Soeharto's fall a near repeat of Sukarno's ruin (2)

Soeharto's fall a near repeat of Sukarno's ruin (2)

By Tjipta Lesmana

JAKARTA (JP): In the mystery which still shrouds first
Indonesian president Sukarno's downfall in 1966, some theories
point an accusing finger at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA).

In one of his books, Manai Sophiaan explains the CIA's
possible involvement in Sukarno's downfall with great clarity. Of
course, one is free to disbelieve what the former Indonesian
ambassador to Moscow wrote. But the Cornell Papers have also
described at length Washington's supposed involvement.

It may sound absurd at this early juncture, but did the U.S.
have more than meets the eye to do with Soeharto's descent from
power? It is an apt question, considering that U.S. "hands" reach
throughout the globe, particularly in states whose governments
are not favorable to Washington, and also in view of the alleged
role of the United States in getting the "ball" of the monetary
crisis rolling in Asia.

A Reuters report said the White House, U.S. State Department
and Pentagon had considered the possibility of offering asylum to
Soeharto if his departure from Indonesia could prevent bloodshed.
Does this also mean that the United States considered the
likelihood of treating Soeharto in the same way as it treated
former Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos before?

It must be borne in mind that many Filipinos and observers of
international affairs have wondered about this: Did in early
February 1986 president Marcos leave his country of his own
volition or was he abducted by the United States? If the United
States really wished to help Marcos, why was he flown directly to
Hawaii (after a brief transit in Guam) and "taken hostage"
subsequently?

The political crisis undermining Sukarno finally led to a
crisis of confidence. People flatly rejected whatever policy
Sukarno drew up after the Indonesian Communist Party's alleged
coup attempt.

Soeharto's administration experienced the same phenomenon.

The economic crisis became so bad it brought about a crisis of
confidence. The people refused to believe his Cabinet would be
able to overcome the economic crisis. The fact that the value of
the rupiah kept on sliding reflected the crisis of confidence.

In the end, 14 ministers tendered their resignation to
Soeharto. There was an anticlimactic end to the crisis of
confidence when Soeharto admitted that he was unable to recruit
personnel for his planned National Reform Committee. All
candidates rejected his offer to serve as members of the planned
committee because they were sure they would not be able to help
solve the economic crisis.

Sukarno's administration after the announcement of his July 5,
1959 decree is commonly called the Old Order. After Soeharto
accepted a mandate based on the Instruction of March 11, 1968
(known as Supersemar) and the New Order period was ushered in,
opportunists turned up one after another. Those previously known
as Sukarno's supporters turned against him and even demanded that
he be immediately tried.

History repeats itself. The New Order was replaced by the
Reform Order on May 21, 1998. At critical moments marking the
change of the governance, many figures previously known as long-
time Soeharto supporters reversed their position and, following
with the changing winds, also pushed him to step down. At the
start of Soeharto's rule, everybody shouted for the "New Order"
but now everyone is clamoring for "Reform".

After Sukarno had been stripped of his power by virtue of MPRS
Decree No. XXX/MPRS/1967 dated March 12, 1967, the demands that
Sukarno be brought to court continued. It was said Sukarno should
assume responsibility for three national disasters -- the
rebellion of PKI, the economic crisis and moral decadence.

Soeharto then wisely asked all parties to resort to rational
interest. He reminded the whole nation of Sukarno's great merits
as a patriotic freedom fighter, one who advocated the state
philosophy of Pancasila and as one of the proclamators of
Indonesia's independence.

Soeharto, in his address before a special session of the
legislature, added: "Bung Karno should not be treated unjustly.
Don't allow the present generation to be blamed by the next
generation for improperly treating a patriotic leader of the
people." Sukarno passed away before the people took a final
stance.

Thirty-one years later, before Soeharto resigned his
presidency, a similar legal demand was also made. Generally, the
demand can be summed up to include three things: The economic
crisis, practices of corruption, collusion and nepotism and the
return of state assets.

Of course, Soeharto's fate partly depends on the wisdom of
President B.J. Habibie. However, the opposition can make this
issue their trump card in their struggle to establish a Reform
Order.

Perhaps, a very valuable lesson that one can draw from these
two events is the collapse of a myth about the impossibility of
replacing a "great leader". Prior to Sukarno's downfall, who
could ever dream there was an Indonesian capable of replacing
him? As for Soeharto, up to March this year, he was also regarded
as the sole figure capable of leading the nation as it entered
the new millennium.

In fact, Soeharto himself had much earlier dismissed this
myth, saying that it was impossible that none out of the 200
million Indonesian people could replace him. Yet, only through
the machinations of a number of turncoats, were we finally able
to lose the horrible specter of the state and nation
disintegrating if Soeharto gave up his position.

The writer is a lecturer at the School of Social and
Political Sciences of the University of Indonesia.