Soeharto's fall a near repeat of Sukarno's ruin (2)

By Tjipta Lesmana

JAKARTA (JP): In the mystery which still shrouds first Indonesian president Sukarno's downfall in 1966, some theories point an accusing finger at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

In one of his books, Manai Sophiaan explains the CIA's possible involvement in Sukarno's downfall with great clarity. Of course, one is free to disbelieve what the former Indonesian ambassador to Moscow wrote. But the Cornell Papers have also described at length Washington's supposed involvement.

It may sound absurd at this early juncture, but did the U.S. have more than meets the eye to do with Soeharto's descent from power? It is an apt question, considering that U.S. "hands" reach throughout the globe, particularly in states whose governments are not favorable to Washington, and also in view of the alleged role of the United States in getting the "ball" of the monetary crisis rolling in Asia.

A Reuters report said the White House, U.S. State Department and Pentagon had considered the possibility of offering asylum to Soeharto if his departure from Indonesia could prevent bloodshed. Does this also mean that the United States considered the likelihood of treating Soeharto in the same way as it treated former Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos before?

It must be borne in mind that many Filipinos and observers of international affairs have wondered about this: Did in early February 1986 president Marcos leave his country of his own volition or was he abducted by the United States? If the United States really wished to help Marcos, why was he flown directly to Hawaii (after a brief transit in Guam) and "taken hostage" subsequently?

The political crisis undermining Sukarno finally led to a crisis of confidence. People flatly rejected whatever policy Sukarno drew up after the Indonesian Communist Party's alleged coup attempt.

Soeharto's administration experienced the same phenomenon.

The economic crisis became so bad it brought about a crisis of confidence. The people refused to believe his Cabinet would be able to overcome the economic crisis. The fact that the value of the rupiah kept on sliding reflected the crisis of confidence.

In the end, 14 ministers tendered their resignation to Soeharto. There was an anticlimactic end to the crisis of confidence when Soeharto admitted that he was unable to recruit personnel for his planned National Reform Committee. All candidates rejected his offer to serve as members of the planned committee because they were sure they would not be able to help solve the economic crisis.

Sukarno's administration after the announcement of his July 5, 1959 decree is commonly called the Old Order. After Soeharto accepted a mandate based on the Instruction of March 11, 1968 (known as Supersemar) and the New Order period was ushered in, opportunists turned up one after another. Those previously known as Sukarno's supporters turned against him and even demanded that he be immediately tried.

History repeats itself. The New Order was replaced by the Reform Order on May 21, 1998. At critical moments marking the change of the governance, many figures previously known as long- time Soeharto supporters reversed their position and, following with the changing winds, also pushed him to step down. At the start of Soeharto's rule, everybody shouted for the "New Order" but now everyone is clamoring for "Reform".

After Sukarno had been stripped of his power by virtue of MPRS Decree No. XXX/MPRS/1967 dated March 12, 1967, the demands that Sukarno be brought to court continued. It was said Sukarno should assume responsibility for three national disasters -- the rebellion of PKI, the economic crisis and moral decadence.

Soeharto then wisely asked all parties to resort to rational interest. He reminded the whole nation of Sukarno's great merits as a patriotic freedom fighter, one who advocated the state philosophy of Pancasila and as one of the proclamators of Indonesia's independence.

Soeharto, in his address before a special session of the legislature, added: "Bung Karno should not be treated unjustly. Don't allow the present generation to be blamed by the next generation for improperly treating a patriotic leader of the people." Sukarno passed away before the people took a final stance.

Thirty-one years later, before Soeharto resigned his presidency, a similar legal demand was also made. Generally, the demand can be summed up to include three things: The economic crisis, practices of corruption, collusion and nepotism and the return of state assets.

Of course, Soeharto's fate partly depends on the wisdom of President B.J. Habibie. However, the opposition can make this issue their trump card in their struggle to establish a Reform Order.

Perhaps, a very valuable lesson that one can draw from these two events is the collapse of a myth about the impossibility of replacing a "great leader". Prior to Sukarno's downfall, who could ever dream there was an Indonesian capable of replacing him? As for Soeharto, up to March this year, he was also regarded as the sole figure capable of leading the nation as it entered the new millennium.

In fact, Soeharto himself had much earlier dismissed this myth, saying that it was impossible that none out of the 200 million Indonesian people could replace him. Yet, only through the machinations of a number of turncoats, were we finally able to lose the horrible specter of the state and nation disintegrating if Soeharto gave up his position.

The writer is a lecturer at the School of Social and Political Sciences of the University of Indonesia.