicly known.

But, a fine line appears. Are the strategies and tactics that are being developed at odds with the interests of party activists who worked for the party during the campaign and the voters who supported the party on election day?

Is the party collaborating in a collusive manner with other parties in order for party elites to share in the perquisites of power?

Also problematic for the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia is the personalistic nature of many of the parties. Top vote winner Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI Perjuangan) draws votes and tremendous loyalty because of party chairwoman Megawati Soekarnoputri.

Similarly, the National Awakening Party (PKB), while in large part based on the organizational strength of Nahdlatul Ulama, relies heavily on the personal pull of Abdurrahman Wahid.

The tension between organization and personality in PKB showed in the presidential election, as PKB was pulled from its organizational commitment to support Megawati to the charismatic necessity of supporting Abdurrahman Wahid.

As vehicles for the promotion of certain political figures, charismatic parties rarely outlast their founders. Those that do have staying power are the ones that begin to organize an institutional basis for the continuation of the party beyond the original meaning given to the party by the founders' parties that "are" something (institutionally) or parties that "stand" for something (programmatically).

Institutionalization of the parties' creation of stable rules and structures, rooting of the party in durable social groups, presentation of ideologically consistent programs and the fostering of intraparty democracy are the tasks at hand.

Particularly important in Indonesia's case and in order to get around the problem of a lack of opposition is the institutionalization of democratic decision-making within the parties.

Writing in The Jakarta Post Nov. 10, PDI Perjuangan's Mochtar Buchori suggested as much when he said that he hoped that PDI Perjuangan in parliament could serve as a "corrective force" on the government. Dubious about "party discipline," Mochtar wrote that disciplining party members for representing the wishes of the people smacked of the practices of the New Order.

How party discipline will play out in the Indonesian context is not yet certain, though it is not an enemy of democracy in and of itself. It can be useful to make parties effective political actors. The safeguard on party discipline is the internal mechanism of decision-making within the parties and the degree to which parties represent the interests of their members and supporters. It is from the grassroots that the party can hear society's demands. If only it will listen.

Importantly, parties have an incentive to listen. While there is advantage to be gained from participating in the National Unity Cabinet, there is declining utility over time for all parties to be jointly responsible for governance. How can a party distinguish its participation from all the others? Who can the electorate hold responsible for successes and failures?

In time, parties will need to distinguish themselves from others in order to attract support. Elites that are unconnected from the Indonesian people may be able to continue to parcel out shares in political power over the short-term. But, parties that listen, truly listen, to the ground will more accurately represent the interests of members and supporters.

Over the longer-term, I would argue that this strategy would be the more successful one, electorally for the parties concerned as well as institutionally for the overall health of Indonesia's democratic consolidation.

Improved intra-party democracy, consciously fostered by party leaders now in order to take root over the long-term as part of a strategy of institutionalization would serve as a check on many of the concerns raised above: lack of an opposition, overly centralized decision-making, and personality-based parties.

While elite accommodations might be needed to overcome sticking points in the transition, compromise without voice might lead to the new systems' ignoring of the wishes of large segments of the Indonesian population with all the prospects for anti- system action which that entails.

This article has argued that the existence of a government of national unity is not an imminent threat to the successful consolidation of democracy in Indonesia. A greater threat can be seen in the nature of political party decision-making and the existence of personality-based parties.

With popular input into party decision-making and party institutionalization, opposition will eventually take root. The press of government and the need of parties to present alternative visions to voters will lead some parties to go into opposition, to represent the interests of their members, to distinguish themselves from the field and to serve as a potential alternative government.

The author is a Ph.D. Candidate in Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia in the United States. She recently returned from a one year stint as a visiting fellow at the National University of Singapore. She is currently working on her dissertation entitled Indonesia's Tentative Transition: The Role of Political Parties.