Tue, 14 Aug 2001

Sociocultural conflicts and xenophobia

By I Wayan Juniartha

DENPASAR, Bali (JP): The ubiquitous "No Scavengers Allowed" signs along most roads in Bali's capital of Denpasar and other regencies, and the so-called "population control" operations, which have been regularly held in the past several months, have one thing in common; they both reflect the fast growing xenophobia among the great majority of the Balinese people.

The "No Scavengers Allowed" signs, written in Bahasa Indonesia, were a rare sight two years ago. Then only several villages in the northern outskirts of Denpasar, such as Angantaka, Jagapati and Sedang, displayed the signs along their dirt roads.

Organized and financed by their respective Desa Adat (traditional village), the signs are a manifestation of the prevailing prejudice that the scavengers are actually thieves in disguise.

"They do not only collect the rubbish, because if the house is empty, they will steal the television set, sewing machine, water pump or other valuables, put them into their gunnysacks, and calmly walk away," a local villager once said.

Today, the signs can be found almost everywhere in Denpasar, Badung, Tabanan, and several parts of Gianyar. Scavengers who dare to defy the signs, receive the retribution, from mild verbal abuses to physical assaults, immediately

The fact that most of the burglars caught by the police turn out to be a "full-time career burglars", has not helped diminish this firmly-held prejudice.

On the other hand, the fact that most of the scavengers are Javanese, has strengthened another prejudice on Javanese people in Bali. For a long time, many Balinese, whether they openly admitted it, harbored the view that the Javanese were a source of trouble.

The Javanese have been made the scapegoat for many of the problems afflicting Bali. They are blamed for the growing number of slum areas, increasing crime rate, prostitution and other social problems.

The prejudice against the Javanese by the common people of Bali and its elite stems from different reasons. The common people mostly disliked the uncleanliness of the Javanese migrant workers. For instance, the Balinese, who have for centuries adopted the concept of ulu-teben (that each thing had its own space and position), were shocked to see their Javanese neighbors drying their undergarments on the roof of the house. A Balinese will never place his undergarments anywhere above his head, let alone above his family shrine. This action is believed to be not only rude, but also desecrates the house.

So the xenophobia and prejudice of the common people stems more from cultural misunderstanding and ignorance.

On the contrary, the Balinese elite dislike the Javanese because they fear the mainly Muslim Javanese will eventually dominate the Balinese Hindus -- socially, economically, and religiously. The Balinese have often complained of the increasing number of mosques and have vigorously opposed plans by the Muslim community to build their own Muslim cemetery.

In various closed meetings, the elite have warned of the impending danger of "Islamization" and "Javanization" of Bali.

They say the Muslims have a hidden agenda of reorganizing Bali's demography.

"They want to change the balance from 90 percent Balinese Hindu and 10 percent non-Balinese Hindu to 70 percent and 30 percent respectively. That's the reason why several wealthy non- Balinese businessmen financially support efforts to bring in as many Javanese migrant workers as possible into Bali," one of them accused.

Three recent developments, namely the economic crisis, political instability and the emergence of Hindu fundamentalism, have worsened the xenophobia among the Balinese people.

In the past few years, the economic crisis has forced many poor Javanese to leave their hometowns in Java to look for a new life in Bali. They filled the nonformal sectors, which were either vacant or never touched by the Balinese people.

Collecting garbage, working at construction sites and peddling on the streets were three of the most popular occupations for the migrants.

The migrant street vendors occupied any vacant space they could find like public squares, sidewalks, parking lots and even the front yard private houses. This provoked a public outcry, demanding the government take stern measures to control and manage these vendors.

In some cases the Desa Adat took matters into their own hands by ransacking and burning the vendors's kiosks -- the years of anger and frustration manifesting itself as acts of violence.

At the same time, thousands of Indonesians of Chinese descent who fled several riot-torn cities in Java and Sumatra, also chose Bali as their new home.

Some came with big capital, buying land and houses, and starting their own business. Some only came with their superior skills, which entitled them to comfortable positions in the flourishing companies across Bali.

Inevitably, they brushed aside Balinese candidates for these positions.

It is no wonder that many Balinese view these outsiders' superior capital power and skills with a mix of envy and rage.

The fall of the New Order regime weakened the grip of the security forces and the government's authority. This vacuum was filled by the ever-growing traditional Balinese social institutions such as the Desa Adat and Banjar.

These traditional institutions later transformed themselves into both a law-making body and a law enforcer. Yet, being a traditional agricultural Balinese Hindu organization in nature, these organizations continued to treat non-Balinese as outsiders, and considered the Balinese Hindus as the true natives, thus the sole rightful "owners" of the island.

These organizations were also strengthened by growing Hindu fundamentalism among many Balinese scholars and social activists. The most recent victims of this sentiment were two Denpasar-based schools belonging to a Catholic and a Protestant foundation respectively. The foundations were forced to rename the school, since their names -- Swastiastu and Widya Pura -- were in sanskrit, thus an exclusive property of the Balinese Hindus.

There are rumors that next to be targeted will be churches and mosques that are decorated in Balinese traditional carvings and symbols.

This combination of prejudice, social and economic envy, and growing fundamentalist sentiments, finally manifested into a population control policy, which is spearheaded by the Denpasar administration .

Although being justified as an effort to curb the fast-growing population of Denpasar, the policy is undoubtedly an effort to secure the Balinese Hindus' interests. This time the Javanese were not the only target.

All non-Balinese Hindus, the "outsiders", were the focus of the policy.

Population control operations -- a door-to-door night operations -- are held by each Desa Adat in Denpasar. Any non- Balinese found without a Denpasar-issued identity card or a steady job, are rounded up and sent back to their respective hometowns in Java, Lombok or Sumatera.

Other regencies soon followed Denpasar's initiative, and Bali has become a more difficult place to live in for non-Balinese Hindu people.

The non-Balinese Hindus who have a proper ID and hold a steady job are required to deposit a certain amount of money as security so that if in the future they lose their job, the government will have enough money to send them back to their hometowns.

Some Balinese scholars have praised this policy as a breakthrough, but have failed to see the simple truth; prejudice and intolerance would bring nothing but violent conflict. In the long term, prejudice and intolerance, as history has taught us, are self-destructive for any society.

Violent conflicts and self-destruction are two things Bali and its people cannot afford at this moment or at any moment.