Skepticism of military reform

Skepticism of military reform

Tiarma Siboro, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

During the initial years of the "reform" euphoria, the streets
were abuzz with spirited talk about removing the military from
politics.

Approaching the elections this year, much of this hype
evaporated -- some suggested this was because most voters had
begun to yearn for security and stability, following six years of
stagnant reformasi and the lingering socioeconomic crisis.

When it came to choosing a president, however, the choices
were few and limited, and boiled down to candidates groomed under
the New Order or of the post-New Order elite. Warnings of the
background of presidential candidate Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
faded as his popularity grew throughout the campaign period, then
was drowned out entirely by the overwhelming support of his
constituents in the country's first direct presidential election.

The former chief security minister was a retired general
anyway, and the public felt that at least the Indonesian Military
(TNI) had shown some goodwill in ending its formal role in
national and local politics to concentrate on defense -- or so it
appeared on the surface.

The TNI's journey to this point in its institutional evolution
has not been straight nor smooth, progressing in fits and starts
and at times, doubling back.

Shortly after strongman Soeharto was ousted from power in
1998, then TNI chief Gen. Wiranto announced a "new paradigm" --
the military would eventually withdraw from politics.

In 2000, a formal and drastic step to end the military's
traditional role in politics was taken when the functions and
jurisdiction of the police and the military were separated.
Public order and safety became the sole domain of the police and
the military was strictly in charge of national defense.

The new House of Representatives thus saw the end of members
appointed from the military and police faction, their
justification as lawmakers having outlived their historic role
"to guard the unitary republic and Pancasila state ideology".

However, as the nation's most powerful force with about
500,000 personnel spread in every subdistrict and village, the
effort to restrict the military's role to defense evidently
requires more than three civilian presidents and six years of
polemic.

Despite the laws changing the military's political role, a
"white paper" issued by the defense ministry last year explained
that the TNI's role was primarily to watch over the nation
against its main threat -- "armed separatist movements... given
that the police are not yet ready". The paper thus virtually
contradicted the National Police Law, which declares internal
security the responsibility of the police.

In particular, the presence of separatists -- or "rebels" in
TNI lingo -- in Aceh and Papua have long justified "military
operations" on domestic soil, as well as fueled the self-
fulfilling prophecy that the military must forever "guard" the
unitary republic at all sociopolitical levels.

Even after the new law on the military was passed this
October, stressing the principle of "civilian supremacy," TNI
Commander Gen. Endriartono Sutarto continued to quip, as in the
past, that the military was wary of being abused by civilian
politicians.

"Mutual need" might be a better description. Sensing that the
civilian politicians needed the military, yet were nervous of a
possible backlash, the TNI has been able to retain much of its
power: However radical the Indonesian Military Law seemed, it was
silent on the controversial issue of the TNI's territorial
authority -- the basis of the TNI's outreach beyond its defense
role.

This issue was at the core of a heated debate involving
politicians, lawmakers, academics and activists over the TNI
bill, which was revised several times before it was finally
accepted by the House for deliberation. The key argument against
maintaining the TNI's territoriality was that it hindered
democratic development.

Another key issue was the legal jurisdiction of the military
court and tribunals in trying soldiers accused of crimes, and
whether soldiers could be indicted by civilian courts also.
Meanwhile, the ad hoc rights tribunal was wrapping up the East
Timor abuse cases to national and international criticism that it
was all a sham.

Still, it was election year, and from the outset, the glut of
major, minor and budding political parties had been courting
retired and active generals, expecting the officers' influence
down to the village level through local military commands would
tip the scales when it came to the final vote-count.

Endriartono claimed that at least two presidential candidates
and a high-ranking politician -- then president Megawati
Soekarnoputri of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
(PDI-P), Amien Rais of the National Mandate Party (PAN) and Akbar
Tandjung of the Golkar Party -- had come and asked him to be
their running mate in the presidential race.

He also claimed to have brushed aside their requests in a bid
to maintain neutrality among the TNI ranks. The military
leadership also barred soldiers from using their constitutional
right to vote, but the silence of the local commands made such
shows of "neutrality" just that -- a pretense.

Civilian and military intellectuals remind us again and again
of civilian incompetence that always brings the military back to
the political fore. That may be so, but prolonged communal
conflicts resulting in the deaths of thousands of people in
recent years have also raised questions as to the military's
capabilities, if not unwillingness, to overcome unrest and
internal rivalry.

How much President Susilo will try to nudge his former
military colleagues and the TNI leadership to acquiesce to a role
under a government of "civilian supremacy" remains to be seen.

A TNI man at heart, he had already resisted suggestions during
his campaign that the military chief should answer to the defense
minister. Further, at the front line of his campaign team were
retired generals who had served under Soeharto -- and who have
now been awarded Cabinet positions.

Susilo is clearly treading carefully when it comes to the
military. His first test will be the ongoing change-of-guard
issue, which arose when Endriartono tendered his resignation to
Megawati in the last days of her term. She not only accepted it,
but also installed army chief of staff Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu as
his successor.

When Susilo took office in October, he recalled Endriartono,
saying that the new administration needed time to prepare plans
to revitalize the TNI leadership. The House, dominated by
legislators from Megawati's PDI-P and Golkar, raised a fuss at
this, pointing to an article in the defense law that necessitated
House approval for the appointment of the TNI chief.

The revitalization of the TNI is still on hold -- as though
Susilo is seeking a balance between taking an assertive stance in
the face of the formidable military and in seeking allies within
the TNI on handling prickly issues, such as separatism.

As the new administration moves well into its 100-day program,
perhaps we will see whether Susilo will choose to toe the line
with regards the TNI or will pick up the thread of military
reform and proceed full force.