Smog: ASEAN's unconventional security threat
By A.K.P.Mochtan
JAKARTA (JP): The smog which is emanating from Indonesia and plaguing Southeast Asia has come at an unfortunate time. A time when the region's governments are wrestling with economies allegedly being attacked by foreign speculators.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was caught completely off guard. It reacted slowly to both problems and has only been partially successful in overcoming them. This puts a big question mark on the effectiveness of intra-ASEAN cooperative security, particularly the association's sophistication and preparedness to handle nonconventional security threats.
ASEAN has identified some sources of nonconventional security threats and has made a joint commitment to overcome them. The last such attempt was in 1996, when the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting agreed to take up new economic crimes such as extortion and money laundering into its agenda.
These new sources of identifiable nonconventional security threats expand the previous ASEAN "watch-list", which includes piracy, illegal immigration, and illicit drugs. In short, ASEAN has all the political will and intention to work together to minimize nonconventional security threats from escalating.
What ASEAN is failing to do is to initiate concrete actions to back up its political commitment. Of these, two important elements are conspicuously missing. The first is a credible and effective early warning system. The second, following on from the first stipulation, is a mechanism for coordinated joint actions, with particular emphasis on swiftness and thoroughness.
The most difficult part in trying to materialize these arrangements is complying with the nature of the nonconventional security threat itself. As demonstrated by the haze problem, a nonconventional security threat often transpires as an entirely new issue, unforeseen and unpredictable.
For this reason, it is absolutely imperative that ASEAN opens up and solicits input from all potential quarters, including non- governmental actors, such as scholars and NGO activists. This is particularly relevant for environmental-related issues, in which many NGOs excel and have made commendable contributions. In other words, by widening the sources of input and participation, there are better prospects that ASEAN would be better prepared.
An equally important prerequisite is for ASEAN governments to be more sensitive and farsighted in formulating their developmental plans and policies. There are indications that suggest nonconventional security issues often occur as byproducts of development activities.
As the haze problem in Indonesia exemplifies, more legal measures and enforcements must be incorporated into developmental policies, to ensure that investors act more responsibly and not simply aim for quick profit.
An early warning system for nonconventional security threats could then start with an exchange of assessments over individual members' developmental activities and progress, stressing the areas where a country performs less successfully. To be objective, the country may want to invite independent assessments by NGOs, according to their areas of expertise.
This may not be the common way of ASEAN operations. But, as unconventional security threats are often elusive and unpredictable, ASEAN could only gain by being daring and innovative.
A precise mechanism for joint action may be difficult to arrive at, especially if it entails permanent structures and arrangements. A regional crisis management center is not an urgent priority for Southeast Asia. The same role and function is best carried out by the designated national institution, working in close collaboration and coordination with its neighboring counterparts.
Noting the far-reaching consequences and nonconventional security threats could bring to all members of the association, ASEAN must, at the very least, agree on the basic principles that will allow swift action.
This action may include fact-finding missions, standby arrangements, and if necessary, joint training and exercises. The main objective of these activities is to enable detection of problems at the earliest stage possible.
The haze issue is a major disaster for Southeast Asia. It is a big loss for Indonesia particularly, especially its future generations. The most worrying part is that there is no guarantee that the same disaster will not reoccur. The best chance Southeast Asia and ASEAN has is to minimize the risk, by understanding more the nature of nonconventional security threats and from there, acting swiftly and effectively to overcome them.
The writer is an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.