Soeharto's support crumbled as economy weakened

Soeharto's support crumbled as economy weakened

The students' moral movement finally toppled Soeharto from his
presidency. Mochtar Mas'oed, a political science lecturer from
Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta discusses matters which
accelerated their demands toward a successful conclusion.

Question: What accelerated the progress of the demonstrating
students' struggle to topple Soeharto down from his power?

Mochtar: The flood of sympathy attracted by the student cause
after the fatal shooting of demonstrators at Trisakti University
on May 12 propelled the movement to new heights. Support for
their struggles was even forthcoming from affiliate groups of the
ruling Golkar grouping. Kosgoro (a group of veterans running
businesses and cooperatives) and KNPI (a federation of youth
associations) both have strong links with Golkar but came out in
support of the students. This placed the Armed Forces (ABRI) in
an awkward position, and its commander, General Wiranto, was
forced to order army personnel to take a more relaxed stance at
demonstrations.

Thereafter, a number of neutral officials opportunistically
declared their support for the students. This made it difficult
for Soeharto to recruit personnel for his planned committee for
reform because many able candidates had aligned themselves with
his opposition.

The presence of thousands of students in the House of
Representatives (DPR) compound in Central Jakarta since May 18
was also effective in demonstrating to House leaders the
importance of change.

Furthermore, worsening economic conditions encouraged low-
income people into supporting the student movement. That is why
so many people turned out for a reform campaign rally in
Yogyakarta on May 20. The total number of demonstrators that day
was close to one million.

Q: Why did the DPR, which is dominated by the pro-government
Golkar and ABRI factions, finally come out in support of the
students?

M: House Speaker Harmoko, who belongs to the Golkar faction,
apparently started trying to show he was independent from
Soeharto after a number of prominent figures, including lawyer
Adnan Buyung Nasution and poet W.S. Rendra, spoke to him in such
a way that he felt humiliated. From then on, Harmoko tried hard
to show to the people that he had integrity and a mind of his
own. Then, realizing that Soeharto's days were numbered, Deputy
House Speaker Abdul Gafur (also of Golkar), jumped on the
bandwagon too.

Q: What about the role of intellectuals?

M: Intellectuals and university lecturers supported the students
by providing ideas and moral drives. Students realized that their
struggles were supported not only by lecturers, but also by
university leaders and employees.

Q: Do you consider the meeting between University of Indonesia
(UI) leaders and Soeharto, where the former demanded the
presidents resignation, as an example of their support to the
students?

M: I don't exactly know. But I think by extending an invitation
to UI leaders alone, Soeharto was once again trying to bring his
favored divide-and-rule tactics into play. Another example of
this type of leadership was when Soeharto invited nine Moslem
figures to a crisis meeting on May 19, while ignoring figures
from other religions.

Q: Did you see international pressure against Soeharto as playing
a role?

M: Soeharto was very strongly self confident and stubborn enough
to ignore any pressure from overseas. Furthermore, U.S. state
secretary Madeleine Albright's statement that it was time for
Soeharto to go came too late -- less than 12 hours before his
resignation.

Q: How could his strong political machine crumble in the way that
it did?

M: He built up his power on a patrimonial basis, meaning that he
provided money, position and privilege for his supporters.

He passed the rewards out through various means, including
presidential-decree-based development projects. Villages, for
example, could lose out on an opportunity to get their houses
supplied with electricity under a development program if they did
not vote for Golkar in an election.

So, Soeharto regarded Indonesian citizens as his clientele. As
soon as he began to fail to deliver money, position and privilege
to his clientele, they deserted him.

Q: How do you see ABRI's loyalty to Soeharto?

M: ABRI remained loyal to Soeharto, but the Armed Forces
Commander Gen. Wiranto voiced his backing through an expression
of support for the constitution -- a statement which can be
interpreted in a number of different ways. What the Commander
meant was that the constitution had already been interpreted in
many ways which favored Soeharto, but pro-reform parties also
sought to protect their movement against Soeharto from state
interference by taking a "constitutional path."

Q: Wiranto pledged that ABRI would protect the safety and dignity
of Soeharto and his family. Do you think ABRI can also protect
him from legal action seeking to reclaim the wealth of his
family?

M: I think ABRI would do a lot to prevent such a thing from
happening. (riz)