Solving the absence of opposition

Solving the absence of opposition

By Paige Johnson

WASHINGTON (JP): Since the formation of President Abdurrahman
Wahid's National Unity Cabinet, many informed Indonesians have
lamented the absence of an organized opposition, considering this
dangerous for democracy's consolidation.

The Cabinet seemingly leaves no parties of any size or the
military outside of the government. Observers question whether
democracy can take hold without the institutionalization of
checks on executive authority. Given the past weakness of
Indonesia's legislative and judicial institutions as well as the
capacity of civil society to serve as a check on government, this
is a valid concern.

While much hard thinking needs to go into the issue of the
best means for consolidating democracy in Indonesia, this article
will attempt to add to the debate by suggesting that party
institutionalization and growth in intra-party democracy will
lead to better representation of societal interests and
eventually to the creation of an opposition by parties seeking to
offer not only "opposition" for the sake of opposition but
opposition with a view to creating an alternative government.

Grand coalition governments such as Indonesia's National Unity
Cabinet are relatively common after periods of prolonged
authoritarian rule or other national "trauma," such as war. The
first post-Communist governments in many Eastern European nations
were national movements turned into governing parties.

In short order, though, the unity of the early transition
period was broken. Absent from the overwhelming enemy of the
former regime, the press of massive political and economic change
led parties to form and re-form, creating in many countries
competitive (though still volatile) party systems along the way.

Given other nations' experiences in democratic transitions,
then, the grand coalition in Indonesia is not an insurmountable
problem for the consolidation of democracy.

In fact, because of the magnitude of tasks Indonesia faces:
overcoming the economic crisis, addressing separatist demands,
confronting the authoritarian past and crafting a democratic
future, one might argue that a broadly inclusive government can
be helpful in encouraging all parties to sign on to difficult
solutions to difficult problems.

This brings us to the nature of Indonesia's political parties
themselves. Thus far, the evidence suggests that party decision-
making is tightly controlled at the center. Of course, to some
degree, parties must develop strategies and tactics without
making these publicly known.

But, a fine line appears. Are the strategies and tactics that
are being developed at odds with the interests of party activists
who worked for the party during the campaign and the voters who
supported the party on election day?

Is the party collaborating in a collusive manner with other
parties in order for party elites to share in the perquisites of
power?

Also problematic for the consolidation of democracy in
Indonesia is the personalistic nature of many of the parties.
Top vote winner Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI
Perjuangan) draws votes and tremendous loyalty because of party
chairwoman Megawati Soekarnoputri.

Similarly, the National Awakening Party (PKB), while in large
part based on the organizational strength of Nahdlatul Ulama,
relies heavily on the personal pull of Abdurrahman Wahid.

The tension between organization and personality in PKB showed
in the presidential election, as PKB was pulled from its
organizational commitment to support Megawati to the charismatic
necessity of supporting Abdurrahman Wahid.

As vehicles for the promotion of certain political figures,
charismatic parties rarely outlast their founders. Those that do
have staying power are the ones that begin to organize an
institutional basis for the continuation of the party beyond the
original meaning given to the party by the founders' parties that
"are" something (institutionally) or parties that "stand" for
something (programmatically).

Institutionalization of the parties' creation of stable rules
and structures, rooting of the party in durable social groups,
presentation of ideologically consistent programs and the
fostering of intraparty democracy are the tasks at hand.

Particularly important in Indonesia's case and in order to get
around the problem of a lack of opposition is the
institutionalization of democratic decision-making within the
parties.

Writing in The Jakarta Post Nov. 10, PDI Perjuangan's Mochtar
Buchori suggested as much when he said that he hoped that PDI
Perjuangan in parliament could serve as a "corrective force" on
the government. Dubious about "party discipline," Mochtar wrote
that disciplining party members for representing the wishes of
the people smacked of the practices of the New Order.

How party discipline will play out in the Indonesian context
is not yet certain, though it is not an enemy of democracy in and
of itself. It can be useful to make parties effective political
actors. The safeguard on party discipline is the internal
mechanism of decision-making within the parties and the degree to
which parties represent the interests of their members and
supporters. It is from the grassroots that the party can hear
society's demands. If only it will listen.

Importantly, parties have an incentive to listen. While there
is advantage to be gained from participating in the National
Unity Cabinet, there is declining utility over time for all
parties to be jointly responsible for governance. How can a party
distinguish its participation from all the others? Who can the
electorate hold responsible for successes and failures?

In time, parties will need to distinguish themselves from
others in order to attract support. Elites that are unconnected
from the Indonesian people may be able to continue to parcel out
shares in political power over the short-term. But, parties that
listen, truly listen, to the ground will more accurately
represent the interests of members and supporters.

Over the longer-term, I would argue that this strategy would
be the more successful one, electorally for the parties concerned
as well as institutionally for the overall health of Indonesia's
democratic consolidation.

Improved intra-party democracy, consciously fostered by party
leaders now in order to take root over the long-term as part of a
strategy of institutionalization would serve as a check on many
of the concerns raised above: lack of an opposition, overly
centralized decision-making, and personality-based parties.

While elite accommodations might be needed to overcome
sticking points in the transition, compromise without voice might
lead to the new systems' ignoring of the wishes of large segments
of the Indonesian population with all the prospects for anti-
system action which that entails.

This article has argued that the existence of a government of
national unity is not an imminent threat to the successful
consolidation of democracy in Indonesia. A greater threat can be
seen in the nature of political party decision-making and the
existence of personality-based parties.

With popular input into party decision-making and party
institutionalization, opposition will eventually take root. The
press of government and the need of parties to present
alternative visions to voters will lead some parties to go into
opposition, to represent the interests of their members, to
distinguish themselves from the field and to serve as a potential
alternative government.

The author is a Ph.D. Candidate in Foreign Affairs at the
University of Virginia in the United States. She recently
returned from a one year stint as a visiting fellow at the
National University of Singapore. She is currently working on her
dissertation entitled Indonesia's Tentative Transition: The Role
of Political Parties.