Sizing up an appropriate electoral system
By Olle Tornquist
JAKARTA (JP): In an important article in The Jakarta Post on Dec. 5, Mulyana W. Kusumah, secretary-general of the Indonesian Independent Committee for General Election Monitoring (KIPP)), pointed to what might be the positive effects for democratization of an electoral system based on a simple majority in one-person constituencies; the so-called district system.
No doubt there is much to the argument that such a district system may help undermine authoritarianism, and especially the dominance of centralized established parties and certain leaders.
It might be added, however, that such a system is also likely to generate fiercer conflicts between people mobilized on the basis of ethnic and religious loyalties. Both to win the only seat and after the election, groups may end up fighting each other rather than trying to compromise.
Furthermore, since the winner takes all (and only large parties will benefit from a national proportional/distribution of additional seats), this system is not likely to result in the inclusion of many of the weak groups that were excluded under the country's authoritarian regimes.
Even more important, the new rules of the game to be decided upon are likely to be formative and of great importance for a long period of time. Most powerful groups will adjust their machineries to the new institutions and thereafter change will be difficult.
Hence, it may also be crucial to consider the effects of different electoral systems on the possibility of not only undermining the remnants of authoritarianism but also consolidating and further developing democracy.
For the future, then, I would argue, experience from other relevant countries suggests that a proportional system in rather large constituencies may be preferable, especially if combined with decentralization, local elections and democratization of parties.
There are two major reasons for this. First, one-member constituencies are likely to promote personality-oriented politics and local boss-rule on the basis of guns, goons and gold -- plus ethnic and religious loyalties.
Second (and even worse), such boss-rule within a district system would make it extremely difficult for new concerned groups in civil society to enter politics by gradually organizing new mass movements and democratic parties based on societal interests and ideas -- thus compensating for their economic weakness and lack of muscle. They usually have to limit themselves to extra- parliamentary struggles, lobbying, and to betting on the least worst passion.
For instance, the above were the clear and frustrating experiences of democrats in cases such as the Philippines after Marcos.
In conclusion, while no electoral system is ideal, it may be important to consider the effects beyond the undermining of authoritarianism -- on the consolidation and further development of democracy.
The writer is professor of politics and development, at the University of Oslo, Norway.