Soerjadi, Megawati and PDI: Facing the realities
The following is an interview by The Jakarta Post's Yogyakarta correspondent, Asip Agus H, with Gadjah Mada University political science lecturer, Cornelis Lay. The interview was conducted on Monday, July 21, at the East Nusa Tenggara student dormitory, in Yogyakarta.
Question (Q): How do you explain the existence of Megawati supporters in the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI)? The past general election proved that Megawati masses greatly influenced the votes collected by the PDI in Soerjadi's camp. However, they do not seem solid enough to make up a political organization.
Answer (A): In general, Megawati supporters began as a spontaneously formed mass. They are loyal to Megawati as an individual. In the past year there have been no organizational steps which enable them -- being spontaneously formed and pledging loyalty to an individual -- to shift their loyalty to an organization. It is a political risk if loyalty rests on the charisma of an individual. In a situation like this, an organization usually occupies the lowest place on the scale of priorities and can be ignored. This is the situation that has been evolving.
Afterwards, Megawati followers experienced systematic pressure from the government. Their room for action became very limited. And they had to spend extra energy to counter the action taken by the Soerjadi and Fatimah group, particularly during the election campaign. Therefore, nothing was done about organizational consolidation and concept, ideology and material basis -- elements needed by a large political organization.
The organization which emerged was simply a mob and their activities are sporadic and reactive. So the ideology is not visible, nor is there a material base. The activities are spontaneous in nature and take the form of only small splashes.
Q: What about the party elite?
A: The elite circles around Megawati do not seem to have enough resources with enough attention and proper capacity to undertake the consolidation. The elite have spent most of their energy taking legal action.
One observation in the last few months is that the activities of the party bureaucracy in Megawati's camp are politically less significant than those carried out by her lawyers, the Team to Defend Indonesian Democracy (TPDI). In my opinion, TPDI is more ideological in character than the central governing board (DPP) in Megawati's camp. And indeed they (the DPP) do not have many opportunities.
Q: But during the past election campaign Megawati's supporters were quite prominent...
A: During the election, Soerjadi and his camp could still be used as a common frame of reference for the formation of a crowd and to forge internal solidarity among Megawati supporters or to design political activities. Now Soerjadi and his followers are no longer there and politically and morally they are now crushed, there are no longer any external incentives which can be used to forge internal solidarity.
Q: What are the external incentives?
A: The presence of Soerjadi's camp during the campaign was a favorable political incentive for Megawati's supporters to mobilize funds. This happened in the framework of a response to a particular event. It could never occur through crowd-forming.
A group called "Loyal Supporters of Mrs. Megawati" (PSIM) was formed in Yogyakarta. Elsewhere there are other groups (supporting Megawati outside the organization/bureaucracy of PDI- Megawati - Ed.), but in substance they are crowds not organizations, and certainly not political organizations. At the level of the crowd itself, though, the participants already feel part of a movement and enjoy the political experience.
Many complaints have been lodged about instructions being issued from the top but never reaching the masses. This has made it more difficult for those in the regions to make a move.
Q: How do you assess the steps taken by the PDI Megawati camp in suing the PDI Soerjadi camp? Do the Megawati supporters have consolidation in view?
A: I think the action is for now rather than the future. This step can be used as a political incentive to maintain morale, to guard gatherings. But seriously, will it last and until when, if from region to region it is rejected by the courts. On the one hand it is proof of the basic thesis that Megawati's camp put forward: the law does not function neutrally, the law is biased in favor of power and the law treats Megawati supporters unfairly. It may foster unity among Megawati supporters who see themselves as victims of systematic injustice and pressure from the authorities. On the other hand, it could demoralize and discourage them.
Q: Why doesn't the Megawati camp put order into their organization?
A: I do not know. But I do know for certain that the Megawati camp must now transform the loyalty it has built on individual charisma into a loyalty for the organization. It is inevitable that to reach that objective they must seriously think of developing the organization. I do not know why it has not been done. Maybe their attention is focused on the legal aspects of the political process. Or perhaps the human resources at higher levels are very limited.
It is not easy to find a person with high managerial skills to conduct such political consolidation. And there may be financial limitations. This is an internal matter.
It may also be a model of politics being developed around Megawati and reflects the opinion that an organization is not a matter of principle. What is considered important is safeguarding Megawati as a symbol.
Q: Are there any external factors?
A: I think an external determining factor is the very limited political space available for Megawati and her supporters. Although a certain mobility is allowed, i.e. grassroots groups across areas meet with each other, there is a very tight supervision of the state. Small political errors are expected to be used against them some day.
In the process of consolidation there are very high political risks. This may cause Megawati, and the political elite surrounding her, to make continuous "recalculations" to avoid steps becoming a boomerang, to prevent capture or being declared subversive. These activities demand a lot of time and leave little space for organizing.
Q: Is it dangerous for the Megawati camp to lack unity and control?
A: Yes. There is a point of tolerance at the mass level. If the point of despair is reached there may be serious consequences for the community. And the problem may originate from "the unclear state of things". Who should be responsible for what and at what level? The next risk concerns the slowing down of activities aimed at supporting Megawati and continuing the struggle against Soerjadi and the symbols of repression.
Once again, the choice poses a dilemma. The power of an individual's charisma is usually quite conspicuous under heavy pressure. It result from heightened political tension or mobilization like the period of the general election. Or, after the July 27 incident, it was clear that charisma became the key to all political happenings. There were expectations of Megawati's words, movements, actions and attitude. But in "normal" situations the limits of an individual's charisma is revealed. Therefore, charisma must be substituted with or supported by an organization's charisma.
I have often argued that it is essential for a transformation, so that in a "normal" situation the mechanism of the organization and of the politics of Megawati does not stop. With an individual's charisma, if the person stops, everything will stop. And the politics based on the individual's charisma are tiring for the prominent figure because the person must have extraordinary energy, both physically and mentally. At the same time the person must have an exceptional imagination. The demands at a mass level are very high, while at the state level Megawati is systematically waylaid. It is not easy to face all sides at the same time.
Q: Does PDI Megawati have the same characteristics as the former PDI which was dynamic, had friction and easily broke up? If Megawati restructures the organization is it feared that frictions will recur?
A: Yes, from the aspect of PDI's tradition, yes indeed if we want to say there was never loyalty to the organization or there was never a culture to be loyal to the organization. Moreover, there is the addition of key figures who recently appeared and have become Megawati's main supporters whose characteristics are about the same. They resemble, more or less, those of the former Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) so it is not the PDI but the former PNI. Yes, it was very fluid as an organization and its identity was very personal, its forms of expression were very symbolical. That perhaps has been inherited by the PDI Megawati at present. But at the same time we cannot ignore that the tendency is gaining strength at a time when nearly all people are loyal because of Megawati. I think not too many people consider Mangara or the others.
Q: So, the positions with the PDI Megawati are mainly filled by PNI people?
A: I am not saying it is PNI because PNI itself represents many sides. Ideologically speaking,it means they have a high sense of romanticism about the great ideas left by Bung Karno and continued by PNI. I think they have been responsible for forming many of the Megawati supporters' centers.
Q: But the support for Megawati does not come from PDI circles only?.
A: Indeed. There are many groups in the community who support Megawati who are motivated, not by ideological fanaticism but hate and anger towards the political regime. They do not see another alternative and consider Megawati as a person who could bring about change.
NGOs do not care who Megawati is, what her thoughts are or what people steeped in PNI tradition think. What counts is that people obey Megawati and she has charisma.
So, the political motives behind the support vary and that too will produce quite different results when political steps are taken. I think this explains why contradicting political moves occur among Megawati supporters in different regions. I think it is not solely the result of confusion because of the non- existence of clear instructions at the lower level. But it clarifies the differences in political motives behind the support given to Megawati.
I do not know the end of the story but a political organization is obliged to take sensible steps toward consolidation. Its function is to transform loyalty for an individual to loyalty for the organization. That is important, not solely for Megawati and PDI, but it is also important for those in the Megawati camp who have placed themselves as figures struggling for justice, democracy, law, etc.
If the Megawati camp continues to be characterized by sporadic and reactive action, does not have inter-organization links and loyalty is given only to Megawati, I think if Megawati's image declines politically everything will fall apart.
Q: You said the PDI Megawati now is different from the former PDI. Please explain...
A: I think the majority, it cannot be denied, are there because of great political disappointment with the authorities and see an opportunity for change in Megawati. Some people denote them roughly as free riders in politics. Things are not like that. But part of the former PDI people have found similarities with the romanticism of the former PNI and the old PDI. Another part of the new group has found a reason for their disillusion with the regime. They constitute the two big pillars.
Q: What about the PDI Megawati congress in 1998?
A: I do not know about that, but it is clear that the Megawati term will end in December and a congress is being planned. Organizationally and legally speaking, it is true. Until today the Megawati chairmanship has remained legal, the moral legality is there, so the congress can take place. But from the aspect of practical politics it is nearly impossible.
First, because from the beginning the government has indeed precluded Megawati. Second, although the number of Soerjadi supporters is limited, they have formal legality in the eyes of the government. They, the party bureaucracy of the Soerjadi camp, like the regional and branch chairmen, who were installed with blessings of the state, cannot be completely, politically eliminated.
The Megawati camp cannot neglect them although it is morally very hard for Megawati to accommodate them.
Q: Why?
A: Because of the July 27 incident. I once said: "What if the Soerjadi camp is brought to court at the national level?" This is impracticable because the masses will not be able to differentiate. In this case I think Megawati has a big problem. If there were no July 27 incident the problem might have been solved. I emphasize this to refute the argument that PDI's chairmanship is of great value and coveted by Megawati.
What has been emphasized is not the loss of the chair but the violence committed against their own "children". This is difficult to justify morally. I think that is the substance of the problem. It is very hard for Megawati to express this. Besides, the media are perhaps not in a position to offer space to her. I think that is also an important explanation why Megawati's actions have diminished drastically. Support by the media has understandably also declined as a result of the unequivocal limitations imposed on the media. The media may have lost enthusiasm or their passion to give their support. How many media are willing to speak about the PDI?
Q: What do you really think of the Soerjadi camp?
A: They are actually supporters of their own interest, they concur with Soerjadi's ideas because their interests are safeguarded. Those who are members of DPRD (regional house of representatives) hope to remain in the same position, those who are chairmen of a PDI regional board hope to maintain their position and those on the PDI central board do not wish to abandon their position. It is in their self-interest. Primarily they are not Soerjadi supporters but defenders of their own interests.