Soeharto's fall a near repeat of Sukarno's ruin

Soeharto's fall a near repeat of Sukarno's ruin

By Tjipta Lesmana

JAKARTA (JP): Former president Soeharto's downfall and that of
his predecessor, Sukarno, share many things in common.

Both men were confronted with serious crises before their
falls. The former encountered a monetary crisis which developed
into a political crisis; the latter faced a political one.

Sukarno, popularly known as Bung Karno, was engaged in a
protracted conflict with the Provisional People's Consultative
Assembly (MPRS). It began with his reluctance to disband the
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) after its Sept. 30, 1965
abortive coup attempt. Sukarno even wished to continue
implementing his Nasakom (Nationalism, Religion and Communism)
concept with the objective of sustaining national unity.

On Feb. 21, 1966, Sukarno announced the composition of his
revised Dwikora Cabinet, which included a number of "crypto-
communist" figures, such as Suryadarma, Omar Dhani, Suharnoko
Harbani, Asmara Hadi and Sumardjo.

The political crisis reached its apex when the MPRS rejected
Sukarno's accountability speech, called Nawaksara, at its general
session on June 22, 1966.

The collapse of Soeharto's administration began with the
monetary crisis in July 1997; it was triggered by Thailand's baht
devaluation earlier in the month. The devaluation affected the
values of almost all currencies in Southeast Asia.

By January of this year, the rupiah's value had dropped by
over 50 percent. By then, the monetary crisis had developed into
a debt crisis. About 90 percent of the country's conglomerates
could be regarded as technically bankrupt because their debts
suddenly multiplied in value following the skyrocketing of the
dollar's value against the rupiah.

Indonesia, regarded as a middle-income country, was suddenly
poor again. Thousands of companies had to close, causing millions
to lose their jobs. Prices of commodities, including basic needs,
soared to a level unaffordable to most. The public became hostile
to a government which failed to feed it.

On the surface, both Sukarno and Soeharto were toppled by
demonstrating students. The killing of student Arief Rachman
Hakim on Feb. 24, 1966, and that of four Trisakti University
students on May 12, 1998, caused huge social turmoil.

At the beginning, it seemed the two leaders belittled the
significance of student demonstrations. When students deflated
the tires of cars that would take ministers to the Merdeka Palace
for a swearing-in ceremony on Feb. 24, 1966, for example, Sukarno
commented: "This demonstration is really beyond reason...kip
zonder kop. Stupid people ignorant of the stages of a revolution.
In short, (they are) contrarevolutionaries."

Thirty-two years later, one of Soeharto's aides commented on
similar demonstrations: "They cannot claim to act on behalf of
the people."

Students are indeed only part of the people. However, they are
prospective intellectuals who are involved in daily social
interaction with lecturers. The latter include senior
intellectuals with rich experience in life; some others are
younger and imbued with idealism, especially those who have just
completed their studies in the West. These two groups may be
comparable to ammunition reinforcing the students. No wonder the
students' voice is often identified as the popular voice.

Everywhere, history notes that a student movement can topple a
regime if it is supported by the military, as evidenced by the
collapse of Sukarno's power. It was impossible for students at
that time to have the freedom to demonstrate without support from
the Armed Forces. At the very least, the Armed Forces
deliberately let the students continue shaking Sukarno's power
through their demonstrations, particularly those happening around
the palace, so the president received heavy political pressure.

Similar was the downfall of President Marcos of the
Philippines. At critical moments, Defense Minister Gen. Fidel
Ramos and Chief of the Armed Forces Gen. Fabian Fer defected and
sided with the people. In China, on the other hand, the students'
prodemocracy struggle in 1989 could be crushed because the
People's Army was united behind the ruler.

What role did the Indonesian Armed Forces assume in the
process of Soeharto's downfall? It seems impossible to answer
this right now. As we know, the day after the killing of the
Trisakti students, Jakarta felt stirrings of unrest. Massive
destruction, looting and arson climaxed the next day, May 14.

Everybody wondered where the Armed Forces were; the impression
was troops were deployed slowly. Many security personnel merely
looked on as the mobs destroyed offices, public utilities and
motorized vehicles. Looters and hoodlums took control of
kilometers of toll roads. In short, this highly embarrassing
"people's festivity" occurred before military troops.

It was also a mystery why the Armed Forces assumed a lenient
attitude toward student demonstrations, both on campuses and at
the compound of the House of People's Representatives/People's
Consultative Assembly (DPR/MPR).

After all, they could not have assembled in the DPR/MPR
compound if the Armed Forces had from the beginning adopted a
firm stance, without necessarily using armed power.

The presence of the students obviously played on the minds of
legislators. House Speaker Harmoko, known as one of Soeharto's
most loyal aides, was even compelled to urge Soeharto to resign.

It is all still cloaked in mystery. The mystery deepened with
the hasty discharge of Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto as commander-in-
chief of the Army's Strategic Command (Kostrad) and Maj. Gen.
Muchdi PR as commander of the Army's Special Force (Kopassus).

The writer is a lecturer at the School of Social and Political
Sciences of the University of Indonesia.