Soerjadi, Megawati and PDI: Facing the realities

Soerjadi, Megawati and PDI: Facing the realities

The following is an interview by The Jakarta Post's Yogyakarta
correspondent, Asip Agus H, with Gadjah Mada University political
science lecturer, Cornelis Lay. The interview was conducted on
Monday, July 21, at the East Nusa Tenggara student dormitory, in
Yogyakarta.

Question (Q): How do you explain the existence of Megawati
supporters in the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI)? The past
general election proved that Megawati masses greatly influenced
the votes collected by the PDI in Soerjadi's camp. However, they
do not seem solid enough to make up a political organization.

Answer (A): In general, Megawati supporters began as a
spontaneously formed mass. They are loyal to Megawati as an
individual. In the past year there have been no organizational
steps which enable them -- being spontaneously formed and
pledging loyalty to an individual -- to shift their loyalty to an
organization. It is a political risk if loyalty rests on the
charisma of an individual. In a situation like this, an
organization usually occupies the lowest place on the scale of
priorities and can be ignored. This is the situation that has
been evolving.

Afterwards, Megawati followers experienced systematic pressure
from the government. Their room for action became very limited.
And they had to spend extra energy to counter the action taken by
the Soerjadi and Fatimah group, particularly during the election
campaign. Therefore, nothing was done about organizational
consolidation and concept, ideology and material basis --
elements needed by a large political organization.

The organization which emerged was simply a mob and their
activities are sporadic and reactive. So the ideology is not
visible, nor is there a material base. The activities are
spontaneous in nature and take the form of only small splashes.

Q: What about the party elite?

A: The elite circles around Megawati do not seem to have enough
resources with enough attention and proper capacity to undertake
the consolidation. The elite have spent most of their energy
taking legal action.

One observation in the last few months is that the activities
of the party bureaucracy in Megawati's camp are politically less
significant than those carried out by her lawyers, the Team to
Defend Indonesian Democracy (TPDI). In my opinion, TPDI is more
ideological in character than the central governing board (DPP)
in Megawati's camp. And indeed they (the DPP) do not have many
opportunities.

Q: But during the past election campaign Megawati's supporters
were quite prominent...

A: During the election, Soerjadi and his camp could still be
used as a common frame of reference for the formation of a crowd
and to forge internal solidarity among Megawati supporters or to
design political activities. Now Soerjadi and his followers are
no longer there and politically and morally they are now crushed,
there are no longer any external incentives which can be used to
forge internal solidarity.

Q: What are the external incentives?

A: The presence of Soerjadi's camp during the campaign was a
favorable political incentive for Megawati's supporters to
mobilize funds. This happened in the framework of a response to a
particular event. It could never occur through crowd-forming.

A group called "Loyal Supporters of Mrs. Megawati" (PSIM) was
formed in Yogyakarta. Elsewhere there are other groups
(supporting Megawati outside the organization/bureaucracy of PDI-
Megawati - Ed.), but in substance they are crowds not
organizations, and certainly not political organizations. At the
level of the crowd itself, though, the participants already feel
part of a movement and enjoy the political experience.

Many complaints have been lodged about instructions being
issued from the top but never reaching the masses. This has made
it more difficult for those in the regions to make a move.

Q: How do you assess the steps taken by the PDI Megawati camp in
suing the PDI Soerjadi camp? Do the Megawati supporters have
consolidation in view?

A: I think the action is for now rather than the future. This
step can be used as a political incentive to maintain morale, to
guard gatherings. But seriously, will it last and until when, if
from region to region it is rejected by the courts. On the one
hand it is proof of the basic thesis that Megawati's camp put
forward: the law does not function neutrally, the law is biased
in favor of power and the law treats Megawati supporters
unfairly. It may foster unity among Megawati supporters who see
themselves as victims of systematic injustice and pressure from
the authorities. On the other hand, it could demoralize and
discourage them.

Q: Why doesn't the Megawati camp put order into their
organization?

A: I do not know. But I do know for certain that the Megawati
camp must now transform the loyalty it has built on individual
charisma into a loyalty for the organization. It is inevitable
that to reach that objective they must seriously think of
developing the organization. I do not know why it has not been
done. Maybe their attention is focused on the legal aspects of
the political process. Or perhaps the human resources at higher
levels are very limited.

It is not easy to find a person with high managerial skills to
conduct such political consolidation. And there may be financial
limitations. This is an internal matter.

It may also be a model of politics being developed around
Megawati and reflects the opinion that an organization is not a
matter of principle. What is considered important is safeguarding
Megawati as a symbol.

Q: Are there any external factors?

A: I think an external determining factor is the very limited
political space available for Megawati and her supporters.
Although a certain mobility is allowed, i.e. grassroots groups
across areas meet with each other, there is a very tight
supervision of the state. Small political errors are expected to
be used against them some day.

In the process of consolidation there are very high political
risks. This may cause Megawati, and the political elite
surrounding her, to make continuous "recalculations" to avoid
steps becoming a boomerang, to prevent capture or being declared
subversive. These activities demand a lot of time and leave
little space for organizing.

Q: Is it dangerous for the Megawati camp to lack unity and
control?

A: Yes. There is a point of tolerance at the mass level. If the
point of despair is reached there may be serious consequences for
the community. And the problem may originate from "the unclear
state of things". Who should be responsible for what and at what
level? The next risk concerns the slowing down of activities
aimed at supporting Megawati and continuing the struggle against
Soerjadi and the symbols of repression.

Once again, the choice poses a dilemma. The power of an
individual's charisma is usually quite conspicuous under heavy
pressure. It result from heightened political tension or
mobilization like the period of the general election. Or, after
the July 27 incident, it was clear that charisma became the key
to all political happenings. There were expectations of
Megawati's words, movements, actions and attitude. But in
"normal" situations the limits of an individual's charisma is
revealed. Therefore, charisma must be substituted with or
supported by an organization's charisma.

I have often argued that it is essential for a transformation,
so that in a "normal" situation the mechanism of the organization
and of the politics of Megawati does not stop. With an
individual's charisma, if the person stops, everything will stop.
And the politics based on the individual's charisma are tiring
for the prominent figure because the person must have
extraordinary energy, both physically and mentally. At the same
time the person must have an exceptional imagination. The demands
at a mass level are very high, while at the state level Megawati
is systematically waylaid. It is not easy to face all sides at
the same time.

Q: Does PDI Megawati have the same characteristics as the former
PDI which was dynamic, had friction and easily broke up? If
Megawati restructures the organization is it feared that
frictions will recur?

A: Yes, from the aspect of PDI's tradition, yes indeed if we
want to say there was never loyalty to the organization or there
was never a culture to be loyal to the organization. Moreover,
there is the addition of key figures who recently appeared and
have become Megawati's main supporters whose characteristics are
about the same. They resemble, more or less, those of the former
Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) so it is not the PDI but the
former PNI. Yes, it was very fluid as an organization and its
identity was very personal, its forms of expression were very
symbolical. That perhaps has been inherited by the PDI Megawati
at present. But at the same time we cannot ignore that the
tendency is gaining strength at a time when nearly all people are
loyal because of Megawati. I think not too many people consider
Mangara or the others.

Q: So, the positions with the PDI Megawati are mainly filled by
PNI people?

A: I am not saying it is PNI because PNI itself represents many
sides. Ideologically speaking,it means they have a high sense of
romanticism about the great ideas left by Bung Karno and
continued by PNI. I think they have been responsible for forming
many of the Megawati supporters' centers.

Q: But the support for Megawati does not come from PDI circles
only?.

A: Indeed. There are many groups in the community who support
Megawati who are motivated, not by ideological fanaticism but
hate and anger towards the political regime. They do not see
another alternative and consider Megawati as a person who could
bring about change.

NGOs do not care who Megawati is, what her thoughts are or
what people steeped in PNI tradition think. What counts is that
people obey Megawati and she has charisma.

So, the political motives behind the support vary and that too
will produce quite different results when political steps are
taken. I think this explains why contradicting political moves
occur among Megawati supporters in different regions. I think it
is not solely the result of confusion because of the non-
existence of clear instructions at the lower level. But it
clarifies the differences in political motives behind the support
given to Megawati.

I do not know the end of the story but a political
organization is obliged to take sensible steps toward
consolidation. Its function is to transform loyalty for an
individual to loyalty for the organization. That is important,
not solely for Megawati and PDI, but it is also important for
those in the Megawati camp who have placed themselves as figures
struggling for justice, democracy, law, etc.

If the Megawati camp continues to be characterized by sporadic
and reactive action, does not have inter-organization links and
loyalty is given only to Megawati, I think if Megawati's image
declines politically everything will fall apart.

Q: You said the PDI Megawati now is different from the former
PDI. Please explain...

A: I think the majority, it cannot be denied, are there because
of great political disappointment with the authorities and see an
opportunity for change in Megawati. Some people denote them
roughly as free riders in politics. Things are not like that. But
part of the former PDI people have found similarities with the
romanticism of the former PNI and the old PDI. Another part of
the new group has found a reason for their disillusion with the
regime. They constitute the two big pillars.

Q: What about the PDI Megawati congress in 1998?

A: I do not know about that, but it is clear that the Megawati
term will end in December and a congress is being planned.
Organizationally and legally speaking, it is true. Until today
the Megawati chairmanship has remained legal, the moral legality
is there, so the congress can take place. But from the aspect of
practical politics it is nearly impossible.

First, because from the beginning the government has indeed
precluded Megawati. Second, although the number of Soerjadi
supporters is limited, they have formal legality in the eyes of
the government. They, the party bureaucracy of the Soerjadi camp,
like the regional and branch chairmen, who were installed with
blessings of the state, cannot be completely, politically
eliminated.

The Megawati camp cannot neglect them although it is morally
very hard for Megawati to accommodate them.

Q: Why?

A: Because of the July 27 incident. I once said: "What if the
Soerjadi camp is brought to court at the national level?" This is
impracticable because the masses will not be able to
differentiate. In this case I think Megawati has a big problem.
If there were no July 27 incident the problem might have been
solved. I emphasize this to refute the argument that PDI's
chairmanship is of great value and coveted by Megawati.

What has been emphasized is not the loss of the chair but the
violence committed against their own "children". This is
difficult to justify morally. I think that is the substance of
the problem. It is very hard for Megawati to express this.
Besides, the media are perhaps not in a position to offer space
to her. I think that is also an important explanation why
Megawati's actions have diminished drastically. Support by the
media has understandably also declined as a result of the
unequivocal limitations imposed on the media. The media may have
lost enthusiasm or their passion to give their support. How many
media are willing to speak about the PDI?

Q: What do you really think of the Soerjadi camp?

A: They are actually supporters of their own interest, they
concur with Soerjadi's ideas because their interests are
safeguarded. Those who are members of DPRD (regional house of
representatives) hope to remain in the same position, those who
are chairmen of a PDI regional board hope to maintain their
position and those on the PDI central board do not wish to
abandon their position. It is in their self-interest. Primarily
they are not Soerjadi supporters but defenders of their own
interests.