Soeharto's support crumbled as economy weakened

The students' moral movement finally toppled Soeharto from his presidency. Mochtar Mas'oed, a political science lecturer from Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta discusses matters which accelerated their demands toward a successful conclusion.

Question: What accelerated the progress of the demonstrating students' struggle to topple Soeharto down from his power?

Mochtar: The flood of sympathy attracted by the student cause after the fatal shooting of demonstrators at Trisakti University on May 12 propelled the movement to new heights. Support for their struggles was even forthcoming from affiliate groups of the ruling Golkar grouping. Kosgoro (a group of veterans running businesses and cooperatives) and KNPI (a federation of youth associations) both have strong links with Golkar but came out in support of the students. This placed the Armed Forces (ABRI) in an awkward position, and its commander, General Wiranto, was forced to order army personnel to take a more relaxed stance at demonstrations.

Thereafter, a number of neutral officials opportunistically declared their support for the students. This made it difficult for Soeharto to recruit personnel for his planned committee for reform because many able candidates had aligned themselves with his opposition.

The presence of thousands of students in the House of Representatives (DPR) compound in Central Jakarta since May 18 was also effective in demonstrating to House leaders the importance of change.

Furthermore, worsening economic conditions encouraged low- income people into supporting the student movement. That is why so many people turned out for a reform campaign rally in Yogyakarta on May 20. The total number of demonstrators that day was close to one million.

Q: Why did the DPR, which is dominated by the pro-government Golkar and ABRI factions, finally come out in support of the students?

M: House Speaker Harmoko, who belongs to the Golkar faction, apparently started trying to show he was independent from Soeharto after a number of prominent figures, including lawyer Adnan Buyung Nasution and poet W.S. Rendra, spoke to him in such a way that he felt humiliated. From then on, Harmoko tried hard to show to the people that he had integrity and a mind of his own. Then, realizing that Soeharto's days were numbered, Deputy House Speaker Abdul Gafur (also of Golkar), jumped on the bandwagon too.

Q: What about the role of intellectuals?

M: Intellectuals and university lecturers supported the students by providing ideas and moral drives. Students realized that their struggles were supported not only by lecturers, but also by university leaders and employees.

Q: Do you consider the meeting between University of Indonesia (UI) leaders and Soeharto, where the former demanded the presidents resignation, as an example of their support to the students?

M: I don't exactly know. But I think by extending an invitation to UI leaders alone, Soeharto was once again trying to bring his favored divide-and-rule tactics into play. Another example of this type of leadership was when Soeharto invited nine Moslem figures to a crisis meeting on May 19, while ignoring figures from other religions.

Q: Did you see international pressure against Soeharto as playing a role?

M: Soeharto was very strongly self confident and stubborn enough to ignore any pressure from overseas. Furthermore, U.S. state secretary Madeleine Albright's statement that it was time for Soeharto to go came too late -- less than 12 hours before his resignation.

Q: How could his strong political machine crumble in the way that it did?

M: He built up his power on a patrimonial basis, meaning that he provided money, position and privilege for his supporters.

He passed the rewards out through various means, including presidential-decree-based development projects. Villages, for example, could lose out on an opportunity to get their houses supplied with electricity under a development program if they did not vote for Golkar in an election.

So, Soeharto regarded Indonesian citizens as his clientele. As soon as he began to fail to deliver money, position and privilege to his clientele, they deserted him.

Q: How do you see ABRI's loyalty to Soeharto?

M: ABRI remained loyal to Soeharto, but the Armed Forces Commander Gen. Wiranto voiced his backing through an expression of support for the constitution -- a statement which can be interpreted in a number of different ways. What the Commander meant was that the constitution had already been interpreted in many ways which favored Soeharto, but pro-reform parties also sought to protect their movement against Soeharto from state interference by taking a "constitutional path."

Q: Wiranto pledged that ABRI would protect the safety and dignity of Soeharto and his family. Do you think ABRI can also protect him from legal action seeking to reclaim the wealth of his family?

M: I think ABRI would do a lot to prevent such a thing from happening. (riz)